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The present music market has shown an imbalance of interests in terms of economic, social 
and cultural interests. The present research has found that joint music copyrights management 
is responsible for this issue. Joint management organisations (JMOs) are competing with each 
other in an unfair market worldwide due to the lack of harmonised rules to standardize their 
behaviours. It is imperative to establish a promising international copyright legal framework 
for regulating their behaviours, providing a fairer and common arena for both CMOs and IMEs, 
enabling JMOs to fulfil multiple functions so as to strike a real balance of interests between 
copyright stakeholders in music industry. It would also facilitate the cross-border flow of 
musical works in the digital era where copyrighted musical works flow across borders easily. 
 
The proposed theoretical framework is formulated on the basis of Rawls’s justice theory which 
provides powerful and systematic explanation and standards to evaluate and design JMOs’ 
functions. The standard of multi-objective, named economic, social and cultural objectives, is 
proposed for balancing interests at stake, more precisely, justifying the interests of the least 
well-off. Therefore, this thesis examines and investigates the issues of unbalanced interests 
existing in cross-border copyright licensing in musical works and, accordingly, proposes to 
design a fairer copyright legal framework aiming to fulfil the multi-objective of copyright – 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
1.1 Overarching Background 
Do we need copyright law or not? The debate on the copyright question has lasted over decades 
between protectionism and libertarianism. Protectionism emphasises rightsholders’ “copyright” 
and advocates harsh copyright law for mitigating illegal file sharing. They believe copyright 
acts as an incentive to encourage more output of creative works, but free-riders cause the loss 
of copyright revenues. To enhance the protection of copyright, digital rights management 
(DRM) is allowed for individual management of exclusive rights1 and reinforcement of private 
rights. Also, extension of protective term is another measure adopted by legislators to 
strengthen rightsholders’ control. 2  By contrast, libertarianism advocates “copyleft”, 3  and 
emphasises individuals’ rights, eg the rights to development, education, and freedom of 
expression which are enshrined in the major international and regional instruments for the 
protection of human rights.4 It believes that persons should be free to use expression without 
governmental restraint, including restraint exercised on behalf of private rightsholders, and that 
an expansive public domain and broad fair use rights will benefit society by facilitating a more 
robust public discussion.5 Copyright laws seek to achieve a “balance” between the interests of 
rightsholders and users. It is argued that for considering the interests of the public domain,6 the 
interests of rightsholders and users should be reconciled usually by copyright limitations and 
exceptions (LEs), such as the common-law doctrines of fair use and fair dealing which are 
often explained and assessed by judges. However, this so-called “balance” is extremely hard 
to be defined and struck in practice.7  
                                                 
1 See Marcella Favale and Estelle Derclaye, ‘User Contracts (Demand Side)’ (2010) 18 Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law; Glynn S Lunney Jr, ‘The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 813. 
2 See Ashley Packard, ‘Copyright Term Extensions, the Public Domain and Intertextuality Intertwined’ (2002) 10 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law 1; Haochen Sun, ‘Copyright Law under Siege: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy 
of Copyright Protection in The Context of the Global Digital Divide’ (2005) 36 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 192. 
3 See Ira V. Heffan, ‘Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age Note’ (1996) 49 Stanford Law 
Review 1487. 
4 Sun (n 2). 
5 David McGowan, ‘Copyright Nonconsequentialism’ (2004) 69 Mo L Rev 1. 
6 Edward Samuels, ‘The Public Domain in Copyright Law Part I’ (1993) 41 J Copyright Soc'y USA 137. 
7 Christophe Geiger, ‘The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics can Influence the Shape 




In practice, this so-called balance has been broken from different aspects. For example, the 
present music market has shown imbalance of interests,8 and copyright has been losing its 
legitimacy9  and acceptance by the public. Ownership of musical works is internationally 
concentrated with three major corporate labels (Universal Music Group, Sony Music 
Entertainment and the Warner Music Group) controlling most of the world’s music market.10 
When musical works are controlled by music companies, digital musical works are still 
expensive and poor people cannot afford good music. 11 The announced balance has been 
broken by means of copyright licensing activities with the involvement of various 
intermediaries. These intermediaries join in the music market and keep forging new business 
models, such as locked cloud (eg iTunes, Google and Amazon) and online streaming services 
(eg Spotify, Deezer and Pandora). Rightsholders assign or transfer all or some of their rights 
by means of copyright licensing contracts to these online distributors, or named internet service 
providers (ISPs), authorising them to exploit their works on an industrial scale. The 
commercialisation of musical works has led to the “winner-take-all” or superstar model 
globally.12 In the music industry, the top 10% of creators receive a disproportionately large 
share of total income in the creative professions – for composers/songwriters about 80% of 
total income,13 and about two thirds of professional creators need second earnings to maintain 
their life.14 So, there is a contradiction in copyright practice in which creators’ economic rights 
                                                 
No13-06. 
8 See Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Aldershot ; Brookfield, USA : Dartmouth 1996); Adolf 
Dietz, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Collecting Societies and Cultural Diversity–A 
Missed Opportunity’ (2014) 3 International journal of music business research 7. 
9 See Christophe Geiger, ‘Fundamental Rights, A Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?’ 
(2004) 35 IIC 268. 
10 Roger Wallis and others, ‘Contested Collective Administration of Intellectual Property Rights in Music The 
Challenge to the Principles of Reciprocity and Solidarity’ (1999) 14 European Journal of Communication 5. 
11 Entertainment and Arts, ‘Music Streaming Services ‘Too Expensive for Many Non-subscribers'’ (BBC, 19 
October 2016)  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-37694909> accessed 26 October 2017;Martin 
Clayton, Trevor Herbert and Richard Middleton, The Cultural Study of Music: A Critical Introduction (Psychology 
Press 2003) 316. 
12  See Martin Kretschmer and others, ‘The Relationship between Copyright and Contract Law’ (2010) IP 
office;ibid 57; Peter DiCola, ‘Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians' Revenue and Lessons about 
Copyright Incentives’ (2013) 55 Ariz L Rev 301. 




have suffered on the one hand, but, on the other hand, the public believes that the current 
copyright legal framework over-protects rightsholders.15 
 
Although copyright scholars have paid sufficient attention to substantive copyright law, the 
area of joint copyrights management has been neglected all the time. As a sub-system of 
copyright law, joint copyrights management (JCM) systems, by means of collective 
management organisations (CMOs) and Independent Management Entities (IMEs), are 
committed to fulfilling the objectives of copyright law, ensuring copyright exercise is on the 
right track. Copyright law leaves copyright licensing activities, by means of CMOs and IMEs, 
to free copyright contracts. This means the music market, manipulated by intermediaries, 
decides the distribution of copyright revenues. It is the unregulated licensing market, rather 
than substantive copyright law, that has led to the imbalance of interests between stakeholders. 
Therefore, this study focuses on the area of JCM in the context of the copyright legal 
framework, rather than substantive copyright law itself.  
 
The scope of this research is defined in the music industry. First, music as an industry affects 
the economy to a large extent.16 Second, musical creations have no national boundaries since 
the appreciation of music is universal regardless of the different languages of lyrics. Copyright 
policy will dramatically affect not only creators’ copyright revenues and individual countries’ 
economy, but also affects people’s musical and cultural life. With respect to music copyrights, 
we are all interested parties, either as creators or as consumers. Third, by the very nature of the 
internet, musical works can be digitised, uploaded, downloaded, streamed, copied and 
distributed instantly all over the world. Digital files of music are comparatively small, so they 
easily flow across borders online. Unlike publishing businesses and the film industry which 
can be managed through individual contracts, it is impractical for musical works to be exercised 
by creators at individual level.17 Fourth, the composition of the copyright of musical works is 
                                                 
15 Justice Laddie, ‘Copyright: Over-Strength, Over-Regulated, Over-Rated?’ (1996) 18 European Intellectual 
Property Review 253. 
16 See IFPI, ‘Digital Music Report: Engine of a Digital World’ (2013) IFPI; IFPI, ‘Digital Music Report: Lighting 
Up New Markets’ (2014) IFPI; IFPI, ‘Global Music Report: Charting the Path to Sustainable Growth’ (2015) IFPI; 
IFPI, ‘Global Music Report: Music Consumption Exploding Worldwide’ (2016) IFPI. 
17 Henry Olsson, The Importance of Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (2005). 
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highly complex,18 especially those technological digital musical works that are popular in the 
digital era. It is necessary to identify proprietary rights and simplify the licensing process of 
musical works. Different categories of copyrighted works have distinctive natures, copyright 
policies should not be equally applied to all of them without specific considerations. As such, 
this study chooses the music industry as the research subject. Despite the fact that the 
significance and importance of music licensing have been recognised in some developed 
countries, the goal of copyright justice would never be fulfilled without a coherent and unified 
global copyright legal framework. For researching the existing copyright issues and 
recommending a more balanced copyright legal framework, the aim and hypothesis of this 
research will be set forth in the following sections.  
 
1.2 The Research Aim and Hypothesis 
This project addresses some key preliminary questions as to whether establishing an 
international legal framework for copyright management of musical works is feasible and 
rational, and accordingly aims to identify the key issues. Its purpose is not to devise concrete 
provisions at a global level for regulating global copyright management but, the key aim is to 
propose a copyright legal framework which based on a more justifiable theoretical framework, 
to regulate global copyright licensing practice in musical works by means of CMOs and IMEs, 
for the purpose of balancing interests, in particular for those disadvantaged, and enhancing 
copyright’s legitimacy.  
 
The hypothesis of this study is that it is feasible to establish a global repertoire database as a 
common infrastructure, which all copyright stakeholders, including rightsholders, users, and 
the society as a whole, would benefit from. In doing so, the licensing activities by means of 
CMOs and IMEs are able to be tracked and supervised by internal and external authorities. 
More importantly, joint management organisations (JMOs)’ licensing activities, including both 
copyright contracts between JMOs with creators and with users, should be regulated by a 
common global copyright regulatory law. As an important pillar of a copyright legal framework, 
                                                 
18 See more discussion in section 6.5.1.5. 
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this copyright regulatory law is feasible and imperative in such a digital era where cross-border 
dissemination and distribution of musical works happen easily and frequently.  
 
1.3 Clarification of Some Terminologies in This Research  
In this research, rightsholder refers to a person or legal entity who owns in whole or in part of 
the copyrights to a musical work. Copyright is a bundle of rights protected by copyright law, 
so this research adopts the term of rightsholder rather than rightsholder. Since copyright can be 
transferred partly or wholly from one holder to another, rightsholders are not necessarily the 
person(s) who create the musical works. Rightsholders include small and large rightsholders.  
 
Small rightsholders in this study are those individual music creators who receive small amount 
of royalty payments from JMOs who manage copyrights on their behalf.19 Some terms referred 
to small rightsholders are interchangeably used, including small creators, individual creators, 
infamous music creators. They are weak party in copyright licensing negotiation. 80-90% 
music creators are small rightsholders. In Rawls’s justice theory, they are less well-off group 
or least advantaged members of a society.  
 
By comparison, large rightsholders are legal entities who receive large amount of royalty 
payments from JMOs or directly from music business.20 They usually acquire copyrights in 
part or in whole of a musical work from a former rightsholder or music creator(s) by assigning 
copyright licensing contracts and very few music superstars. They are not music creators. But, 
they are the “winners” of music market who receive 80-90% revenues of total income. Large 
rightsholders include music producers, publishers, other types of music companies and few 
music superstars who manage music copyrights individually. In copyright licensing negotiation, 
they are stronger party. In Rawls’s justice theory, they are advantaged members or more 
favoured group. 
 
                                                 
19  See PWC, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright, Secondary Copyright and Collective Licensing’ 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/766._org__attachment_2_2011_pwc_final_report.pdf> accessed 




Music creators in this research include all types of musicians, such as composers, songwriters, 
arrangers, synthesizer programmers, mixers and remixers. They may be famous or infamous 
music artists or ordinary people who create music. Famous musicians refer to talented or gifted 
music creators who have been favoured by nature according to Rawls’s theory. Music users 
include both individuals and organisations who exploit musical works for personal use or for 
business purpose. For simplifying the expression, in this study the research on users’ rights 
refers to individual users’ rights. 
 
1.4 Existing Literatures 
This section is a survey of publications in the area of global joint management of copyrights in 
musical works. It, therefore, structures and builds upon these general questions for examining 
the existing studies to create a map of what has been done and, accordingly, narrowing down 
the research gaps for the present thesis. This review includes some core literature relating to 
the discussed issues, especially European Union (EU) and United States (US) studies. This is 
because, firstly, research in this area at the global level is very limited, and, secondly, the EU 
covers different jurisdictions that can be a case study for the present research of cross-border 
copyright licensing.  
 
1.4.1 Studies on Joint Copyrights Management in Musical Works 
IMEs have become increasingly prevalent and playing important role in copyright licensing 
practice. However, research in JCM is insufficient, in particular IMEs and their relations to 
CMOs. The literature on JMOs is still in its infancy. Only a few studies have established 
comparative relations between CMOs and IMEs. 21  Ficsor contends that ‘CMOs and such 
business-type bodies may very well exist and function side by side in “peaceful coexistence”, 
and they may also establish alliances – “coalitions” – in order to pursue common interests or 
exercise and/or enforce certain rights together’.22 This position is doubtful, as in practice IMEs 
perform better than CMOs in terms of satisfying member rightsholders’ economic interests and 
                                                 
21 See Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, vol 855 (WIPO 2002) 
22 Ibid, 23. 
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have threatened the existence of CMOs.23 With the emergence of various new models of IMEs 
and online music distributors, a comprehensive study on JMOs is needed for comparing their 
roles with CMOs and redefining their functions in the context of online copyright licensing in 
music works. 
 
Unlike CMOs, too little attention has been paid to IMEs by academia. There is not a universally 
accepted term to them. In some studies, IMEs have been referred to as large-scale users, 
business-type bodies, business-type rights clearance, business-type managers, private for-profit 
online platforms, for-profit joint rights management organisations, profit-maximizing 
independent supplier, or profit-maximizing firms.24 The EU Directive 201425 has firstly named 
them as IMEs, and this thesis adopts this name. Ficsor states that IME is one of the two basic 
systems of the joint exercise of rights.26 He suggests that the only or nearly exclusive task of 
IMEs is the collection and transfer of royalties as quickly, precisely, cheaply and as much in 
proportion with the value and actual use of the productions involved as possible.27 Different 
from CMOs which are mostly not-for-profit organisations, the main feature of IMEs is the 
nature of for-profit. Another important feature of IMEs, such as publishers and record 
companies who manage copyright as well, is that they do not play a role in social and cultural 
activities.28  
 
Whether IMEs or CMOs perform better in terms of social welfare maximization, so far there 
is no consensus. For example, Besen, Kirby and Salop29 and Watt30 believe that a monopolistic 
rational CMO unrestricted by regulation and with imperfect price discrimination among new 
                                                 
23 This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
24 See generally Ficsor (n 21); Christian Handke, ‘Joint Copyrights Management by Collecting Societies and 
Online Platforms: An Economic Analysis’ (2016) <http://www.serci.org/2015/Handke.pdf> accessed 3 March 
2018. 
25 Directive 2014/26/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council of 26 February 2014 on collective 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online 
use in the internal market. 
26 Ficsor (n 21). 
27 ibid. 
28 Nérisson (n 48). 
29 Stanley M Besen, Sheila N Kirby and Steven C Salop, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives’ (1992) 
78 Virginia Law Review 383. 
30 See Richard Watt, Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends Or Foes? (E. Elgar 2000). 
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members will limit membership, and thus the supply of works available under JCM. They argue 
that an independent, profit-maximizing JMO will perform better by including a socially optimal 
number of works into its license. 31  On the contrary, Handke argues that the superior 
performance of IMEs in approximating the optimal repertoire size available under a joint 
licence does not necessarily translate into a superior performance regarding social welfare.32 
In the absence of a unified legal framework, Mazziotti suggests that reform plans like that 
undertaken by the EU Commission in the online music sector are likely to fail if EU lawmakers 
do not create a common playing field for CMOs.33 Thus, it is necessary to investigate and 
compare the social and cultural functions between both CMOs and IMEs and to identify which 
model is performing its social function better. Also, it is necessary to examine carefully the 
different types of IMEs and their nature, features and how they function in the music market, 
and more importantly, to research the question of how to locate IMEs on the same market with 
CMOs under the premise that they do perform the same obligations as CMOs and do not harm 
CMOs’ activities. 
 
1.4.2 Research on JMOs’ Functions 
Economic justification of copyright covers a wide range of topics with various arguments either 
through, eg a law and economics approach or a political economy one, the effect of copyright 
and its doctrines on markets and the administration of copyright.34 Study on the economics of 
copyright only really started to develop in the 1980s, yet it has been of increasing importance 
and a substantial amount of literature has appeared in recent years. The economics of copying 
deals with impacts on the economy that derive from technical means of reproduction, whereas 
the economics of copyright focuses on impacts of the legal framework. In this study, CMOs’ 
economic function refers to financial aspects of copyright and the impact of copyrights on 
societal economy.35 For defining the scope of the present thesis, this study divides the literature 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Handke (n 24). 
33 Giuseppe Mazziotti, ‘Managing online music rights in the European Digital Single Market: current scenarios 
and future prospects’ in Jan Rosén (ed), Intellectual Property at the Crossroads of Trade (EE 2012) 142. 
34 Handke (n 24). 
35 More Discussion About the Investigation of Economics and Copyright, See Ruth Towse, Christian Handke and 
Paul Stepan, ‘The Economics of Copyright Law: A Stocktake of the Literature’ (2008) 5 Review of Economic 
Research on Copyright.  
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of economics of copyrights into two main branches – the study of copyright markets and the 
study of copyright law from an economic perspective. This thesis mainly discusses the first 
branch of issues, and more specifically, the market of joint management of copyrights in the 
music industry.  
 
CCM has attracted a lot of attention to economists. As to the economic justification of CMOs, 
economic literature discusses collective copyright management (CCM) as a response to 
relatively high transaction costs in complex markets for copyright works.36 CCM reduces the 
average transaction costs per transaction and the total number of transactions under a broad 
range of conditions. 37  Economists argue that CMOs reduce transaction costs for authors, 
rightsholders, and particularly in favour of users. Moreover, Richard Wattadds another 
justification of CCM. He points out that having copyrights managed as an aggregate repertory, 
rather than individually, is based on risk-pooling and risk-sharing through the contracts 
between the members themselves. 38  Similarly, based on the theory of syndicates, CMOs 
themselves should exist because they offer a blanket license of an entire repertoire which have 
aggregation benefits of licensing, but smaller sub-sets do not have such benefits.39  
 
Ariel Katz criticises that the case for performing rights organisations (PROs) is not as 
straightforward as it is assumed to be, because many of the underlying cost efficiencies that are 
attributed to PROs, are usually simply assumed and, in many cases, could be equally achieved 
under less restrictive arrangements.40 He argues that the rationale of costs-reduction for CMOs 
no longer holds, and the productive inefficiency of CMOs is inevitable.41 Members should not 
                                                 
36 Christian Handke, ‘Collective Administration’ (2014) Chapters 179; KEA 2012 KEA, Licensing Music Works 
and Transaction Costs in Europe (2012) Vrije Universiteit Brussel; Ruth Towse and Christian Handke, ‘Regulating 
Copyright Collecting Societies: Current Policy in Europe’ (2007) Society for Economic Research on Copyright 
Issues (SERCI) Annual Congress SERCI; Gerd Hansen and Albrecht Bischoffshausen, ‘Economic Functions of 
Collecting Societies-Collective Rights Management in the Light of Transaction Cost-and Information Economics’ 
(2007) 6 GRUR 17. 
37 Handke (n 24). 
38 Richard Watt, ‘The Efficiencies of Aggregation: An Economic Theory Perspective on Collective Management 
of Copyright’ (2015) 12 Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 26. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ariel Katz, ‘Commentary: Is Collective Administration of Copyrights Justified by the Economic Literature?’ 




be restricted from exiting of CMOs. He believes the advancements in information technology 
can render CMOs unnecessary.42 Whether this view has exaggerated the function of technology 
needs further research. All the above contradictory arguments have indicated that CMOs’ 
function needs to be justified from a new perspective rather than economic analysis, 
particularly in digital era. 
 
The existing research of the social function of copyright law is not systematic, but fragmented. 
Generally, scholars adopt different methodologies on the discussion of this topic, including 
economic analysis, positive analysis and doctrinal analysis. In the context of copyright law, 
there is not a unified term for its social function.43 Literature discusses social function of 
copyright law on the basis of a range of broad relevant topics, eg balance of interests, social 
welfare, LEs, public domain, user’s rights, or consumer’s rights, compulsory licences, and 
social-cultural deductions. 44  From the survey of existing literature on social function of 
copyright law, most are positive analysis which mainly focuses on the discussion of the Berne 
“three-step test”. 45  Economic justification of social function is based on the reduction of 
transaction costs that benefits rights-users. From doctrinal analysis perspective, social function 
is usually interpreted as LEs to copyright. In common law jurisdiction, social function is 
justified by the “fair use” and “fair dealing” doctrine. Recently, the concept of users’ rights as 
the component part of rightsholders has been proposed in Canada,46 but not fully developed 
either recognised at international level. Particularly at global level, research of social function 
is very limited. Most studies of this topic stay at national level. There is not such a concept of 
international general interest. Due to the fact that musical works flow in a borderless internet 
world, the research of international public interest is necessary and has to be done. Relevant 
                                                 
42 ibid. 
43 Geiger, ‘The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics can Influence the Shape and Use 
of IP Law’;ibid. 
44 See generally Geiger ibid; Hugh Breakey, ‘User’s Rights and the Public Domain’ (2010) 3 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 312; Jessica Litman, ‘The Public Domain’ (1990) 39 Emory Lj 965; Sylvie Nérisson, ‘Social Functions 
of Collective Management Societies (CMS)-Provisory Conclusions’ (2007); Kathleen K Olson, ‘Preserving the 
Copyright Balance: Statutory and Constitutional Preemption of Contract-Based Claims’ (2006) 11 
Communication Law and Policy 83; Myra Tawfik, ‘International Copyright Law and ‘Fair Dealing’ As a “User 
Right”’ (2005) E-Copyright Bulletin; Edward Samuels, ‘The Public Domain Revisited’ (2002) 36 Loy LAL Rev 
389. 
45 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (9 September 1886), Article 9(2). 
46 See more discussion in section 5.2.2. 
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literature of social function of copyright law remains scattered and can hardly provide 
convincing explanation to copyright LEs. Library exceptions play an important role in the 
social function of copyright in digital era. In the legal research area, however, library 
exceptions which represent public interest, have not drawn the attention of legal researchers. 
Generally, there is a lack of systematic analysis of social function of copyright legal system. 
 
Musical works as a type of cultural goods have cultural features. However, research of 
copyright licensing in musical works has hardly been done from the perspective of cultural 
goods. Most IP studies regard musical works as economic goods rather than exploring their 
cultural function. CMOs’ cultural function, even not all CMOs have, should be one of the most 
important features which differ from other types of intermediaries such as IMEs. It has been 
argued that the goals of protecting authors’ rights go hand in hand with the promotion of 
cultural diversity. 47  The significance of the cultural value of copyrighted works has been 
realised. However, the study on the enforcement of JMOs’ cultural function at global level is 
not enough. In practice, the fulfilment of cultural function at national level is usually in forms 
of deductions that are made from collected royalties for cultural and social purposes.48 It is 
questionable whether the cultural function of musical goods is affiliated to the protection of 
creators’ copyrights. Cultural values of musical works should be examined from an 
independent value judgement. 
 
Generally, most scholars discuss copyright issues from the economic perspective, but neglect 
to justify the cultural value of cultural goods, and to analyse its relation to other functions. They 
have also neglected to examine the international copyright policy which aims to maintain and 
promote cultural diversity, and to research which concrete provisions, rather than being written 
as a strategical recital, can be legislated to fulfil this goal. Another important question is, in the 
global context, how to foster worldwide cultural diversity through enforceable and feasible 
                                                 
47  Thierry Desurmont, ‘Considerations on the Relationship between the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the Protection of Authors’ Rights’ (2006) 208 Revue 
Internationale du Droit d’Auteur. 
48 See Sylvie Nérisson, ‘Social Functions of Collective Management Societies (CMS) Provisory Conclusions’ 
(2007) <http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-A4E8-9> accessed 1 June 2017. 
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strategies. Some scholars have proposed to protect small rightsholders’ interests and preserve 
the smallest CMOs from small countries. However, they have not conducted any theoretical 
discussion to justify small rightsholders’ and small CMOs’ interests from the perspective of 
legal theories rather than political research. In a nutshell, the existing literature usually justifies 
JMOs’ role from the perspective of economic justification, especially in terms of collection 
and distribution of earnings to their members. They neglect studies from other perspectives, 
such as social and cultural ones, to evaluate CMOs’ roles. They are also neglected in the general 
literature on the music industry, and that which focuses on the specific effects of digitalisation. 
 
11.4.3 Harmonisation of Legislation at the Global Level 
The topic of harmonisation of copyright law at the global level has hardly been touched, either 
the regulation of JCM in the music market. There is not a consensus among academics to this 
issue. The debate among academics on whether CCM should be regulated by legislation has 
never stopped. Globally, in practice, some CMOs are supervised and regulated by national 
regulation, but some are not.49 National arrangements differ and range from direct political 
control or continuous scrutiny by specialised supervisory bodies to a simple application of 
competition and contract law.50 In the EU, there was a lengthy debate as to the question whether 
it is appropriate to harmonise EU copyright law to regulate CMOs. EU scholars have distinct 
opinions. Some support a hard-law approach, eg Kretschmer in favour a scenario in which 
CMOs would be unequivocally treated as regulatory instruments;51 Matulionyte argues that 
diverging requirements from national law makes cross-border collective management in some 
cases impossible, and highly burdensome in others;52 Towse and Hanke contend that a pan-
European monopoly might be the most efficient solution, if properly regulated;53 Watt believes 
                                                 
49 Adolf Dietz, ‘Legal Regulation of Collective Management of Copyright (Collecting Societies Law) in Western 
and Eastern Europe’ (2001) 49 J Copyright Soc'y USA 897. 
50 Fabrice Rochelandet, ‘Are Copyright Collecting Societies Efficient Organisations? An Evaluation of Collective 
Administration of Copyright in Europe’ (2003) The economics of copyright: Developments in research and 
analysis 176; Stanley M Besen and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, ‘Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying 
Royalties’ (1989) 32 The Journal of Law and Economics 255; Besen, Kirby and Salop (n 29). 
51  Martin Kretschmer, ‘The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright 
Societies as Regulatory Instruments’ (2002) 24 European Intellectual Property Review 126.  
52 Rita Matulionytė, ‘Cross‐Border Collective Management and Principle of Territoriality: Problems and Possible 
Solutions in the EU’ (2008) 11 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 467. 
53 Towse and Handke (n 36). 
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that, when the CMO is a natural monopoly, public supervision and regulation would promote 
efficiency;54 Matulionyte points out that CMOs protect social-cultural values rather than mere 
economic interests, so they should not be subject to free competition.55 Some partly support a 
hard-law approach, eg Dietzagrees the legislative initiative on certain aspects of collective 
management and good governance of CMOs; 56  Tuma concludes four areas need to be 
harmonised by law: 57  CMOs’ legal status, the issue of relationships between CMOs and 
rightsholders, between CMOs and users, and the issue of small users, and relationships among 
the CMOs. Merges doubts the hard-law initiative and argues that the legislature or judiciary is 
inherently inferior to industry insiders in shaping a proper framework for the commercialisation 
of copyrights.58 To him, spontaneously founded CMOs illustrate the ability of the industry to 
create its own solutions on the basis of property rights.  
 
As to whether it is necessary to regulate copyright licensing activities by IMEs at the global 
level, the research in this area is extremely insufficient. None of the prior research has touched 
on this issue yet due to the fact that these related areas of the law remain to a large extent 
nationally determined, influenced by the legal tradition of each country, where significant 
differences appear between common law and civil law systems.59 In practice, most copyright 
licensing and copyrights assignment60 happen by means of copyright contracts. Also, IMEs 
have been playing an increasingly important role in copyright contractual activities. However, 
this part has been constantly neglected by policy-makers and academia. Recently, some 
regulatory proposals point out the necessity to establish an international IP contract law,61 since 
                                                 
54 Richard Watt, Handbook on the Economics of Copyright: A Guide for Students and Teachers (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2014). 
55 Matulionyte (n 52). 
56 Adolf Dietz, ‘European Parliament versus Commission: How to Deal With Collecting Societies?’ (2005) 
Auteurs & media 205. 
57 Pavel Tuma, ‘Pitfalls and Challenges of the EC Directive on the Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights’’ (2006) 4 EIPR 220 at 220. 
58  Robert P Merges, ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organisations’ (1996) 84 California Law Review 1293. 
59 Lucie Guibault, ‘Book Review: Jacques de Werra (ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Licensing’ 
(2013) 4 JIPITEC 249.  
60 Assignment means copyrights of a work being transferred from one right-holder(s) to the other in which the 
right-holder(s) lose part or whole of the copyrights. 
61 See Jacques De Werra, ‘Moving Beyond the Conflict Between Freedom of Contract and Copyright Policies: In 
Search of a New Global Policy for On-Line Information Licensing Transaction: A Comparative Analysis Between 
US Law and European Law’ (2003) 25 Colum JL & Arts 239; James Griffin, ‘The Interface Between Copyright 
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there are no uniform international private rules to deal with copyright contractual disputes at 
the international level.62 However, it is still questionable whether a separate copyright contract 
law is needed. It can hardly find any systematic study on copyright legal framework by which 
to regulate copyright licensing contracts by both CMOs and IMEs at international level in a 
consistent way. 
 
Regionally, the EU has published Directive 201463 to harmonise collective management and 
multi-territorial licensing of copyrights in musical works for online uses. For the first time, 
JCM by means of CMOs and IMEs has been regulated by an integrated piece of legislation at 
the regional level. Some literature has commented on this Directive for the benefit of the EU.64 
The debate, indeed, helps to improve the evolvement of the Directive. This thesis will draw on 
this debate, taking the EU as a case study of regional harmonisation for drawing lessons from 
its experience to design the legal framework of JCM at the global level. 
 
Apart from hard-law approaches, there are some alternative proposals, eg a soft-law 
approach,65 national supervised arrangements for dispute settlement between CMOs and their 
members.66 Some scholars are in favour of the requirements of transparency and efficiency and 
supervision of CMOs’ operation in order to ensure good functioning of CMOs.67 Different 
forms and extents of supervision and public control on the operation of CMOs exist in countries 
                                                 
and Contract: Suggestions for the Future’ (2011) University Of Exeter; Brennan Lorin and Dodd Jeff, ‘A Concept 
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62 See De Werra (n 61). 
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64 See generally eg Josef Drexl and others, ‘Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and 
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(Guidelines which eventually is transposed into a code of conduct, has been recommended.) 
66 Towse and Handke (n 36). 
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around the world – for example, supervision of the establishment by a public authority: the 
Ministry of Culture in France and Spain; the Ministry of Justice or the Patent Office in Germany; 
the self-regulatory framework approach in UK; civil courts supervision over all disputes in 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; specialist copyright tribunals in Australia; and 
Government department supervision in Canada and Denmark, supervised by the general law 
of competition and the powers of the competition authorities.68 However, hardly any in depth 
analysis can be found on these different approaches – either on the legitimacy and competence 
of institutional supervision on CMOs at the international level, or the comparison of the 
effectiveness of these supervisory approaches.  
 
1.4.4 Summary  
The existing literature shows an unbalanced research trend within the area of copyright, in 
particular JCM. Literature on the CCM in musical works is often at the national and EU level. 
Little attention is given to JCM at the international level. A range of excellent research studies 
from the perspective of economic analysis have been done; and along with the development of 
new models of copyright licensing in practice, economic analysis has been developing further 
to study the economic functions of IMEs. However, hardly any literature on the social and 
cultural functions played by JMOs can be found.  
 
In the literature on innovation and the music industry very little attention is given to the role of 
CMOs beyond the distribution of royalties to artists. Although the social-cultural role of CMOs 
have been overlooked in music studies, it has attracted the attention of legal scholars and 
economists. Some scholars have emphasised the importance of CMOs’ social-cultural 
functions. However, they have not proven how important social-cultural functions are and how 
these functions interact with the economic function. There is a lack of normative analysis of 
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the economic, social and cultural functions of copyright legal system. A systematic analysis of 
these three main interactive functions in the music industry is needed since copyrights in 
musical works, in particular in the internet world, are even more complex than other areas. 
 
Yet, the literature on the role of IMEs is even less. Thus, as the joint management model on 
the current music market is more popular, a deep research on IMEs as well as their relations 
with CMOs is imperative. CCM in musical works has caught the notice of European policy 
makers, in particular those who regulate competition. However, some core issues still exist that 
need further convincing evidence. For example, the one-stop-shop cross-border licensing 
model is deemed a violation to competition law, so it has been negated by EU policy makers.69 
Moreover, due to the rapid development of technology, the means of copyright licensing 
activities have changed dramatically in the environment of borderless internet world. Literature 
in private international law and copyright contracts has been out-dated to balance the interests 
between licensors and licensees.70 A more balanced private international law system to protect 
rightsholders’ interests, in particular individual creators’ interests, has to be explored.  
 
As to the regulation of JCM in the music market, there is not a consensus among academics. 
Although EU policy makers have published Directive 2014 to harmonise collective 
management of copyrights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works at the 
minimum level, the debates have never stopped. At the global level, this tough topic has not 
drawn scholars’ attention yet. Based on the identified research gaps discussed above, a range 
of objectives have motivated the present study to research these issues further – for better 
protecting individual creators’ economic interests; for promoting free cross-border flow of 
musical works between developed and developing countries; for balancing the public interest 
at international level and enhancing the public acceptance of copyright law; and for maintaining 
cultural diversity for the whole society.  
 
                                                 
69 See more discussion in section 6.5.2. 
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1.5 Research Objectives  
To achieve the aim above, with the consideration of the main legal issues within the area of 
copyright licensing of musical works at a global level, the present research objectives are set 
forth as follows:  
(1) Establishing the theoretical framework 
Establishing a theoretical framework based on the Rawls’s theory of justiceto underpin 
a copyright legal framework. As an important part of copyright law, the regulation for 
commercial copyright law has to rely on a philosophical theory for law and policy goals 
towards which the new policy is directed.  
 
(2)  Functionalising JMOs 
a. Establishing a systematic framework of multi-objectives of copyright law based on 
Rawls’s justice theory, to functionalise JMOs and standardise their management 
activities in a just way;  
b. Assessing the performance of traditional CMOs and their international cooperation;  
c. Examining the functions of IMEs and the current copyright licensing of the music 
market; 
d. Investigating the pros and cons of the EU’s approach to cross-border copyright licensing.  
 
(3) Evaluating economic fairness 
a. Assessing the existing copyright legal framework to investigate whether it fulfils the 
objective of economic fairness; 
b. Justifying copyright’s economic function of fairness in terms of Rawls’s justice theory; 
c. Examining legal issues related to copyright contracts in the context of choice of law 
rules; Evaluating how exploitation contracts override small rightsholders’ legitimate 
rights, whether or not it is necessary to regulate the first ownership rule; 
d. Assessing how to improve the bargaining outcome of small creators in international 
copyright contracts. 





(4) Evaluating social justice and cultural diversity 
a. Assessing the social function of current copyright law by the objective of social justice;  
b. Examining the jurisdictional rationales of copyright LEs, and evaluating to what extent 
the current LEs have been respected by national laws; 
c. Justifying users’ rights in a defined scope and public interest at the international level;  
d. Justifying the LEs for the purposes of study, research and education at the international 
level;  
e. Evaluating the values of cultural diversity in musical works; investigating the 
interactions between copyright law and maintenance of cultural diversity. 
 
(5) Recommending a global repertoire platform 
a. Justifying the establishment of a new model of global repertoire platform (GRP) as a 
common infrastructure to facilitate cross-border copyright management in musical 
works, and remove the hurdles to the cross-border flow of musical works; 
b. Assessing the justness of CMOs and IMEs by the proposed theoretical framework; 
c. Examining legal obstacles to set up GRP and assess how to overcome such legal barriers; 
71 
d. Evaluating the governance and supervision on CMOs internally and externally for 
enhancing their abilities to attract more rightsholders to join in and expand the 
international music repertoire. 
 
1.6 Methodology – Mixed-method Approach 
Legal research may be carried out for varied reasons. The aim of this research is to explore an 
appropriate theoretical and legal framework for JCM in musical works. In order to attain it, this 
thesis will identify the sources of copyright law applicable to understanding the legal problems 
in this area, and then recommend a solution to the problems that have been identified. The 
                                                 
71 The regulatory constraints relating to the collective management for the online distribution of musical works 
are hurdles for cross-border flow of intellectual assets. See Jacques de Werra, ‘What Legal Framework for 
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research will investigate economic, social and cultural implications of the current and 
suggested copyright law. This section will identify the appropriate methodology which will 
guide the present thesis along with a justification of why this particular methodology has been 
chosen. It starts with a brief introduction of the existing methodologies of legal research with 
the explanation of their advantages and disadvantages. Then it discusses the methodology of 
the present thesis and demonstrates why this mixed-methods approach has been chosen and 
how it will help the current research process.  
 
The methodologies nowadays being employed to study issues in copyright law have covered 
both doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches. Some are purely theoretical research on the nature 
of copyrights; some relate legal research to other disciplines, eg economic analysis of 
copyrights, copyright and human rights, historical analysis of copyrights, and other empirical 
studies. The goal of this thesis is to explore a balanced legal framework for global JCM in 
musical works. For justifying this legal framework, Rawls’s theory of justice is applied as a 
theoretical framework to underpin the proposed legal framework, which is, at the same time, 
used to analyse and assess the fairness of the relevant existing principles and rules. By doing 
so, a functionalised model of JMO will be proposed. Due to the multi-purpose project 
objectives, a mixed methods approach would be an appropriate methodology to deal with 
different issues for a specific purpose in a more effective way. Following this section, a brief 
introduction of the mixed methods methodology approach, will be addressed prior to justifying 
its choice for the present thesis, which consists of a combination of both doctrinal and non-
doctrinal approaches using a comparative legal method. 
  
The mixed method approach, also called ‘multi-methodology’ is a methodology for conducting 
research that involves collecting, analysing, integrating and mixing quantitative and qualitative 
research (and data) in a single study or a longitudinal program of inquiry.72 The advantages of 
this form of research is that both qualitative and quantitative research, in combination, provides 
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a better understanding of a research problem or issue than either research approach alone.73 
The convergence of the data collected by all methods in a study, as well as the answers to 
research questions from a number of perspectives, can enhance the credibility of the research 
findings, and ultimately fortifies and enriches a study’s conclusions.74 A study’s findings may 
raise questions or contradictions that will require clarification. The desired effect of the multi-
methodology would be to add new insights to existing theories on the phenomenon under 
examination. All of these reasons provide strong arguments for considering a mixed-methods 
approach for this study.  
 
As discussed above, doctrinal analysis is a basic and fundamental legal research method to 
identify issues and to examine the current state of legal doctrine. Socio-legal analysis is law-
in-context that helps to reform the present law. Research into the current state of legal doctrine 
can hardly be pursued through the methods of socio-legal studies, whilst the strictly doctrinal 
approach of the black-letter methodology is incapable of analysing policy and moral questions 
effectively.75 Political researchers have too often focused on outcomes and ignored doctrine. 
Legal researchers have studied doctrine as pure legal reasoning, without recognizing its 
political component.76 A researcher who performs socio-legal research critiques and comments 
on legal doctrine and practices from the perspective of different sciences likes economics, 
politics and sociology.77 Thus, this thesis will choose different methods where it is appropriate 
to the research questions. 
 
At a macro level, this thesis will start with legal theory research according to the theoretical 
framework of copyright and its sub-system – JCM law, aiming to establish a fundamental 
underpinning for the proposed legal framework. Specifically, it will apply Rawls’s justice 
principles as an explanation for assessing and justifying per se rules that favour the minority 
or weaker party’s interests. At the micro level, black-letter analysis will be adopted throughout 
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the chapters to examine the issues existing nationally, regionally and globally within the current 
legal framework of copyright licensing. In addition, since the main topic is concerned with the 
management of copyrights in musical works which will, theoretically, influence all social 
people’s interests (whether they are creators or consumers of musical works), a socio-legal 
approach will be an ideal method to evaluate the social impact of legislation. For justifying the 
multiple-functions of CMOs, the socio-legal research of law and economics will be used to 
discuss the CMOs’ economic function; law and cultural diversity will be used to discuss CMOs’ 
cultural function; and the CMOs’ social function will involve the discussion of law and human 
rights. Moreover, since this study will be conducted from an international perspective, 
comparative methods will also be utilised to compare different legal measures between national 
laws; and as EU law covers different jurisdictions, this regional harmonisation will also be a 
case study for the present study of global regulation of global JCM. This approach is expected 
to yield a more sensible solution than if more national laws were taken into consideration. 
 
To sum up, this thesis adopts mixed method approach of multi-methodology to systematically 
discuss the due functions of copyright law and JCM organisations. This will be achieved by 
intensively evaluating the adequacy of existing rules based on black-letter analysis; and to 
recommend changes to the existing legislation found to be requiring reform, which is based on 
socio-legal analysis; and all of the evaluating research and recommendations will be based on 
the doctrinal analysis – jurisprudence of justice – to assess and evaluate the due functions of 
copyright law and its sub-legal-system; meanwhile, 1 between different jurisdictions will also 
be used to explore a more justifiable legal framework. 
 
1.7 Overview of Chapters  
This thesis begins with a brief introduction of the overarching background and context and 
motivation in Chapter 1. It puts forward the core general issues of the imbalance in copyright 
law, which is then followed by the research aim of establishing a more balanced copyright legal 
framework, and the hypothesis that it is possible and feasible to establish a global JCM 
framework in musical works. In order to achieve this aim, it specifies several objectives to 
design a just copyright legal system. Some core terminologies used in the study which may be 
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slightly different in the meaning used in other papers, are clarified in section 1.3. Then, section 
1.4 examines what has been done in the area of global joint copyrights management in musical 
works for the purpose of identifying relevant legal issues and narrowing down research gaps. 
To avoid overlapping research, and bridge the gaps which are important but neglected in this 
area, section 1.4 reviews the core literature related to copyright theories, the roles of CCM and 
other JCM organisations, as well as the regulatory scenario of copyright licensing activities. A 
truly comprehensive review is probably impossible and unnecessary for this thesis; therefore, 
literature has been chosen according to the defined scope of this thesis. The main research 
objectives of this thesis are described in section 1.5. Section 1.6 demonstrates the methodology 
adopted in this study. Generally, this study adopts a multi-methodology to systematically 
analyse the due functions of copyright law and its sub-systems of joint management copyright 
law. Since the project is carried out in the context of cross-border JCM, it will, unavoidably, 
need to examine and compare national laws on the related legal issues between different 
jurisdictions.  
  
Chapter 2 examines the existing copyright theories and assesses if they have fulfilled the 
objectives of balancing interests at stake, and then proposes a nuanced theoretical framework 
to reconstruct the copyright legal framework, aiming to restore the balance between 
stakeholders and fulfil the ultimate goals of justice in the distribution of copyrighted works. 
Rawls’s theory of justice has been chosen to underpin the proposed theoretical framework, by 
which the current copyright legal framework will be examined and assessed. In this chapter, it 
will also demonstrate why Rawls’s theory is better for justifying the interests of the 
disadvantaged and the public interest, and how to apply it to design the multi-objective system 
to the copyright legal framework, particularly to the multifunction of JMOs.   
 
Chapter 3 researches deeper into the topic of the theoretical framework, aiming to establish a 
concrete multi-objective system based on Rawls’s theory for the purpose of functionalising the 
current JMOs. It starts with the investigation of the music licensing market by different models 
of CMOs and IMEs. It aims to compare their different natures, features, obligations and identify 
some core legal issues within the unregulated licensing market. Then it takes the EU’s hard-
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law approach as a case study to evaluate its pros and cons to regulate cross-border copyrights 
management at an international level. Then, the nuanced theoretical framework will be adopted 
to assess the functions of JMOs with the aim of standardising their licensing activities in the 
digital era. To identify the specific issues of the current copyright legal framework in the chosen 
area, a multi-objective system based on Rawls’s theory, will be established to assess the 
economic, social and cultural objectives of copyright law and its sub-systems.  
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explore the relevant legal issues in detail, respectively. Chapter 4 
focuses on the discussion of economic fairness. It examines the existing international copyright 
legal framework to ascertain whether current copyright law fulfils economic fairness. Then it 
adopts the objective of economic fairness to justify small rightsholders’ as well as potential 
creators’ economic interests. Then it assesses the fairness of JMOs’ copyright licensing 
activities by means of various copyright contracts. Since cross-border copyright licensing 
involves choice of law rules, the discussion of copyright contract issues will be carried out in 
the context of private international law. Chapter 5 mainly studies the legal issues related to 
social and cultural objectives of copyright law. Due to some misperceptions as regards to the 
social function of copyright, this chapter starts with the definition of social function and then 
examines to what extent the current copyright LEs system in copyright treaties has been 
respected by national law. Then it defines the scope of the public and users’ interests and 
justifies some users’ legitimate rights based on Rawls’s theory. In doing so, the LEs for the 
purposes of study, research and education, will be justified as a uses’ right which should be 
granted the equal legal position as to copyrights. At the end of this chapter, the interaction 
between cultural diversity and copyright law will be discussed. Copyright law impacts on 
cultural diversity, and flourished cultural works will incentivise re-creation. Since music is one 
of the most potent forces shaping culture, entertainment and technology, 78  the impact of 
copyright law on cultural values of musical works is also assessed in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                 
78 IFPI, ‘Global Music Report: Music Consumption Exploding Worldwide’ (n 16). 
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For standardising and facilitating global copyrights management, Chapter 6 justifies the 
legitimacy of a GRP as a common social infrastructure which will benefit all stakeholders and 
the society as a whole. In order to overcome some core legal obstacles, it clarifies the nature of 
CMOs and the GRP which is different from the traditional perceptions of CMOs. Apart from 
a hard-law approach, the internal and external supervision at international level on CMOs has 
also been proposed at the end of this chapter.  
 
The study will draw conclusions and discussions in Chapter 7. It examines whether the 
objectives put out in the beginning have been achieved, summarises the core research findings, 





Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework for Copyright Legal Framework in 
Musical Works 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The role of copyright law is to strike a balance between different interests at stake. Although 
existing classic theories attempt to explain copyright in a moral way, in practice the distribution 
of revenues of present music market has shown a considerable imbalance of interests at stake.79 
The copyright practice of music market has deviated from the widely-accepted principle of 
balancing interests at stake. Copyright has been losing its legitimacy and acceptance by the 
public.80 The classic theories are not able to guide copyright law to strike a fine balance 
between different interests. Hence, it is the time to restore the balance of copyright law. 
Currently, there is, however, no widely accepted theoretical approach among theorists on 
copyright law, and the debates on the justifications of copyright law have been ongoing for 
centuries between scholars all over the world. Legal scholarship has submitted various 
recommendations in response to balancing the failure of copyright law, but none of them has 
proved to be effective. So, it is necessary to explore a sounder theoretical framework by which 
to underpin copyright legal framework, for shaping copyright law fairer, particularly in the area 
of global JCM in musical works; for balancing interests at stake, especially in such a changing 
digital era when copyright has changed to a large extent compared to a decade ago; and for 
enhancing legitimacy of copyright and improving acceptance by the public.  
 
This chapter applies Rawls’s theory of justice to design a more balanced copyright legal system 
for JCM practice in music works, in particular for regulating JCM in musical works. This 
copyright legal framework is supposed to strike a real balance between interests at stake in 
                                                 
79 Empirical research has shown that music industry is a “winner-take-all” market which is prevalent all over the 
world. The term of “winner-take-all” was coined by Frank and Cook, 1995. See Martin Kretschmer, ‘Music Artists’ 
Earnings and Digitisation: A Review of Empirical Data from Britain and Germany’ (2005) Bournemouth 
University Eprints; Joost Smiers and Marieke van Schijndel, Imagine There is No Copyright and No Cultural 
Conglomorates Too: An Essay, vol 4 (Lulu. com 2009); Drahos (n 8); Dietz (n 8). 
80 See Geiger (n 9). 
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music industry, especially for the interests of the least well-off, such as small rightsholders and 
individual musicians, individual music users and small music repertoires. In order to do so, this 
chapter starts by examining the inadequacies of several classic theories on copyright law. It is 
followed by an analysis of the nature of creative activities by people from a social science 
perspective. And then a nuanced theoretical framework is proposed, based on Rawls’s theory 
of justice through which contested copyright issues may be resolved and upon which the 
international copyright legal system could be based. In the last section, copyright law’s multiple 
functions as three main objectives of the copyright legal system will be proposed as a part of 
the underpinning theoretical framework. 
 
2.2 Existing Theories to Copyright Law   
A group of literature has emphasised the importance of copyright theory by analysing the 
philosophy of IP, and examined, concluded and exposited several classic theories of copyright. 
As Fisher demonstrates that theories surely have a practical use and retain considerable value: 
while IP laws have failed to make good on their promises to provide comprehensive 
prescriptions concerning the ideal shape of IP law, theories can help identify non-obvious 
attractive resolutions of particular problems. 81 Zemer also claims that copyright law must 
recognise the great value of theoretical approaches to copyright, because copyright theories are 
specifically designed to criticise the moral and ethical flaws inherent in present copyright 
legislation.82 The copyright community must recognise the invaluable contribution of theories 
to clarifying controversial conceptual gaps in the way we understand copyright and its limits.83 
Menell recognises the important role theories play in providing fresh insights ‘for the evolution 
of new privately and socially constructed institutions to develop effective governance 
structures’.84 As one of the core missions, therefore, this study starts by exploring a more just 
copyright theory and develops it into a copyright theoretical framework by which to assess and 
guide the designation of a more balanced copyright legal framework, in particular for guiding 
                                                 
81 William Fisher, ‘Theories of intellectual Property’ in Stephen R Munzer (ed), New essays in the legal and 
political theory of property, vol 168 (CUP 2001). 
82 Lior Zemer, ‘On The Value of Copyright Theory’ (2006) 1 IPQ 55. 
83 Ibid. 
84  Peter Menell, ‘Intellectual Property: General Theories’ in Gerrit de Geest Boudewijn Bouckaert (ed), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2000) 129.  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the evolution of JMOs in musical works in digital era. In doing so, a just and acceptable 
copyright theory would improve conversation among the various participants, such as scholars, 
legislators, judges, litigants, lobbyists, and the public at large, in the law-making process. 
Accordingly, it would impact upon the reformulation of social principles and provide ethical 
resolution to issues that court cannot predict alone.85 
 
To have an overlook of IP theories, there are many different approaches to copyright theory.86 
The classic theories of copyright can be categorized as four streams: utilitarianism, natural 
rights such as Locke’s labour theory and personality theory, social planning, and economic 
analysis.87 Each of them tends to provide support for, or shed influence on, the jurisprudence 
and general objectives of copyright law. Although the emphasis of these approaches is distinct, 
some of the arguments tend to overlap with each other. The different choice of theoretical 
considerations of copyright in different territories would indirectly, as an ultimate goal, be 
reflected in their national copyright law. This goal as a general guideline affects the designation 
of the specific rules by which each stakeholder’s interests are entrenched and influenced. 
 
Natural law believes that property right exists pre-societally and pre-institutionally, and this 
unalienable right is granted by god mixed with creator’s labour or personality which is against 
decision making.88 The consequence is the function of copyright law is over-emphasised to 
serve creators and/or right-owners, but it tends to ignore the public interest. 89  The social 
planning approach90 is too ideal in that it requires all citizens to share a certain degree of 
consensus and this ideal concept of civil society can hardly become true.91 Utilitarianism92 
                                                 
85 Fisher (n 81). 
86 On the philosophy of IP, in particular copyright, see generally Fisher (n 81).; Menell (n 84) 2, 129; Drahos (n 
8); James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens (Harvard University Press 1996); Tom G Palmer, ‘Are Patents 
and Copyrights Morally Justified-the Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects’ (1990) 13 Harv JL & Pub 
Pol’y 817; Justin Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77 Geo LJ 287. 
87 Fisher, ibid; Chidi Oguamanam, ‘Beyond Theories: Intellectual Property Dynamics in the Global Knowledge 
Economy’ (2009) 9 Wake Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal 104; Zemer (n 82). 
88 Fisher (n 81). 
89 See Fisher (n 81); Alfred C. Yen, ‘Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession’ (1990) 51 
Ohio State Law Journal 517. 
90 This approach is proposed by William Fisher, see ibid. 
91 Oguamanam (n87).  
92 See Zemer (n 82); Fisher (n 81). 
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depicts a general social welfare and does not recognise the legitimate rights of the public at 
large. In addition to these four classic theories, another influential theory is economic analysis 
of copyrights. It focuses on the investment of creators and right-owners and their financial 
revenues from consumers, and relies on a market setting to promote the efficient allocation of 
resources.93 The central role of copyright law, according to economic analysis approach, is to 
strike a correct balance between access and incentives. For promoting economic efficiency, the 
principal legal doctrines of copyright law must, at least approximately, ‘maximize the benefits 
from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs of 
administering copyright protection’.94 Landes and Posner, as the pioneers of economic analysis, 
believe that once creative works have been put in the public domain, they are vulnerable to free 
circulation by free-riders. 95  The consequence is the creator’s total revenues will not be 
sufficient to cover the cost of creating the work because of the loss of revenues from free-riders. 
Thus, economists believe the user’s access to copyrighted works must be limited. To some 
extent the economic analysis approach provides aspiration to understand the values of 
copyright but the problem is economic analysis does not deal with the issue of fairness. 
Economists are so interested in power that they regard market power as a universal principle. 
They believe that everything can be priced and economically measured, and problems can be 
solved via the market power principle.96 This approach is too concerned with efficiency and 
cost-reduction as well as socio economic development. They believe the protection of the 
public interest serves this goal. 
 
Incentive theory, as one of the economic approaches that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, 
proposes that behaviour is motivated by the “pull” force of external goals, such as rewards, 
money, or recognition. According to incentive theory, individuals are motivated to do things 
by external rewards that helps activate particular behaviours, such as a promotion at work, 
amount of monetary rewards, an opportunity to win a competition.97 It believes that we are 
                                                 
93 ibid. 
94 ibid. 
95 Fisher (n 81). 
96 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 The Journal of 
Legal Studies 325. 
97 Douglas Bernstein, Essentials of Psychology (Cengage Learning 2013). 
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living in a knowledge-based economy, and we need copyright to operate as an incentive to 
reward creators’ efforts and to drive that economy, and copyright law can be explained as a 
means for promoting efficient allocation of resources.98 Copyright monetary rewards are in 
diverse forms including copyright royalties, licensing fees and various rents, and certain 
contractual profits. These various monetary rewards as an exclusive right conferred to original 
creators are deemed as positive incentives for fostering more creativity and to ensure a robust 
public domain or common pool of valuable information and knowledge.99 This approach has 
widespread theoretical justification and has been recognised in most copyright legislation from 
different jurisdictions.100  
 
Incentive theory believes re-creation of literary and artistic works is dependent, in many 
instances, on economic rewards. It regards economic rewards as the fundamental function of 
copyright, but rejects independent values of non-economic arguments. As Breyer asserts that 
‘none of the noneconomic goals served by copyright law seems an adequate justification for a 
copyright system. If we are to justify copyright protection, we must turn to its economic 
objectives’.101 The main problem of this theory, however, is no empirical evidence shows 
economic reward is the determinant factor for creative activities, especially in the copyright 
area.102 Some other economists standing at the opposite side believe that non-monetary rewards 
– such as profits attributable to lead time, inventors’ opportunities to speculate in markets that 
will be affected by the revelation of their inventions, the prestige enjoyed by artistic and 
scientific innovators, academic tenure, and the love of art – would be sufficient to sustain the 
current levels of production even in the absence of IP protection. 103  This non-monetary 
                                                 
98 See ibid; Edith Tilton Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins Press 1951); A Samuel Oddi, ‘Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century’ 
(1988) 38 Am UL Rev 1097; Oguamanam (n 87). 
99 Landes and Posner (n 96). 
100 See Preamble of WCT; Copyright Act of 1976, US; Copyright Law of China, 2010; Ian Hargreaves, ‘Digital 
Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth: an Independent Report’ (2011) 1. 
101 Boyle (n 86) 291; See Barry W. Tyerman, ‘The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published 
Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer’ (1971) 18 UCLA Law Review 1100; And Stephen Breyer, ‘Copyright: A 
Rejoinder’ (1972) 20 UCLA L Rev 75. 
102 Empirical study suggests that, in certain industries, patent replies more on economic incentives than copyright 
area; see Fisher (n 81). 
103 See for Example, Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (Springer 1969); Arnold Plant, 
‘The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books’ (1934) 1 Economica 167; Jack Hirshleifer, ‘The Private and 
Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity’ (1971) 61 The American Economic Review 
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incentive theory is also doubtful. The continuous production and supply of artistic works 
should not only rely on some prestige artists’ inner desire of arts. Copyright law is the origin 
of legal protection. Without this legal protection, creators and right-owners’ economic interests 
as well as moral interests cannot be ensured.  
 
Some scholars believe that incentive theory can also be perceived as a way to improve social 
welfare, since this philosophy focuses on promoting the general public good rather than on 
placing the individual creator as an independent object entitled to a right.104 They believe that 
copyright protection provides incentives to re-creations, which benefits the social welfare and 
economic development, and then the public. Although this theory recognises the public good 
aspect and regards it as a distinguishing characteristic of IP,105 the economic analysis is still 
essentially utilitarian in nature and emphasises the general public domain without considering 
individuals’ legitimate interests, since it focuses partly on the access to public goods rather than 
an individual’s rights of accessibility. It focuses on general welfare but ignores the issues of 
fairness.106 The problem in utilitarian justifications for copyright, as Boyle rightly remarks, is 
that they emphasise the property component of the prerequisites of information production and 
not the role of the public domain.107 Most of economists and legal scholars regard the issue as 
the extent of property necessary to motivate and reward the creative spirit, rather than the extent 
of the public domain necessary to give the magpie genius raw material she needs.108 Put simply, 
it does not admit the independent virtue of public interest but regards it as the by-product of 
the promotion of the social economy.  
 
There is, generally, not a consensus on the philosophical clarity to the purpose of copyright. 
Scholars have a debate on the application of an appropriate theory to underpin copyright law. 
Menell claims that IP theory should be divided into utilitarian and non-utilitarian theories 
                                                 
561; Stephen Breyer, ‘The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs’ (1970) Harvard Law Review 281. 
104 See Fisher (n 81). 
105 ibid. 
106 This is distinct to the Rawls’s theory of justice which will be discussed in section 4. 
107 Boyle (n 86). 
108 ibid, 244.  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(includes natural right/labour theory; unjust enrichment; personhood theory; libertarian 
theories; distributive justice; democratic theories; radical/socialist theories; and ecological 
theories).109Hughes discusses labour theory and Hegelian personality justification to justify IP, 
and utilises two civil rights, the privacy right argument and the freedom of expression argument, 
to support the personality justification. 110 He argues that the ‘Hegelian personality theory 
applies more easily because intellectual products, even the most technical seem to result from 
the individual’s mental processes. Intellectual properties are comparatively more acceptable 
for personality’.111 Merges adds to his influential body of scholarship by adopting foundational 
principles that focus on the author, the creator, and the designer to support the legal institution 
of IP.112 Drahos differs and observes the paradox of IP rights in that they create an incentive to 
generate new information by restricting access to the information created, but the distribution 
of information is in the public interest.113 He contends that it is essential to strike a fine balance 
between the incentive function and the distributive function of IP laws, between the public and 
the private interest.  
 
The existing theories focus more either on rightsholders’ copyright or incentivising outputs for 
the society. They poke holes easily in other positions, but none of them have made an 
affirmative and instrumental theory for today’s copyright law. These existing theories have all 
proved inadequate to be applied to copyright. 114 Scholars suggest that there is no unitary 
convincing justification for copyright, and a pluralistic approach 115  should be adopted to 
different categories of copyright works. There are many different categories of copyright works, 
and a variety of incommensurable values play a role in the justification of copyright. The best 
approach to copyright is to assess and balance competing moral values in light of the particular 
facts and circumstances of different types of copyright works. Accordingly, this chapter 
focuses on exploring an appropriate theory to copyrights management in musical works. 
                                                 
109 Menell (n 84). 
110 Hughes (n 86).   
111 Ibid.  
112 Robert P Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press 2011). 
113 Drahos (n 8). 
114 Fisher (n 81). 
115 See ibid; Zemer (n 82); David B Resnik, ‘A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property’ (2003) 46 Journal of 
Business Ethics 319. 
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Copyright licensing, rather than the authorisation of copyright per se, is the factor that affects 
the interests at stake,116 eg musicians’ interests, the interest of the public and the society. With 
the goal of copyright justice in mind, this thesis will explore a more just theory for assessing 
JMOs’ copyright licensing activities in musical works, consequently shaping a truly balanced 
copyright legal framework. Inspired by a different application of Rawls’s theory to copyright 
area,117 this thesis will apply the theory to the area of JCM, in particular CMOs and IMEs. 
Rawls’s perspective on justice offers a better justification for copyright licensing and would 
potentially induce better copyright justice.118 Before justifying the choice of Rawls’s justice 
theory, some key preliminary questions of why people create, and what the role of copyright 
law is will be discussed. 
 
2.3 Rethinking the Role of Copyright 
Based on the discussion above, none of the classic theories can adequately justify a balanced 
copyright law in digital era. For exploring a more appropriate theory to justify the modern 
copyright law system, here, it is necessary to inspect the nature of human being’s creative 
activities and the purpose of copyright by which musicians or rightsholders are able to 
exclusively dispose their works. This section starts with the discussion of the nature of human 
being’s creative activities which are deemed as social behaviour. 119  Then it analyses the 
ultimate goal of the copyright law system.  
 
2.3.1 Why do Music Creators Create?  
The motivation in human being’s creative activities is related to complex psychological 
processes. Sometimes, music creators’ behaviours are motivated by a desire for monetary or 
other extrinsic rewards. This is the position of incentive theory which suggests that individuals 
are motivated to do things by extrinsic rewards.120 According to this view, people are pulled 
toward behaviours that offer positive incentives and pushed away from behaviours associated 
with negative incentives. In reality, however, it is always found that the differences about how 
                                                 
116 This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter 4 and 5.  
117 Deming Liu, ‘Copyright and the Pursuit of Justice: A Rawlsian Analysis’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 600. 
118 See section 4.3, 5.3, and 6.4. 
119 Drahos (n 8). 
120 Bernstein (n 97). 
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people value incentives are presented from one to another and from one situation to another. 
For most musicians, copyright does not provide much of a direct financial reward for what they 
are producing currently. Empirical research findings are instead consistent with a winner-take-
all or superstar model in which copyright motivates musicians through the promise of large 
rewards in the future in the rare event of wide popularity.121 Many music creators have to hold 
a second source of income to live their life. In many other occasions, people are motivated to 
create because of intrinsic desires and wishes. And these innate driven motivations are believed 
to play more important roles than pecuniary rewards.122 The intrinsic motives for all voluntary 
human actions, including creative activity, is to experience pleasure or to avoid pain. 123 It is 
not for economic return that all musicians create. Some authors even pay to publish to ‘satisfy 
other desires than direct economic remuneration’ such as ‘the propagation of partisan ideas; 
notions of altruism, as in the case of religious and moral tracts; desire for recognition; and 
enhancement of one’s reputation’. 124  In psychology research area, a growing number of 
empirical works believe that intrinsic motivation is beneficial to creativity.125 The power of 
intrinsic motivation is very strong to boost creativity for challenging tasks, and creative people 
tend to have higher-level intrinsic motivations.126 Creative activities may also happen without 
any motivation which is purely an unconscious conduct. Research has found that unconscious 
thought is “liberal” and leads to the generation of items or ideas that are less obvious, less 
accessible and more creative. 127  According to psychologists, creative process starts with 
conscious thought, followed by unconscious work that eventually results in ‘inspiration’.128 
Some psychologist divides a creativity process into four stages and this model involves both 
conscious and unconscious thoughts.129 
                                                 
121 DiCola (n 12).  
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Evidences can also be easily found in practice. Lohmann suggests that ‘99% of copyrighted 
works today are not incentivized by copyright’.130 The common example is that most internet-
users who share personal photography works, writings, thoughts, as well as the phenomenon 
of fan fiction and fan art derived by fans on social networking websites, do not expect 
commercialisation of their creative works. They even rarely need to be incentivized to create 
such expression either. It is also not difficult to understand why Van Gogh, Mozart and many 
other comparable geniuses died in poverty. It is also true that children keep creating without 
any reward. Numerous music amateurs who create musical demos on sharing sites are merely 
for fun, or they have the needs to express inner emotions. They might only intend to draw 
attentions of the others but pay less attention to economic profits. The motivation might also 
be their willingness to create for their families or leave a memento after his/her death.131 Judge 
Simon Rifkind once argued that some creative geniuses will not forbear from inventive activity 
even when they are confronted with the threat of a jail term as a disincentive to invent.132 In 
many situations, motivation for creating is out of noneconomic considerations.  
 
Motivation of creative activities has very little to do neither with money, nor with the 
conferment of ownership by copyright law. The popular incentive theory of copyright law is 
untrue. Without monetary incentives, people will not stop to create. Before the introduction of 
copyright, or earlier in the ancient world, and even ahead of ancient times, human being did 
create things, share and accumulate knowledge without any protection of intellectual property 
system. In fact, all of the factors that serendipity, academic respect, value-realisation, social 
esteem, peer prestige and other nobler ideals are contributors to incentivise innovation and 
creation. Non-monetary incentives are not less powerful than monetary incentives in terms of 
motivating creations of cultural goods. 
 
                                                 
130 Terry Hart, ‘Incentives to Share: Why Copyright Continues to Play A Role Online’ (Copyhype, 28 October 
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2.3.2 The Role of Copyright Legal System 
As analysed above the authorisation of copyright is not able to motivate creativity, but it does 
not mean copyright is redundant. Without copyright, either creators could receive revenues for 
creating more works, nor the public domain would become more flourishing. Indeed, copyright 
is not an incentive to create, but it is an incentive to authorise exploitation.133 Copyright is of 
importance to play the role in providing incentives to publish and disseminate musical works 
by a third party, mostly in a commercial way. Also, intermediaries are incentivised to 
commercialise musical works. 
 
Theoretically, a musical work might appear to be inexistent like it had never been created if it 
has never been published or revealed to others. A music creator is not able to receive any 
revenue or any other reward from his/her unrevealed work, because copyright does not reward 
the act of creation itself. As Parker claims, ‘authors’ income, if any, arises not from the act of 
creation but from exploitation of his work; not his own exploitation but from a third party’s; 
and not copyright itself, but under the terms of a contract’. 134  It implies that musicians’ 
economic interests come from a third party’s exploitation which happens by means of licensing 
or transferring contracts. Copyright law provides creators such exclusive rights against 
unauthorised exploitation of his work by any intermediary.  
 
The role of a third party is usually played by CMOs, publishers, producers, IMEs, and other 
organisations. They exist to distribute musical works and collect revenues on behalf of music 
creators. Some creators may assign their copyrights to producers or publishers through a 
transferring contract. The substantive copyright law exists as a basis of providing copyrights 
where the exclusive rights come from. But, only copyright practice, such as licensing and 
transferring as well as exploitation of musical works, is the key to make revenues for both the 
third party and creators. Therefore, copyright legal system should play a positive role to 
                                                 





facilitate such copyright practice and promote the transaction of copyrighted works in a just 
way.  
 
It can be concluded that there are multiple motivations for creativity, which can be classified 
as monetary, non-monetary, non-incentive creative activities, and a combination of the above 
motivations. For the copyright licensing activities by intermediaries, their motivation is no 
more than monetary. Therefore, some essential questions to be drawn here are – what copyright 
law encourages both monetary and non-monetary motivated creativities, and what copyright 
licensing law promotes the dissemination and allocation of copyrighted musical works in a just 
way; and first and foremost, what copyright theory should be chosen to underpin a real balanced 
copyright legal framework to regulate copyright practice. Substantive copyright law alone is 
not able to achieve this goal. The copyright legal system, including substantive copyright law, 
JCM regulation, and enforcement of copyright,135 has to be designed in a coherent way to 
achieve this goal. 
 
2.4 Rawls’s Justice Theory and the Coherent Copyright Legal Framework in Music 
Works 
As discussed in the last section, scholars have explained copyright by a number of theories 
which are all to a certain extent inadequate to consider stakeholders’ interests. Rawls’s theory 
of justice is different from those approaches discussed above. The copyright legal framework 
based on Rawls’s justice analysis could truly balance the interests at stake, and particularly 
improve the protection of disadvantaged groups and provide an ethical perspective to improve 
the acceptance of copyright legal system. When copyright theory is examined in the light of 
Rawls’s justice theory, the copyright legal framework including copyright licensing law, is 
better justified and explained than would be the case with other theories. This section will 
introduce and analyse the proposed theoretical framework based on Rawls’s theory of justice 
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in a general way, and more importantly demonstrate how this mechanism works to justify 
copyright licensing and commercial distribution of musical works.  
  
With regard to the question of whether Rawls’s theory can be applied to the copyright legal 
system, Rawls writes that ‘the principle applies in the first instance to the main public principles 
and policies that regulate social and economic inequalities. It is used to adjust the system of 
entitlements and rewards’.136 The difference principle holds, for example, ‘for income and 
property taxation, for fiscal and economic policy; it does not apply to particular transactions or 
distributions, nor, in general, to small scale and local decisions, but rather to the background 
against which these take place’. 137  It is argued, though, that Rawls’s principles have the 
‘capacity to serve as rather abstract, broad-gauged constraints against which test more specific 
and circumstantially contingent proposals at the constitutional and legislative levels’. 138 
Likewise, Kordana and Tabachnick apply Rawls’s theory to contract law with a broad 
argument that ‘all aspects of social living that affect citizens’ life prospects constitute the basic 
structure’. 139  In this respect, the authorisation of copyrights and the distribution and 
dissemination of copyrighted goods and revenues affect citizens’ life, thus copyright falls into 
the scope of basic structure. Additionally, Liu applies Rawls’s theory of justice to copyright 
law to justify an author’s copyrights and their limitations, and advises specific doctrinal 
questions in copyright.140  
 
This thesis differs in the way that it applies a unified theory to the five pillars141 of copyright 
legal framework, in particular for regulating JCM practice and JMOs. In this coherent copyright 
legal framework, the supposed function of JMOs is to strike a real balance between interests at 
stake, in particular for fairly considering the interests of the least well-off such as individual 
music creators, music users, and small music repertoires. Rawls inferred that justice is believed 
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as the first virtue to assess laws and institutions, and ‘if they are unjust, no matter how efficient 
and well-arranged they must be reformed or abolished.’142 Copyright law, of course, can be 
assessed and should be in accordance with justice. Due to the fact that the concept of justice is 
perceived distinct in different culture, and there is no unified measure of agreement on justice, 
Rawls worked out a theory of justice with two principles to solve the problem of distributive 
justice and structure a well-organised society.  
 
The first principle of Rawls’s theory, also called the principle of equal liberty, requires equality 
in the assignment of basic rights and duties. According to this theory, the basic rights and duties 
indicated by the first principle are the political-social rights that every rational person is 
presumed to want, and these basic citizenship rights, such as the right to vote, freedom of 
speech, right to hold property and so on, have to be equally distributed.143 Likewise, music 
creators’ rights to be protected by copyrights and music users’ rights to freely exploit musical 
works also have to be equally distributed among all citizens. According to the first principle, 
each person in a society is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty consistent 
with a similar liberty for others.144 The main distinction between Rawlsian and utilitarianism 
is that the latter believes ‘a state cannot grow rich except by an inviolable respect for property’, 
but it is justifiable to invade property rights of wealthy individuals for distributional purposes 
if this results in an overall increase in happiness. 145 It indicates that a government can arrange 
copyright policy to benefit the general economy while sacrificing a minority’s interests. This 
proposition is fundamentally contrary to Rawls’s theory. Rawls’s principles demonstrate that 
it is unjust to allow that the sacrifices are imposed on a few for general improvement. 146 
Inequality is only acceptable when everyone’s well-being depends upon a scheme of 
cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, so the life of those who are 
less well situated, is thereby improved.147 
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The second principle, normally named difference principle, emphases that social and economic 
inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in 
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of 
society.148 When this principle is applied to the copyright system, the main argument can be 
explained as copyright legal system does not promote justice to grant creators ever-increasing 
protection and reward as if his/her talent were his/her desert; rather, justice is promoted only if 
creators put their talent into full exploitation to benefit the least talented.149 Rawls does not 
deny the use of incentives. For Rawls rewarding talent or the efforts of talented people to 
develop their inborn abilities is justifiable ‘only on instrumental grounds’, rather than on the 
grounds of desert.150 This is fundamentally different from natural rights theories which believe 
that creative works are deserved since labourers have added their labour or personality into it.  
 
For Rawls, what is relevant is justice and what is not relevant is desert.151 The law crystallized 
by Rawls’s theory of justice is not so much concerned with the reward or desert of the talented 
person, but with the achievement of justice for all in the manner of social cooperation.152 When 
the difference principle is applied to copyright area, JMOs’ commercial activities are actually 
encouraged although it will generate economic inequalities. So, Rawls formulated the condition 
to economic inequalities that only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in 
particular for the least advantaged members of society. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth 
can only be accepted when everyone in a society, including those less well situated, would be 
better off.153 The commercially distribution of musical works incentivises music intermediaries 
to participate in copyright licensing. The generated economic interests should benefit not only 
intermediaries, but also more importantly they should benefit all other stakeholders, with 
priority to benefit the least well-off of society. Thus, JMOs’ copyright commercial activities 
should be regulated by a coherent copyright legal system.  
 
                                                 
148 ibid, 15. 
149 Liu (n 117). 
150 Stewart E Sterk, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’ (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review 1197. 
151 See more discussion in section 4.4.2. 
152 Rawls (n 137). 
153 ibid, 15. 
  
51 
2.5 Multiple Values and Objectives  
The copyright legal framework functions to protect and promote the production, dissemination 
and consumption of cultural goods. Cultural goods, in particular musical works, have three 
essential values: economic, social and cultural values, which benefit individuals, communities 
and societies.154 As a social institution, copyright legal system should function to preserve and 
increase these values of cultural goods. Thus, the discussion of the functionality of JMOs can 
be conducted from three main aspects: economic function, social function and cultural function, 
for the purpose of preserving and fortifying the multiple values of musical goods. The analysis 
of this section starts with the discussion on the multiple values of cultural goods, in particular 
musical works, elaborating their distinct characteristic nature. It concludes with a proposal of 
the multi-objective role of JMOs. It has to be noted that in this theoretical framework, Rawls’s 
theory of justice is adopted to assess these multiple objectives of musical works and ensure 
JMOs’ role is consistent with the ultimate goal of the copyright legal system. 
 
2.5.1 Essential Values of Cultural Goods in General 
Although cultural goods may be bought and sold like other commodities and served as 
investments and sources of revenue, they are more than commodities. 155  The inherent 
characteristic of cultural goods is that their cultural values are more apparent than that of 
ordinary goods. In addition to economic and social values, cultural goods have the connotations 
of spiritual, sacred, symbolic, aesthetic, and artistic values. 156  For instance, a house as a 
tangible good, functions more in terms of its economic and social values so its price is valorised 
and usually decided by the market. The evaluation of a common good is easier to understand. 
However, a piece of music, for example, embodies more cultural values that they may represent 
and convey some cultural spiritual, aesthetic and symbolic values, and its valuation may be 
more difficult to be decided. Economic values are measurable, but not social and cultural values. 
It is difficult to evaluate and measure the explicit values of cultural goods. This is distinct from 
                                                 





that of material goods whose value can be easily measured and evaluated as a form of market 
prices. Cultural goods can be transacted at quite different prices. 
 
Cultural goods convey, represent, or serve to realise economic, social and cultural values.157 
Usually, economic value refers to the prices of things, or their exchange value. 158  When 
economists discuss about valuing a good, they mean the pricing of the good. Economic value 
focuses on the moment of exchange.159 When the exchange does not really take place, the 
economic value of a cultural good is what people are willing to pay for it.160 However, the price 
of cultural goods does not really reflect their real value. Economic values of cultural goods are 
very subjective and hardly ever decisive. In economic exchange of cultural goods, people’s 
positioning is problematic and at time inconceivable. Sometimes, people are willing to pay for 
cultural goods far more than their real economic value. It is untrue to say that some cultural 
goods only have economic value since it is only temporarily reflected at some stage or some 
point of the life cycle of the cultural goods.161 Economic value is a part of the value system of 
cultural goods. 
 
Cultural goods have many other values which are not economic values per se. They cannot be 
priced that they are better to be grouped in the separate category of social values. Social values 
are the values of works in the context of interpersonal relationships, groups, communities and 
societies.162 Social values cover a wide range and comprise the values of belonging, being 
member of a group, identity, social distinction, freedom, solidarity, trust, tolerance, 
responsibility, love, friendship and so on.163 In the case of cultural goods the satisfaction comes 
more from what they mean socially than economically.164 For example, music helps people in 
many ways apart from the aspect of generating economic profits for rightsholders. Unlike 
common goods, such as houses, food, and clothes, the value of music is non-material; it can be 
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used for entertainment, personal appreciation and pleasure, medical therapy, expressing and 
evoking emotions, communicating to people and society, inspiring creativity, increasing 
knowledge. People cannot eat or drink a piece of music but music is indispensable in many 
people’s daily lives. The reflected social value of music is almost as subjective financially as 
it is aesthetically.  
 
Cultural values are the values that evoke a quality over and beyond the economic and the social 
values, including aesthetic, spiritual, social, historical, symbolic and authenticity values. 165 
Cultural goods are not because they are so different from common goods that they have 
intrinsic natures. Rather, they are called cultural because the way they being consumed is 
cultural.166 According to Kant the quintessential cultural value of a good is its ability to evoke 
an experience of the sublime.167 It is the quality that causes awe and stirs the soul.168 Kant 
purports that this quality is disinterested; it does not serve a social or economic goal.169 Goods 
have cultural value in that people treat them in a cultural way. So, any goods have cultural 
values. However, cultural goods mainly served in a cultural way and their cultural values can 
be realised more often.  
 
2.5.2 Multiple Values of Musical Goods in Particular 
Being a type of cultural goods, musical goods have economic, social and cultural values. They 
may be realised or unrealised by participants in different space and time. Throughout history 
music was not considered merely an entertainment but rather was associated, in fact, 
interlocked with religious and philosophical beliefs, thus possessed axiological 
connotations.170 Music is more specific about what it expresses than words written about those 
expressions could ever be.171 Music has the power to express, convey and illicit powerful 
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emotions. The unspoken but highly evocative language of music has moral and ethical power 
that affects individuals and societies alike.172 It has been concluded that active engagement 
with music in forms of creation or consumption, may also influence participants’ other 
activities, e.g. perceptual activities, language and literacy skills, numeracy, intellectual 
development, general attainment and creativity, personal and social development, physical 
development, health and wellbeing.173 Taking pop music for example, it is believed that the 
reason of consumption of pop music is because people want to express who they are, to which 
group they belong, what their identity is.174 Since the late 1950s and early 1960s pop music has 
become an important way for many people to distinguish themselves from others.175 People’s 
identity is not strictly individual, but highly social and draws on the socio-cultural values in 
society – values that become ‘objectified’ or institutionalised and may thus be communicated 
to others.176 To explain a phenomenon such as the advent of pop music, it has to conceptualise 
the institutionalised socio-cultural values, and understand how institutions work in signalling 
people’s identity.177  
 
The multiple values of musical goods are differently involved, realised, sustained, evaluated, 
or functioned in the different phases from production to consumption. A music good whose 
value being realised by means of a market exchange, will be a different good from the case in 
which its value has been realised in the form of a gift or as part of a collective program. During 
the producing stage of musical works, creators such as composers and songwriters perceive 
more social and cultural values of their creations than economic values. On the contrary, 
producers and publishers are mainly concerned about whether it is worth their investment for 
marketing later on. Some goods may stop at the stage of production so that they may never 
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enter into the phase of exchange. For example, some individuals create and retain the works to 
themselves rather than release to the public.  
 
When goods become candidates for exchange, they become commodities.178 In this phase their 
economic value is being realised, and the price of musical works will be the major subject. 
Creators may transfer their copyrights to producers/publishers for some economic gains. 
Producers/publishers would be only concerned about the business potential of a music demo, 
assessing how much, if applicable, they should invest in the production of a particular musical 
work. An assignment agreement of copyrights is indeed a marketing contract between creators 
and producers/publishers that both parties may capture different values of the cultural goods.  
 
The consumption is an entirely different matter and subject of different conversations than its 
economic valuation.179 Human beings invest music with value and meaning and use it as a way 
of defining themselves socially and binding themselves into groups.180 At consuming stage of 
musical goods, the social and cultural values, including appreciating, entertaining, enriching 
social life, are the main considerations to individual consumers. For commercial users, however, 
the economic values will be more considered since commercial users exploit musical works 
for the purpose of generating profits. They are not consumers themselves. Generally, at 
different phases of musical goods, different values of cultural goods will dominate and be 
realised in the multi-value system.  
 
The economic values of musical works have been over emphasised, whereas their social-
cultural values have been neglected by the music market. Ancient cultures held strong beliefs 
in the moral and ethical power of music.181 In the light of the current climate of Western popular 
culture, art music has become increasingly marginalised.182 It is asserted that “art” has been 
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greatly trivialised nowadays, and the lines between trend and tradition, the profound and the 
superficial, art and cliché have become indistinct in popular culture.183 Some musical works 
pervasive in society are hardly considered as high-quality art. Their pervasiveness and the 
values they engendered may have an adverse effect on our societies. For example, some 
musical works labelled as negative or angry would negatively impact on societies. Social and 
cultural values have their independent significance. Unlike material goods, the satisfaction or 
usefulness of cultural goods comes more from what they mean socially than economically.184 
Their social values, that is, what it does for issues of identity, culture, connection to society 
and so on, will be far more important.185 Socio-cultural values play a critical role in economic 
processes in people’s daily life.186 Even in a globalised culture and a supposedly classless 
society, musical preference still indicates a lot about social identity and status.187 Different 
groups of people value different musical genres and styles.188 Within each occupational group, 
choices are inflected by ethnicity.189  
 
From the perspective of consumption, people consume certain kinds of music because the 
music expresses certain kinds of basic socio-cultural values they are attracted to and want to 
express.190 In what people consume, they express who they are or want to be; consumption, 
partly at least, creates identity, and it is a way of communicating messages to the relevant 
‘audience’.191 Demographic research show that the typical heavy metal fan, almost world-wide, 
is male, white, aged around twelve to twenty-two, and working-class.192 In respect of youth 
cultures and popular music, the results of statistic studies show that central musical traditions 
are in cementing a sense of individual and group identity as children reach adulthood.193 One’s 
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liking for particular kinds of music is a very powerful way of communicating one’s basic, 
socio-cultural values for almost all people. 194  For example, Jay Chou 195  is the symbol of 
Chinese style music for many –especially 80s and 90s – people in Taiwan, mainland China and 
other societies. By buying his records, listening to his music and subsequently talking about 
his music with friends, audiences indicate they are such a traditional Chinese style person, and 
show the embodied values that mattered. Another example is the teenager consumes 
conspicuously – particularly pop music is a means of expressing identity, of the socio-cultural 
values or beliefs they adhered to.196  
 
2.5.3 Increasing Economic, Social and Cultural Capitals 
Economic capital is a stock of resources that will generate a flow of economic values.197 The 
amount of economic capitals of cultural goods is influenced by many factors, e.g. creators’ 
talents, artistic quality, marketing, and social capitals. It has to observe that each musical work 
has different amount of economic capitals that generate varied economic gains. So, musical 
works have different popularities. Economic capital plays a fundamental role in financing 
social and cultural capitals. The capacity to deal with social values and adhere to social norms 
is called social capital. 198  Social capital is actual and potential resources linked to the 
possession of a durable network of institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition. 199  It is a person’s education (knowledge and intellectual skills) that provides 
advantage in achieving a higher social-status in society.200 Cultural capital is the ability to deal 
with cultural values, regardless of the possible economic returns.201 Musicians usually build up 
and increase cultural capital by participating in musical activities which may require music 
education, study and all kinds of sacrifice in order to achieve insights, wisdom, enlightenment, 
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piety, or the ability to experience the sublime, in which the essential activity is to access to 
existing musical goods. The amount of cultural capital in music is not only influenced by inborn 
talents and abilities, 202  but also, more importantly, the surrounding environment which 
provides accessible musical resources and participative musical activities. 
 
Economic, social and cultural capitals interact with each other. It has to increase the three types 
of capital simultaneously. Talents and artistic quality are not the determinant of the increase of 
economic capital although they are important. The investment in social-cultural capital will be 
good for economic growth and profit.203 Some people, organizations or societies have more of 
it than others. Some creators or performers have prestige and fame by which their musical 
works may be identified widely since these works contain more social capitals. This 
phenomenon particularly reflects the theory of “superstar effect”.204 Superstars reap so many 
more rewards than peers who are only slightly less talented. This is also the case of different 
categories of music. Some categories of music, e.g. pop music or western music, possessed by 
some groups or societies enjoy more popularities than minority music. Creativity is by no 
means an autistic activity.205 Even the most prominent creative genius operates within a social 
context.206 Cultural capital is the power to inspire or to be inspired.207 It is not only the fuel to 
increase economic capital, but also the capacity to experience a meaningful life beyond the 
economic and social dimensions.  
 
From the perspective of creators, revenues brought by musical goods provide material support 
for individuals to communicate their works to audiences and the society. And this material 
support is important for musicians and potential creators to access to copyrighted works, which 
will be internalised as necessary cultural capital in a conscious or unconscious way to 
accumulate their creative capacity. As such, theorists argue that economic function of cultural 
goods is instrumental at most, and the generated income and profits serve the ultimate 
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objectives, e.g. to increase social and cultural capitals.208 In this regard, economic function is 
fundamental and instrumental in terms of increasing personal capital. However, the motive of 
the involvement of intermediaries is no more than monetary purposes. For them, economic 
values of cultural goods are the main justification for their investment. From this aspect, 
economic values have independent justification in terms of commercialising and benefiting 
societal economic growth.  
 
Social and cultural values of musical goods have impacts on the economic capitals. Cultural 
goods with low social or cultural qualities will generate less economic capitals. Profits derived 
from membership (social capital) which are proportionately greater for those who are lower 
down the social hierarchy or, more precisely, more threatened by economic and social 
decline.209 For example, a club build social identity that would generate economic profits. 
Copyright’s social function ensuring accessibility to copyrighted goods, will promote creations 
and enlarge the repertoire of cultural goods and enrich cultural sources. Ultimately, it will 
enhance the economic capitals by means of increasing the exchange of copyrighted goods. The 
possessions of social values increase economic capitals.  
 
Cultural capital is good for economic values, but may also be bad for economic values.210 The 
amount of economic capital that people have appears to be positively related to their cultural 
capital. This is because economic capitals can be invested in education, study and social 
experience which is, despite of natural contingencies, an important condition for increasing 
individuals’ cultural capitals. Economic capital is positively related to the level of accessibility 
to cultural goods. However, cultural capital may have nothing to do with economic capital – it 
may add to it, but it may also depreciate it.211 For example, Peking Opera is fighting for survival 
in modern world, because it is losing out in the battle for the attention of the younger 
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generation.212 Some artists argue that ‘the use of modern techniques in Peking Opera to satisfy 
contemporary audiences alone could undermine the traditional performing arts, and is 
definitely not the way out’.213 For maintaining the traditional culture of Peking Opera, its 
economic capitals reduce dramatically. Another example is when people invest in cultural 
capitals for the purpose of economic gain, the efficacy of their investment will be less than if 
the investment had only a cultural purpose.214 The consideration of economic capital impairs 
the thrift of cultural capital. When economic motives surface, credibility is lost.215 This is 
exactly the case in art music. When individuals create musical goods for the purpose of 
economic gain, the aesthetic value would be less than those works created purely with cultural 
purposes. It is also common in music industry that musical works with great aesthetic values 
do not have great popularity or generate proportionate economic values; great musicians who 
have invested more cultural capitals do not necessarily receive more economic capitals. This is 
why some classical music lacks economic capital but has plenty of cultural capital.216 Thus, it 
can be concluded that the influence between economic and cultural values is mutual, but not 
determinant. 
 
2.5.4 Multi-Objective to Copyright Legal Framework in Musical Works 
The copyright legal system has to function to fortify the multi-value of musical works, enabling 
the realisation of values in the different phases from production to consumption. Therefore, 
this thesis proposes a multi-objective theoretical framework in musical works to achieve these 
goals: economic fairness,217 social justice and cultural diversity.218 The argument in this section 
is that the multiple values of musical goods play an equally important role for embodying their 
explicit value, although different values may be perceived at different phases. This equal 
significance of legal position indicates that the copyright legal system should consider how to 
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increase economic, social and cultural capitals for enhancing the multi-value of musical works, 
and should function to balance interests between stakeholders across music industry in a way 
to fulfil the multiple objectives.  
 
Indeed, the pursuit of economic profits is not the singular objective of copyright. The 
explanation of social values needs the cultural context. The possession of certain social and 
cultural capital can inspire people’s creation which will boost their economic value. Musical 
works are economic goods and they are also cultural goods. They are able to be evaluated on a 
market price. Some artistic music, however, may be wrongly evaluated by market price. The 
motivation of artistic music is non-economic but is social-cultural value related. As argued 
‘good pop music is the expression of something of a person, an idea, a feeling, a shared 
experience, or a Zeitgeist’. 219  In this sense, social-cultural values are independent from 
economic values. Unlike economic values, social and cultural values increase by usage. The 
influence of economic values on social and cultural capital is indirect, instrumental and not 
determinant.  
 
In brief, the multiple values of musical goods are separate, independent but also impact on each 
other. Hence, the copyright legal framework in musical works should have multiple instead of 
singular objectives. This multi-objective copyright legal system exists to preserve and increase 
the multiple values of musical works, for optimising the allocation of copyright resources and 
dissemination of musical works in a just way. In order to accomplish this mission to increase 
the multi-value of musical goods, the functionality of JMOs has to be redesigned for correcting 
the unbalanced situation of music copyright practice. Policy makers should take social-cultural 
values into account in a realistic way and propose a conceptual framework for doing so. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Based on an analysis from a social science perspective, the authorisation of copyrights or 
monetary rewards are not the motivation of re-creation of musical works, rather innate non-
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monetary motivation drives people to create music. The role of copyright is to serve as a base 
to receive revenues, and to promote the exploitation of musical works, usually in a commercial 
way. Therefore, the copyright legal framework in musical works has to be designed to facilitate 
such copyright transactions in a just way. However, the current practice in music industry has 
proved the imbalance between interests at stake. The classic theories do not provide a morally 
acceptable justification for copyright law. In consideration of the inadequacies of existing 
theories to explain modern copyright law, the present research proposes to apply Rawls’s 
theory of justice to underpin the copyright legal framework. 
 
Rawls’s theory of justice is different from those approaches, eg utilitarianism, natural rights 
such as Locke’s labour theory and personality theory, social planning, and economic analysis, 
economic analysis and incentive theory. It offers better explanations to justify the copyright 
legal system, especially for balancing individual music creators’ interests who are in a weak 
position in copyright licensing agreements. The law crystallised by Rawls’s theory of justice 
is not so much concerned with the reward or desert of the talented person, but with the 
achievement of justice for all, in particular to benefit the worst well-off. So, Rawls’s analysis 
of copyright may potentially improve the protection and balance of interests at stake across 
music industry, and provide an ethical perspective on copyright law. To fulfil the proposed 
copyright justice, at the end of this chapter, a multi-objective copyright legal framework in 
musical works is proposed as a part of this theoretical framework. Because multiple values of 
musical goods interact with and impact on each other, their legal position should also be equally 
paid attention by policy makers. Under the guidance of Rawls’s theory, it can be concluded 
that the multiple objectives: economic fairness, social justice and cultural diversity, should be 
codified into the copyright legal framework. Copyright law has a mission to increase and fortify 
the multiple values of musical goods. The aim of the proposed theoretical framework is to fairly 
protect all stakeholders’ rights across music industry and then achieve the goal of justice. JMOs 
are the main organisations playing this role. The next chapter will investigate the various 
existing JMOs worldwide which are managing copyrights in musical works, aiming to improve 





Chapter 3 – Functionalising Joint Copyrights Management Organisations 




The initial CMOs were called authors’ societies which were not fully-fledged in the sense of 
the present CMOs.220 Their main tasks were to fight for full recognition and respect for authors’ 
economic and moral rights recognised by law.221 This function still exists today as authors’ 
negotiation weight remains weak to ensure a fair negotiation. Similarly, World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) states that CCM is the exercise of copyright and related rights 
by organizations acting in the interest and on behalf of the owners of rights. 222 It further 
indicates that ‘traditional CMOs acting on behalf of their members negotiate rates and terms 
of use with users, issuing licenses authorising uses, collecting and distributing royalties. The 
individual owners of rights do not become directly involved in any of these steps’.223 The 
Statutes of International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC)224 
provide that authors’ societies are more than just ‘efficient machinery for the collection and 
distribution of copyright royalties’. Their tasks extend to ‘the advancement of the moral 
interests of authors and the defence of their material interests’.225 The traditional belief of 
CMOs’ function is that they mainly focus on the economic revenues and are regarded as the 
representatives of rightsholders. 
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However, the arguments of this thesis will extend further the concept of CMOs as not the 
rightsholders’ societies to defend their material and moral interests, but independent 
organisations who have the obligations to fulfil economic, social and cultural objectives and 
ultimately achieve justice in terms of balancing different interests at stake. CMOs are not 
representatives of rightsholders but are independent organisations with multiple missions. 
Moreover, this thesis argues that IMEs, as an increasingly important and popular type of JMOs, 
should also perform social-cultural obligations, particularly in digital era. 226 The regulatory 
legislation of JMOs, as one of the fundamental pillars to the copyright legal framework, has to 
implement the spirit of copyright law – fulfilling justice – to balance economic revenues 
between different rightsholders, to ensure users’ rights of access to copyrighted works, and to 
maintain cultural diversity for the whole society.  
 
Social-cultural objectives are in line with the spirit of copyright law ‘to balance interests 
between authors and the public at large, particularly education, research and access to 
information, as reflected in the Berne Convention’.227 In practice, most countries all over the 
world have developed mature models of CMOs. However, only in a few countries CMOs’ 
cultural and social functions have been recognised as a legal obligation.228 This chapter will 
discuss the justification and rationale of JMOs from three aspects, namely economic fairness, 
social justice and cultural diversity, to outline a more functioning JMO, and establish a standard 
based on Rawls’s theory of justice by which to assess the justness of JMOs’ performance. 
 
This chapter is a comprehensive systematic analysis about the multifunction of JMOs’ aims to 
explore the multi-objective of the copyright legal system in digital era. Based on Rawls’s 
justice theory, copyright’s economic, social and cultural objectives are of fundamental 
importance in terms of balancing interests at stake, more precisely, justifying the interests of 
the least well-off. In order to attain this goal, this chapter starts with a comparative analysis of 
the different models of JMOs and detangles the interrelationship between CMOs and IMEs. In 
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doing so, some core legal issues caused by the unregulated licensing market will be disclosed 
in the first section. The EU has made the attempt to internationally harmonise collective 
management and multi-territorial licensing of copyrights in musical works for online uses. So, 
section two will review the pros and cons of the solutions adopted by the EU in this area and 
draw lessons from the EU’s experience to the present research. Section three will 
systematically analyse the multi-objectives of the copyright legal system under the lens of the 
theoretical framework formulated in chapter 4. Then some new unsettled issues regarding 
JMOs’ multifunction will be pointed out. These issues will be studied further in a detailed way 
in the following chapters. 
 
3.2 Joint Copyrights Management Organisations in Musical Works at Global Level 
In this research, joint copyright management (JCM) refers to any models of non-individual 
management and distribution of copyrighted works. It includes the collective management 
system by CMOs and all business-type management system by IMEs. CMOs are called 
collecting societies in some countries. However, this thesis follows the WIPO’s way to call 
them CMOs,229 although there is not a uniform definition. Since CMOs and IMEs actually play 
similar roles in terms of management of copyrights, their nature and legal status needs to be 
investigated, and their differences compared. The following section will detangle the 
interrelation between the two systems, aiming to evaluate the significance of and impact upon 
music copyrights management. It starts with the examination of various existing models 
worldwide and analyses the issues raised by the lack of an appropriate hard-law to regulate 
JMOs. 
 
3.2.1 Collective Management Organisations  
Due to the different legal systems and traditions, there are various models of CMOs worldwide, 
whose nature and legal status vary from one another. Because of the principle of territoriality, 
each CMO can only operate in an exclusive national territory, which means a CMO has to 
adhere to their national law by which they are legally established. But, the status of CMOs 
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varies quite a bit across borders. One country’s piracy may be another’s ‘fair use’.230 There is 
a significant disparity between the regulatory systems applicable to CMOs among countries 
worldwide, and accordingly they demonstrate large disparities in the level of copyright 
protection.  
 
Since there is no international treaty to harmonise CMOs’ operation, their nature and legal 
status are regulated by domestic law. There is no easy answer to or unanimity of views on the 
question of which model is more effective or efficient,231 eg voluntary, compulsory, extended 
or non-voluntary model;232 strict, intermediate or De minimis supervision233 by means of a 
separate piece of legislation. The legal status of CMOs is one of the main factors to influence 
the efficiency of their performance. 234  So, first and foremost, the impact of institutional 
supervision upon CMOs’ performances has to be evaluated. Supporters of legal supervision 
believe that laws or policies regulating CMOs have indeed become an important part of modern 
copyright legislation.235 As Ficsor states:  
 
Government supervision of the establishment and operation of joint management 
organizations seems desirable. Such supervision may guarantee, inter alia, that only 
those organizations which can provide the legal, professional and material conditions 
necessary for an appropriate and efficient management of rights may operate; that the 
joint management system be made available to all rights owners who need it; that the 
terms of membership of the organizations be reasonable and, in general, that the basic 
principles of an adequate joint management (for example, the principle of equal 
treatment of rights owners), be fully respected.236  
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A degree of supervision and public control of the operations of CMOs exists in different forms 
from various countries around the world.  In practice, CMOs in some countries are private 
entities, the US and Singapore for example; while they are public authorities in others, China 
for example. Under Chinese statutory rules, a CMO should be a not-for-profit social 
organisation. Germany adopts very strict supervision, Belgium adopts De minimis supervision, 
and France uses an intermediate supervision model. By contrast, Canada does not definitely 
stipulate the legal form of CMOs.237 Because the legal control is not simply all-or-nothing 
status, it is more appropriate to discuss the impact upon CMOs’ performance according to the 
different extent of legal supervision. The following table 5.1 shows the different degrees of 
supervision on CMOs in selected countries worldwide.  
 
As the sources provided by Fabrice Rochelandet in the table are from 1990s in the EU, and the 
samples only include European countries, data has been added from some selected countries as 
research subjects: eg US, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, China, Singapore, South Korea and 
Nigeria.238. The data has also been updated since during the past two decades some countries 
have amended their policies. As shown in the table, the degree of supervision of CMOs has 
been assessed from five aspects: no control, resolution mechanism control, control of 
establishment, control of activities, and organisation control. No control means that there is not 
statute or government affiliation to supervise CMOs, and they operate as private entities and 
they may be non-profit or entirely commercial, for-profit entities, such as Singapore and Greece. 
Resolution mechanism control means a particular copyright tribunal or panel has been 
established for solving copyright disputes. Control of establishment means the establishment 
of a CMO needs to meet certain legal requirements and approval from a public authority. 
Control of activities denotes that CMOs’ operation is under the particular regulation control. 
Organisation control indicates that a particular government department will, less commonly, 
control the practice of CMOs239. 
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Germany   + +  
Austria   + +  
Spain   + +  
France  + + +  
Italy     + 
Netherlands   + +  
Greece +     
United Kingdom + +    
Australia + +    
Swiss241   + + + 
United States +     
Brazil242  + + +  
Canada     + 
Japan     + 
China   + +  
Singapore +     
South Korea     + 
Nigeria  + + +  
 
+ means the existence of relevant control status 
 
Each country has their own supervision model, and these different models have impacted upon 
the efficiency of CMOs’ performances. After a careful comparison of the different control 
models between European CMOs via the Data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, 243 
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Rochelandet concluded that ‘there is no general positive correlation between the intensity of 
supervision and the results of CMOs’;244 and an ‘intermediary level of supervision appears to 
be imperfect and a source of inefficiencies that even low supervision is better than setting up 
intermediary control’.245 He suggested further that ‘a strong internal control is sufficient to 
overcome the potential failure inherent in limited institutional constraints’ 246 . These 
conclusions are of great importance to some extent to the research at present.  
 
It also has to be noted that the policy change in some countries over the years could shed some 
light on trends of supervision models. For instance, historically the establishment of UK CMOs 
and their performances were not controlled by any public authority. As an implementation of 
the Hargreaves Review247, the UK IP Office appointed BOP Consulting248 to collaborate with 
Australian experts to conduct a comparative study of the regulations of collecting societies 
between Australia, the UK and EU countries for the purpose of finding an appropriate model 
for the UK249 (Hereafter BOP report). They demonstrated in the final report that a voluntary 
code of conduct has little effect on improving the weak bargaining power of the majority of 
users, and therefore, a statutory code of conduct could serve as a mechanism to increase 
transparency and governance for those CMOs with less strong internal mechanisms. 250 
Eventually, the UK adopted the self-regulation approach in 2012 in which the government 
published minimum standards for UK CMOs as a guide to support a self-regulatory framework 
for such organisations.251 
 
The UK’s experience has reflected another issue about the possibility of internal supervision. 
According to the BOP report, ‘a strong internal governance mechanism may generate more 
efficient results than strong external regulation’. But Rochelandet indicates that ‘[i]f the 
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internal governance mechanism fails then there is room to strengthen government legal 
supervision’.252 The BOP report has another important conclusion that a strict external control 
does ensure a better service for users.253 Any consideration of how regulation can improve the 
performance of CMOs needs to focus far more on addressing the concerns of users rather 
members.254 The present research agrees that users’ interests have to be paid more attention 
when considering how to improve CMOs’ performance. In practice, however, users’ legitimate 
rights have not been fully taken into account.255  
 
CMOs worldwide may not only take different forms, but can also vary greatly in nature, 
depending on the legislative requirements that the national lawmakers attach to them. Whatever 
the CMO’s form is, there are two most common inherent features of CMOs worldwide. That 
is most CMOs are not-for-profit organisations and incorporated for rightsholders.256 To say 
they are not-for-profit is because the remuneration they collect is not for CMOs themselves, 
but they are held in trust for rights-holders.257 In practice, however, it shows that most CMOs 
are not real not-for-profit organisations as they announced. Even in developed countries music 
artists have been frustrated by CMOs’ performance.258 EU musicians criticised CMOs for 
targeting file-sharers in the name of protecting artistic works, but, de facto, make profits for 
themselves.259 US musicians also have urged the authority to reform the current copyright act 
in order to strengthen the music economy and create a stable music ecosystem for upcoming 
singers, songwriters and musicians.260 In practice, CMOs have also gained substantial market 
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power.261 From artists’ perspective, they claim that CMOs steal their works to make profits for 
themselves.262 So, it is not surprising to hear that musicians disagree with the claim that CMOs 
are “not-for-profit” organisations.  
 
Another issue is whether or not a CMO is owned by rightsholders. Historically, rightsholders 
established the first CMO to look after their works. Traditionally, it is believed that CMOs 
operate on behalf of all rightsholders they represent and have to behave in the best interests of 
them. Even nowadays, it is still believed that the main function of a CMO is rights management, 
that is, to license the use of protected works on behalf of rights-holders.263 By licensing, they 
offer legal access to copyrighted works and make it easy for users to get the necessary 
permission from one source.264 Consequently, the obligation of facilitating users’ access has 
not been fully taken into consideration as it only falls into an affiliation with the central 
obligation of protecting rightsholders’ interests. This is why in some countries CMOs are 
deemed as private in nature and run only for rightsholders. However, this position is not true 
when looking into the process of copyright licensing practice performed by CMOs. CMOs 
provide services to both the rightsholders and the users. Accordingly, their market-dominant 
position exists in two markets, namely, in the market for collective rights management services 
to rightsholders and the market for the grant of licences to users.265 The main task of a CMO, 
in fact, should be to provide a link between rights-holders and users, and thus facilitate the 
exploitation of works. The larger a repertoire is, the better it can serve the users and grant 
licenses for all types of works that are exploited. By providing a link between rightsholders 
and right-users, CMOs serve their constituencies – creators, performers, producers and 
publishers – and secure legal access for users. This is what CMOs truly should do. 
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However, more attention has been paid to the market for rightsholders and users’ rights have 
been ignored.266 The policy of CMOs normally does not contain any rule under which a CMO 
would operate with an obligation to grant licences to all users who request. One of CMOs’ 
roles is they should look into the real market needs, and offer viable solutions and grant 
meaningful licences to users. The licensing activities should really serve both rightsholders and 
right-users. Thus, CMOs are not fully private, rather they serve both rightsholders and right-
users and the public interest of the whole society as well, and this should not be ignored.  
 
3.2.2 Independent Management Entities  
IMEs, being a more common type of intermediary nowadays, manage music copyrights in a 
business way nationally and internationally. They are motivated by profits maximising for both 
rightsholders and themselves.267 It is necessary to examine and compare the diverse business 
models of the music industry to explore their common features. Online copyrights management 
distributors in musical works can be classified into three main categories: first, cloud-based 
closed platforms that either provide online streaming accounts or downloading services, eg 
iTunes store, Amazon, Google and Microsoft; second, open platforms, eg Common Creative 
(CC), advertising-based licensing; and third, integrated model or subscription services that 
combine both closed and open platform service. Most commercialised ISPs take this form, eg 
Spotify, Deezer and Kugou268. Through different internet terminals, such as computers, mobile 
phones and tablets, consumers are able to access music with or without a cost.  
 
Specifically, with respect to the closed platforms operated by ISPs, they have been running 
successful businesses selling music online. For example, iTunes store has achieved a great 
success in the music business since it began selling music online in 2003.269 Now it has 500 
million users worldwide who spend approximately $40 a year on content, according to an 
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analysis produced by Horace Dediu of Asymco.270 Their success has inspired many other music 
businesses like Google and Amazon. The combined model which is commonly adopted way, 
integrates download service, online streaming, free sources and subscription services into their 
music business. According to the IFPI report 2013, subscription services are the fastest growth 
area in digital music, with subscriber numbers up 44 percent in 2012 and revenues up 59 
percent in the first half of 2012.271  
 
In addition to revenues collected from end users, advertising revenue has become the primary 
source of income generated from digital music services.272 Advertising is one of the highest-
profile business models on the internet. Many ISPs combine the advertising model with other 
forms of revenues, and advertising remains a critically important component of internet cross-
subsidisation business models.273 Ad-based revenues are so attractive to ISPs that almost all 
have launched this business model.274 Intermediaries are always free to develop new business 
models to commercialise musical works as long as they have been authorised to do so. 
 
Among the numerous licensing models based on Open Content, the most successful application 
so far is the Creative Commons (CC) initiative, which is now rapidly spreading across the globe. 
CC has developed a series of standardised licences that allow authors of, for example, musical 
works to permit wide dissemination and transformative uses of their works, without completely 
forfeiting copyright protection. The licences grant users the freedom to use, reproduce, modify 
the work, and distribute or re-distribute the work.275 The CC licence scheme is an important 
model to manage copyrights. First, it is beneficial to both authors and users. It protects creative 
works while encouraging certain uses of them. It facilitates the dissemination of musical works 
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for creators and the creation of derivative works. Second, it provides a platform for music 
conversation between musicians and helps potential users become musicians, because it allows 
other musicians to remix or build upon original music. Third, it is a new way to balance 
copyright, and the global porting project ensures it can be exercised on an international level. 
It also helps to increase the global copyright commons of easily accessible content.276 The CC 
model is one of many valuable ways a musician can authorise music in a way that can reap 
rewards, both immediate and long-term.277 This model is an ideal music community for young 
musicians who do not have enough financial support and are looking to build a fan base. The 
open licensing models are thriving in that they conform to the nature of the internet – they can 
facilitate a wider dissemination of works without infringing copyright and without depriving 
rightsholders from control over all possible uses of their works.  
 
However, due to the tailored licensing terms and conditions of granting some permission in 
advance, the development of the licences over the years has made the system increasingly 
complex.278 The risk of licence proliferation has been identified by many scholars and users, 
including the founder of the movement.279 Not all works available by one of the CC licences 
can be combined without further negotiation because not all licence options are compatible and 
this is ‘an unsolvable dilemma’. 280  The multiplicity of CC licensing options increases 
confusion and information costs as well as frustrating internal incompatibilities. These issues 
need to be regulated by predictable legislation. 
 
Nowadays, IME models have become the main choice of JCM by rightsholders so it enjoys a 
dominant market share.281 Intermediaries have been developing new business models to make 
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profits and seize music market share. IMEs, including both traditional business-type 
management and the new open-licensing models, are in nature for-profit organisations. Their 
licensing activities are currently governed by fragmented legislation, such as contract law, 
commercial law, competition law, anti-trust law. Copyright treaties are silent on IMEs. Their 
role of distribution and collection of revenues is to some extent similar to the role of CMOs. 
For researching the compatibility of both systems, the interrelationship between the two 
systems has to be examined. 
 
3.2.3 Interrelationship between CMOs and IMEs 
The joint task of IMEs is to collect and distribute royalties as quickly and as precisely as 
possible, and keep transaction costs as low as possible.282 Within this system, the tariffs and 
licensing conditions are also individualised, and the only joint element of the system is that one 
single licensing source is offered with a significant reduction of transaction costs for both 
rights-owners and users. This benefit is in line with the main economic function of CMOs.283 
The exercise of copyrights of musical works by IMEs have generated huge economic profits 
for music companies and small part of famous musicians. Their professional ability to 
commercialise musical works has contributed to the economic growth of societies. However, 
IMEs are not required to distribute revenues between different rightsholders in a just way. 
Certainly, IMEs concern more about their own economic interests. 
 
CMOs and IMEs have existed and functioned side by side domestically and internationally,284  
and  they may also establish alliances in order to pursue common interests or exercise and/or 
enforce certain rights together.285 However, some of the economic, social and cultural benefits 
contributed by CMOs will never be fulfilled by IMEs. Owing to the two systems based on 
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different philosophical and strategic concepts, fulfilling more or less different objectives, 
existing IMEs are not required to perform the obligation of social-cultural functions.286 The 
following table 5.2 has compared the fundamental differences of the two systems.  
 
Table 5.2: The Main Differences between CMOs and IMEs 
 CMOs IMEs 
Nature Most are not-for-profit organisations For-profit JCM entities;  
Forms 
Strict supervision, Intermediate supervision, 
and De minimis supervision; 
Voluntary, compulsory, extended and non-
voluntary licensing models 
Flexible business models, eg closed, 
open and, combined licensing models; 
Ad-based licensing and Creative 
Commons 
Revenues Collecting on behalf of rightsholders Making own profits  
Tariff to 
members 
Set up by national law Negotiable via agreements  
Decided Royalty 
Rates 
One single price for whole repertoire Depends on market 
Relationship to 
Rightsholders 
Membership agreements; incomplete control 
by rightsholders/members 
Contractual relationship; independent 
intermediaries (not owned or 







Fragmented legislations, such as 
contract law, commercial law, 
competition law, anti-trust law 
Activity area    Nationally Internationally 
 
Because IMEs offer music creators a chance to become a superstar although there is little 
chance, IMEs are more attractive to rightsholders than a true collective system.287 This trend 
will break the balance in the field of protection, exercise and enforcement of copyright. 
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Christian Handke288 demonstrates in an economic analysis that rights management by a profit-
maximizing independent supplier may not perform better than CMOs. 
 
Currently, CMOs and IMEs are competing with each other in an unfair music licensing market, 
since IMEs’ licensing activities are less restricted by copyright laws. This is jeopardising 
CMOs’ performances further. Meanwhile, new models of online distribution, such as Creative 
Commons (CC)289 and advertisement-based platforms,290 have been continually developed, 
and copyright law keep silent on these new models. This phenomenon leads the modern 
copyright licensing market to be more chaotic and problematic. The coexistence of CMOs and 
IMEs has raised various issues. The interrelation between the two systems is intermingled and 
complicated. The interrelations between the two systems needs to be detangled, and a justified 
common legal environment needs to be set up for non-individual management of copyrights in 
musical works for facilitating cross-border licensing activities and a fairer legal environment 
for different licensing models. 
 
3.2.4 Core Issues of the Unregulated Market of JCM 
The coexistence of CMOs and IMEs has raised various issues. For corporate rights-owners, eg 
producers and publishers, with the desire to exercise their exclusive rights, or a simple right to 
remuneration, they join an organisation that could take care of their rights. Although some of 
them are members of CMOs and accept the traditions and rules thereof, most others prefer to 
choose some other forms of exercising rights with as few collectivised elements as possible.291 
This is simply because IMEs make more profits for them;292 and, more attractively, with the 
investment from IMEs there is an unrealistic chance to become a superstar. However, IMEs 
also reduce the appropriability of rightsholders.293 In theory, unauthorised digital copies can be 
seen as cheap, imperfect substitutes for purchases of authorised copies, which reduce the 
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appropriability of suppliers of copyright works.294 Due to high economic rewards from IMEs295 
along with the poor performance of CMOs,296 CMOs are under threat that members might 
withdraw their copyrighted works from the traditional CMOs and transfer the power in 
managing some of the rights to IMEs. 297  Especially, if CMOs are voluntary entities 
rightsholders can freely opt-out. The research on the licensing model of IMEs of musical works 
is very limited, although it has been a concern that the unregulated for-profit providers would 
replace highly regulated non-profit CMOs.298 
  
Another issue is dual licensing and relicensing which means licensing a work under two 
different licences to two or more organisations concurrently. Due to the unregulated licensing 
market and asymmetric information, there is a possibility that right-owners who are members 
of CMOs, to some extent manage and remain in control of their rights, and thus in the 
exploitation of their works. 299  For instance, as a CMO member, a right-owner might 
simultaneously take part in an open content licence, CC for example, allowing free exploitation 
of the work for gaining fame. When CC licences are enforceable, this situation will cause 
chaotic problems to CMOs’ management. In fact, CC licences are now, in some jurisdictions, 
enforceable in court under copyright law.300 When the dual licensing happens, it will confuse 
users when making a decision about using licence and they may consequently infringe 
copyrights.301 
 
More importantly, the unregulated music business models have led to unfair treatment to 
individual creators and some types of users. It has been reported that the music market is now 
dominated by three major music companies which have a worldwide share of 70 percent of the 
                                                 
294 ibid. 
295 IMEs have economically dominated the music market. See section 3.2.2. 
296 With respect of the issues of improving CMOs’ performance, see section 3.2.1 
297 Violaine Dehin, ‘The Future of Legal Online Music Services in the European Union: A Review of the EU 
Commission's Recent Initiatives in Cross-Border Copyright Management’ (2010) 32 European Intellectual 
Property Review 220. 
298 Towse and Handke (n 36) 15. 
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market for distribution.302 The music companies either own the copyrights of most works, or 
they co-own the copyrights with individual creators through contracts so that, undoubtedly, 
most revenues have gone to large right holders rather than the original musicians. When IMEs 
who did not create works, get involved in the music business, they must be motivated by 
economic concerns. They select certain musicians who have commercial potential, to 
collaborate with, and take advantage of them to agree to unfavourable licensing terms and 
conditions. Most artists would agree with those contractual conditions because of their weak 
negotiation power.303  
 
Moreover, copyright-users’ interests cannot be appropriately protected without codified 
provisions by which users’ rights are entrenched explicitly. Since there is a lack of concrete 
provisions to protect users’ rights, IMEs can always escape from their social-cultural 
obligations. Vulnerable consumers can only resort to other laws, such as consumer law or 
commercial law, if they have been unfairly treated. Some disabled persons’ interests have 
caught the legislators’ concerns.304 For instance, the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to 
Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled 
was adopted on 7 June, 2013, aiming to create a set of mandatory LEs for the benefit of the 
blind, visually impaired, and otherwise print disabled (VIPs) to make and supply accessible 
copies of works for the use of disabled persons, without infringing copyright.305 However, LEs 
for other purposes, for education purpose for example,306 which are highly important for the 
development of social-cultural values,307 has not been paid enough attention yet by policy 
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makers. The current fragmented provisions can hardly balance the interests of the public at 
large. Unlike the domestic copyright regime where a social-cultural scheme might exist, there 
is not such a mechanism to support online public uses.  
 
This thesis argues that the international online licensing of musical works through both CMOs 
and IMEs has to be regulated under a harmonised copyright licensing regulation with the 
objective of fulfilling justice for different stakeholders. 308  Indeed, without institutional 
intervention, large music companies will play their dominant place globally, and prefer IMEs 
for the pursuit of more profits and escape from the social-cultural obligations. The present 
copyright legal system, if not completely, keeps silence on the requirement of social-cultural 
goals on IMEs. If CMOs and IMEs are expected to compete with one another on a reasonably 
fair arena, they should preferably enjoy a uniform legal treatment and be subject to similar 
administrative duties and burdens, for example, the pursuit of solidarity and social-cultural 
goals.309 The establishment of a common playing field for JCM through a proper legislative 
harmonisation initiative is indispensable.310  
 
By being required to admit all eligible rightsholders as members, national CMOs operate 
similarly to an insurer that is regulated in order to provide an essential service for everyone in 
the market it serves. It has been argued that CMOs provide greater benefits for smaller market 
participants with many works that are not highly valued than for the larger ones or those with 
more valuable works.311 This position reflects an ideal theoretical prospect that CMOs treat 
large and small right-owners equally. But in practice, CMOs’ ability to attract and hold large 
market participants, usually producers and publishing companies, has been overestimated. 
IMEs, as discussed in the previous chapter, are strong competitors that produce more profits 
without the forced burden of social-cultural deductions.312 Nonetheless, most CMOs’ revenues 
mainly come from large players. If they switch the mandate to IMEs, CMOs’ operation would 
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be more difficult. Therefore, JMOs have to undertake the same social-cultural obligations, 
competing with each other in a fair and common field. 
 
3.3 Regional Harmonisation of Legal System on JMOs – EU’s Experience 
The EU, as the first region, has made the attempt to internationally harmonise collective 
management and multi-territorial licensing of copyrights in musical works for online uses. This 
section reviews the pros and cons of the solutions adopted by EU in this area, and intends to 
draw lessons from EU’s experience. The EU Commission and Parliament have made efforts 
for two decades on the harmonisation of collective management and multi-territorial licensing 
of copyrights in musical works for online uses. In 2005, the European Commission issued a 
Recommendation313 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for 
legitimate online music services and suggested abolishing the network of reciprocal agreements 
within the EU, allowing the right holders to choose freely which society to join to and to what 
extent to grant rights, and allowing the users to choose freely from which society to license 
rights.314 This recommendation was a soft-law without binding effect. Economists point out 
that the proposals made in the Commission Recommendation will predictably lead to 
comparably high (additional) search and information costs.315 Eventually, the EU Council 
launched a hard-law approach, approving a new Directive on the collective management of 
copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online 
uses in the internal market316, which came into force on 26 February 2014 (hereafter, the 
Directive 2014).317  
 
After a long period of debate among academic and policy-makers on the feasibility of the hard 
law measures, this initiative has been finally approved. And this Directive has started to be 
implemented by member countries’ legislations. 318  The hard-law approach has also been 
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acknowledged by the European Commission that a proper legislative measure creating a 
common playing field for collective management should have been done, although some 
provisions need to be improved. For the first time, national laws on collecting management and 
multi-territorial licensing of copyrights are harmonised at the regional level. This legislative 
experience could shed some light on the present research.  
 
The Directive has been welcomed by most stakeholders including CMOs and the digital 
industry as a whole.319 One of the most significant modifications is that it has included IMEs 
into the Directive for the first time, and acknowledged their legal status. They enjoy an equal 
legal position to jointly manage copyrighted works that the provisions of Directive 2014 apply 
equally to these organisations, and rightsholders have the freedom to choose between CMOs 
and IMEs to manage their rights. Apart from this, the researcher believes that the Directive will 
provide a more efficient service to rightsholders and service providers, involving better 
collection and redistribution of revenue, accurate invoicing, and more grants of multi-territorial 
licences for aggregated repertoire. 320  The Directive recognises the need to improve the 
functioning of CMOs, and the transparency and accountability to their members and 
rightsholders, by enhancing the role of right owners in their supervision and management, and 
to facilitate the multi-territorial licensing of an author’s rights in musical works through 
CMOs.321 
 
3.3.1 Social, Cultural and Educational Deductions Related Issues 
There is another significant improvement in that the aims of EU Directive 2014 have a broader 
agenda than simply economic efficiency. Para 3 of the Directive provides that: 
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Collective management organisations play, and should continue to play, an important 
role as promoters of the diversity of cultural expression, both by enabling the smallest 
and less popular repertoires to access the market and by providing social, cultural and 
educational services for the benefit of their rightsholders and the public.322 
 
For the first time, the objectives of social, cultural and educational services have been explicitly 
written into copyright law.  
 
As to the effectiveness of this improvement, however, scholars argue that the Directive is not 
even-handed in its treatment of the goals it sets itself.323 According to Graber, the cultural 
agenda is marginalised, and indeed compromised, by the economic efficiency agenda.324 Dietz 
points out that the Commission’s line on the CMOs’ social and cultural role has been softened 
during the passage of the Directive.325 He remains convinced that the European Parliament 
better expresses or represents the cultural interests of the European Community; the 
Commission, on the contrary, is still ‘aimed primarily towards the internal market and the 
European economy as a whole’.326 Indeed, this point is reflected in the preamble 18 that ‘in 
order to ensure that holders of copyright and related rights can benefit fully from the internal 
market when their rights are being managed collectively and that their freedom to exercise their 
rights is not unduly affected…’. 327 Article 4 of the Directive emphases that ‘CMOs act in the 
best interests of the rightsholders whose rights they represent…’328 Therefore, the preference 
of the Directive is to favour rightsholders’ interests over users’, and facilitate the EU internal 
market.  
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As to users’ interests, Directive 2014 has provided general requirements of providing 
information329 to users and the public and simplified licensing procedures to users,330 but it 
specifies that ‘a deduction for social, cultural or educational purposes, should be decided by 
the members of the CMOs’.331 That means the public interest is left in rightsholders’ hands. 
Users are not authorised any statutory rights. In addition, Article 14 states that the purpose of 
deductions is ‘…used in a separate and independent way in order to fund social, cultural and 
educational activities for the benefit of rightsholders’. The social-cultural deductions do not 
have any independent rationale but they are established for the benefits of rightsholders. 
Moreover, the Direction 2014 does not have any minimum requirement as to the social-cultural 
deductions but leaves the decision power to national copyright law.332 Thus, the so-called social, 
cultural and educational objectives are not ensured, and users do not enjoy equal legal status 
as rightsholders under Directive 2014. 
 
3.3.2 Pros and Cons of the EU’s Measures 
Whether the EU authority had made a promising choice to regulate the existence of and 
activities of JMOs by appropriate provisions is still under debate. According to the EU’s 
experience, it can be concluded its hard-law approach on CCM and cross-border licensing of 
copyrights in musical works have shifted from the wish to harmonise rules on the good 
governance of CMOs to the need to solve the more pressing multi-territorial licensing issues.333 
The most significant improvement is that social, cultural and educational uses have been 
codified, although they are not perfectly designed. The effectiveness and efficiency of CMOs’ 
performance for social and cultural benefits need further investigation.  
 
The current Directive, however, would be unlikely strike a proper balance between interests at 
stake, if some respects are not amended. All the issues put forward above are worth further 
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study when designing a global JCM legal system. The foreseeable issues generated by global 
JCM are even more complicated than those that exist in the regional licensing, since a wider 
range of developed and developing countries will be involved.  
 
3.4 Functionalising JMOs 
From the EU’s experience, it has been learned that a hard-law approach is feasible and 
necessary to regulate cross-border licensing of copyrights. The social, cultural and educational 
uses have been codified. Now the challenge is how to fulfil these objectives. This issue is 
important since it affects the balance drawn between different interests. For searching for an 
optimal model of JCM at the global level, this section studies the multifunction of JMOs in the 
context of the proposed theoretical framework334 to replace the current unregulated copyright 
licensing market. The analysis of the multifunction of JMOs is based on Rawls’s theory of 
justice which is adopted to assess whether JMOs have appropriately fulfilled the fairness 
economically, socially and culturally. 
 
3.4.1 The Objective of Economic Fairness  
The question as to the economic justification of JMOs is the question of their economic purpose, 
thus the reasons for their genesis and the roles they play in economic life.335 A range of varied 
economic studies have shown that copyright is of great economic significance.336 This thesis, 
however, argues that the economic objective of JMOs not only means economic revenues for 
rightsholders and the society as a whole are generated, but more importantly, economic 
interests at stake are balanced with the aim to build up a just society. This section mainly deals 
with the questions such as what JMOs’ economic objective is, and how they perform to fulfil 
economic objective in a way consistent with Rawls’s justice principles.  
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3.4.1.1 Significance and Drawbacks of Economic Analysis  
In today’s debates, copyright is most often justified in economic terms.337 It is believed that we 
are living in a knowledge-based economy, and we need copyright to operate as incentive to 
drive that economy.338 As demonstrated in chapter 2, economic analysis of copyright has paid 
sufficient attention to its economic justification. Economic analysis shows that CMO reflects 
the economic advantages in terms of saving transaction costs.339 By exploiting the economies 
of scale in the management of copyrights, a CMO can reduce transaction costs substantially 
and make markets more efficient and even enable new ones to develop, and, more importantly, 
increase economies of scale to the benefit of online music ISPs, copyright holders, commercials 
users and consumers. 340  Economic analysis justifies one-stop-shop, clearinghouse and 
collective management of copyrights for the following reasons:341 a large reduction of average 
transaction costs, information costs, identification costs, search costs, time costs, contract costs, 
governance costs, for authors, rightsholders, and particularly in favour of users; joint 
management has the benefit of risk-pooling and risk-sharing through the contracts between the 
members themselves by an aggregate repertoire.342 Economists have seen the importance of 
economy not only for financing rightsholders, but also, more significantly, for raising funds for 
the social welfare purposes. 343  This position is of significance to copyright’s economic 
objective in that they also note CMOs acting as social insurance or common carrier particularly 
benefits smaller creators. Indeed, the deduction from national revenues is of utmost importance 
for creativity and social-cultural development of a society.344 
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Additionally, information economics is another important economic function of CMOs.345 Due 
to authors’ inexperience in terms of concluding licensing contracts on the market, it is usually 
the disadvantageous who are the less well-informed party. Without the digital identification 
system, the searching and negotiating time and costs would increase significantly. Since both 
contractual parties are situated on different “information levels”, there is an asymmetric 
distribution of information amongst potential contractual partners. Under the management of 
CMOs which is information advantageous, this asymmetric distribution of information would 
be reduced dramatically. CMOs are more likely to act on the basis of their experience and 
specialisation of transaction knowledge than the individual authors, and accordingly, reduce 
the information asymmetries. Both transaction cost economics and information economics 
should be drawn on in order to explain the CMO’s economic functions.346 
 
Copyright framework constitutes the appropriability system, named substantive copyright law 
which authorises a bundle of rights to creators; and the licensing system operated by different 
joint management models such as CCM and for-profit copyrights management by IMEs. 
Indeed, copyright is of great economic significance to rightsholders, especially for large 
rightsholders, eg publishers and producers; for a given country, especially those developed 
countries which are mainly the export countries of these cultural products; and for the whole 
society as well. JMOs’ economic functions impact on rightsholders’ economic interests, users’ 
economic interests, and social and creative development; and at macro level impact on the 
economy of society.  
 
Economic analysis is concerned with reducing transaction costs and generating more social 
revenues which are believed will benefit all stakeholders for sure. This position comes from 
the assumption that the economic interests of different types of rightsholders are in line with 
each other. When large rightsholders’ interests are better off, small rightsholders’ interests will 
surely automatically better off. Whereas, this is not the case. Rightsholders, whether they are 
                                                 




large, small, or in the middle are not an economic community. There is an important issue that 
economic analysis does not really deal with – distributive justice. The current institution of 
copyright framework, more specifically the copyright licensing framework, is not just and have 
caused dramatic economic inequalities. The issues such as how JMOs’ economic function 
affects the fairness and how to maintain the balance between different stakeholders, need 
further study. Thus, for searching for a functional JMO in terms of fulfilling economic fairness, 
the rest of this section will deal with this issue. Rawls’s theory will be applied to assess 
economic fairness as the economic objective of JMOs.  
 
3.4.1.2 Rawls’s Theory and Economic Fairness  
The second principle of Rawls’s theory is that social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached 
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.347 Rawls 
interpreted this principle as democratic equality which is arrived at by combining the principle 
of fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle. This second principle is composed 
of two parts 2 (a) and 2 (b), and 2(b) has two parts ‘offices and positions open to all’ and ‘fair 
equality of opportunity’.348 According to Rawls, natural talents are arbitrarily distributed and 
morally undeserved. Such initial inequality caused by social and natural contingencies, 
factually exist and cannot be removed, and they influence people’s life prospects. In order to 
treat all persons equally and to provide genuine equality of opportunity, the principle of redress 
requires society to give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into 
the less favourable social positions.349 The idea is to redress the bias of contingencies in the 
direction of equality.350 In pursuit of this principle greater resources might be spent on the 
education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life, the 
earlier years of school.351  
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The difference principle, with a different aim to the principle of redress, would mean resources 
in education would be allocated so as to improve the long-term expectation of the least 
favoured.352 And in making this decision, the value of education should not be assessed solely 
in terms of economic efficiency and social welfare. Equally, is the role of education in enabling 
a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to 
provide for each individual a secure sense of their own worth.353 This aim can be understood 
as a positive scheme to deal with the issue of social and natural contingencies. Thus, not only 
is the intent of the principle of redress achieved, but also the aim of the difference principle is 
to transform the basic structure so that the total scheme of institutions no longer emphasises 
social efficiency and technocratic values.354  
 
In justice, a fair society is interpreted as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.355 The 
difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural 
talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out 
to be.356 More gifted creators who have been favoured by nature, whoever they are, may gain 
from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. 
They are naturally advantaged and need to use their endowments in ways to cover the costs of 
training and education and help the less fortunate. More gifted creators do not deserve the 
greater natural capacity or merit a more favourable starting place in society, but it does not 
mean the undeserved distributions should be eliminated. These social and natural contingencies 
can work for the good of the least fortunate.357 And this is how the basic structure is arranged 
under the difference principle. In this structure, the social system is to be set up in which no 
one gains or loses from their arbitrary places in the distribution of natural assets or his/her 
initial position in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in return.358 
The difference principle is formulated to benefit everybody in an institution.  
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Rawls’s theory can be perfectly applied to assess the justness of CMOs as well. A scheme is 
just when the difference principle is satisfied where everyone benefits.359 Supposedly, the first 
principle and principle of equality of fair opportunity has been satisfied. That is all members 
are given equal copyrights generally and enjoy the equal exclusive rights to their own 
copyrighted works; and all members sign up to an equal management agreement under the 
same terms and conditions with a CMO. CMOs must not refuse entry to any creators wishing 
to join the organisation. That is to say all members are given equal fair opportunity in a same 
CMO and principle 2 (b) is satisfied. When the musical works are licensed as an aggregated 
bundle, royalties collected from licensees are mixed together. Because of the influences of 
either social contingencies or natural chance on the determination of distributive shares, as 
discussed above, the two are arbitrary, each musical work gains different popularity. This, as 
one factor will lead to economic inequalities in a free market. These immoral inequalities can 
and have to be regulated according to the difference principle.  
 
Assuming the JMO framework satisfies the principles of equal liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity, the higher expectations of those better situated, in this case larger rightsholders, 
are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the 
least advantaged members of society. 360  In the scheme of CCM, the revenue inequalities 
generated by popular musical works are allowed only if they contribute to improve the 
expectations of the small members of the CMO. This is the case of CMOs’ scheme of 
distribution of copyright revenues; and the idea of social-cultural deductions being raised to 
cover the cost of training and education for potential creators. According to the chain 
connection theory,361 if an advantage has the effect of raising the expectations of the lowest 
position, this arrangement will also raise the expectations of all positions in between. 
Eventually, everyone benefits from this scheme when the difference principle is satisfied.  
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There is also a standard to assess the injustice of a scheme. According to Rawls, a scheme is 
unjust when the higher expectations, one or more of them, are excessive. 362  If these 
expectations were decreased, the situation of the least favoured would be improved.363 That 
how unjust an arrangement is depends on how excessive the higher expectations are and to 
what extent they depend upon the violation of the other principles of justice, for example, fair 
equality of opportunity.364 Now let us turn to assess the justness of the scheme of IMEs. IMEs 
pick up creators, whose works are popular or have the potential of popularity, to sign an 
exploitation contract. Motivated by business purposes, only a small part of the works will be 
attractive to IMEs. Not every rightsholders would be given equal opportunity to be invested in 
the commercial market. This violates the principle 2 (b), the principle of “fair equality of 
opportunity”.365 Each music artist should be given fair equality of opportunity of investment 
from an intermediary, since those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life 
chances. The expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be 
affected by their social class.366 This is how the principle of “fair equality of opportunity”367 
was formulated. The unequal distribution of opportunities in forms of investment by publishers 
/producers will certainly cause economic inequalities. When the expectations of the large 
rightsholders are raised, it will certainly result in lowering the expectations of small 
rightsholders. This is because the market share is dominated by large rightsholders. And more 
importantly IMEs do not operate for least advantage since they, at least, do not perform the 
social-cultural obligations. Therefore, the scheme of IMEs has to a large extent violated the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle.  
 
Rawls has also demonstrated that the difference principle is compatible with the principle of 
efficiency. 368  The principle of efficiency is originally intended to apply to particular 
configurations of economic system. So, it can be applied to assess the efficiency of the 
distribution of musical works by JMOs. This principle holds that a configuration is efficient 
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whenever it is impossible to change it so as to make some persons (at least one) better off 
without at the same time making other persons (at least one) worse off.369 Under this principle, 
any resulting efficient distribution is accepted as just.  
 
The principle of efficiency is constantly used by economic studies, and in the analysis of the 
efficiency of JMOs.370 Actually, the difference principle also has such an effect to represent 
efficient distribution. According to Rawls, when the difference principle is fully satisfied, it is 
indeed impossible to make any one representative man better off without making another worse 
off, namely, the least advantaged representative man whose expectations we are to 
maximise.371 Thus, justice is defined so that it is consistent with efficiency, at least when the 
two principles are perfectly fulfilled.372 What is different is, however, in justice as fairness the 
principles of justice are prior to considerations of efficiency.373 Rawls emphasised that if the 
basic structure is unjust, these principles will authorise changes that may lower the expectations 
of some of those better off; and therefore the democratic concept is not consistent with the 
principle of efficiency if this principle is taken to mean that only changes which improve 
everyone’s prospects are allowed.374 The principles of justice correct the initial contingencies. 
When a scheme is not just, justice requires some changes even it is efficient in this sense. So, 
the standard of efficiency under the meaning of Rawls’s theory is higher and stricter than the 
principle of efficiency of economic analysis. 
 
In brief, to assess whether the social institution of JMOs is just or not, it has to be seen whether 
the economic inequalities caused by copyright practice are ‘to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’.375 While the distribution of wealth 
and income need not be equal, it must be to everyone’s advantage and at the same time 
members of a just society are to have the same basic rights.376 A sound regime with a sound 
structure of rules should be put in place to determine the allocation of the benefits which the 
talented are to gain from the fruits of their creation because natural assets are ‘social, rather 
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than personal, resources’. 377 As pointed out in chapter 4 what Rawls approves of is that ‘the 
benefits people gain from exercising their talents are determined by a structure of rules that 
makes that distribution of talents work to everyone’s advantage, with priority given to those 
who are worse off’. 378  The aim of the difference principle is not for redressing the least 
advantaged, although it has such an effect of redress; it is not merely for attaining social 
economic efficiency, although the institution is efficient when at least the two principles are 
perfectly satisfied, but this configuration is a social cooperation. The difference principle aims 
to set up a cooperative venture for mutual advantage between all members of the society. 
 
3.4.1.3 Relevant Unsettled Issues Regarding Economic Fairness 
Indeed, JMOs as a professional and high-specialised intermediary are vital institutions to 
reduce transaction and information costs for the two parties as well as the whole society. In this 
regard, JMO is justified on the ground of the increase of aggregate revenues of the whole 
society. However, the economic discussion has neglected, or, by the nature of economic 
analysis, is not able to tackle the issue of fairness. Alternatively, Rawls’s justice theory, as 
analysed above, provides an optimal justification to copyright’s economic objective – to fulfil 
economic fairness between interests at stake. Based on the analysis of the difference principle 
it finds that the model of CMOs can pass the assessment test of difference principle, while 
IMEs do not. The scheme of JMOs need to pay more attention to economic fairness rather than 
economic efficiency. 
 
Neglect of economic fairness has led to the legitimate crisis of copyright law in that the public 
and some scholars has claimed that copyright law favours rightsholders’ private rights.379 
Economic discussion is from a macro economy perspective that generally divides stakeholders 
of licensing agreements into two parties, licensors and licensees. But the increase of aggregate 
revenues does not necessarily mean original creators are able to benefit. At the micro economy 
level, which includes not only individual creators but also heirs, transferred individuals or 
companies, publishers and record producers, the composition of rightsholders is complex. Not 
all JMOs recognise such difference. It has been demonstrated above that the objective of 
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economic fairness requires the social scheme of JMOs to balance the economic interests of 
small rightsholders and potential creators. Even though the general transaction costs have been 
reduced by JMOs, not each individual creator has been given their due by this framework. In 
fact, as has been discussed, only a small portion of creators take most revenues, known as the 
winner-take-all phenomenon.380  
 
As Rawls’s theory provides justification in a general way to justify the economic objective, the 
issue of unbalanced economic distribution has not been touched on yet. How revenues can be 
fairly distributed is a pressing issue to the current music market. For dealing with this issue, 
there are some questions that need further study, such as what causes the unbalanced 
distribution; how to deal with the unfairness of economic interests between different types of 
rightsholders; and how to justify the solution. These issues will be analysed further in chapter 
6. 
 
3.4.2 The Objective of Social Justice  
A body of literature has emphasised the social function of the copyright legal framework.381 
Social function can have very practical implications. In particular, it can be used to restrain the 
excessive tendencies of current copyright legislation and to limit it when it moves away from 
its function. 382  Copyright has been criticised by the public for a long time because the 
exponential growth of exclusive rights is reinforced by technical protective measures (TPMs) 
jeopardising the legitimacy of copyright which favours rightsholders’ private rights. 383  In 
recent years, IP scholars have described a number of fascinating trades and pursuits where 
people get along quite well without the protection of enforceable IP rights, and some have taken 
to calling these areas, collectively, IP’s ‘negative spaces’.384 For one thing, along with the 
social development the subject matter of copyright has been constantly added with new 
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exclusive rights, such as the right to one’s own image 385  or the rights of sports events 
organisers.386 Some rightsholders abuse their proprietary rights, playing their dominant place 
on the market to prevent competitors from developing new creative works. These issues have 
led to more difficulty in the acceptance of copyright by the public. It has been argued that in 
recent years a veritable protest movement aiming at containing the protectionist excesses of IP, 
has developed.387 The reason behind this is because the social function embodied in copyright 
law as LEs has not fulfilled the value of balancing public interest. As an alternative justification 
for the debate in the face of a serious crisis of legitimacy to copyright, it is imperative to restore 
CMO’s social function.388   
 
3.4.2.1 Social Function of Copyright Law 
The theory of social function of private law began at the end of 19th century in Germany, and 
then become a fundamental principle of German private law. According to this theory it 
believes that all private rights are not absolutely exclusive and have to be limited by social 
constraints,389 and there should be a balance between private rights and public interest. When 
this balance is disturbed, it is the basic function of the law to re-establish it.390 Therefore, one 
of the functions of the legal system is to find a compromise between the interests of the 
individual and the interests of the community.391 The theory was extended to the social function 
of copyright, 392  and it developed further to claim that society has a need for intellectual 
production in order to ensure its development and cultural, economic, technological and social 
progress, and therefore the creator is granted a reward in the form of a copyright, which enables 
the person to exploit their own work and to draw benefits from it. In return, the creator, by 
rendering his creation accessible to the public, enriches the community.393  
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This spirit of social benefits has, indeed, been reflected in some early copyright legislation. For 
example, the preamble of the Statute of Anne, 1710, indicates its purpose - to bring order to the 
book trade - that ‘for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books’. 
Likewise, US constitutional provision regarding copyright clause empowers the congress ‘to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts’.394 Also, the French decree of 1793 was 
not just motivated by authors’ personal claims of rights in their intellectual works.395 These 
statutes show a common trend that copyright law started from the purpose of stimulating 
recreation to the public at large far more than for protecting proprietary rights only. The rights 
and interests of creators were to be established in accordance with those of the public 
domain.396 Generally, this justification puts social interests at the first place, indicating that 
public interest is above private proprietary rights.397  
 
The spirit of social function can also be found in international copyright treaties. Article 9 (2), 
of the Berne Convention, provides three criteria of the so-called three-step test for member 
countries by which they can alternatively legislate domestic copyright exceptions, identifying 
LEs. Whether or not a national copyright exception authorising reproduction is lawful has to 
be measured according to this three-step test. “… (2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, 
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” 398 Also, a range of 
international copyright treaties have inherited and adopted the test without any alteration to 
allow domestic LEs – Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT),399 Article 16(2) of 
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WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT),400 and Article 13 of the Agreement On 
Trade-Related Aspects of IP Rights (TRIPS).401 All these provisions explicitly formulate that 
the first step – LEs should only be allowed in “certain special cases”; the second step – the 
allowed LEs should not “conflict with a normal exploitation”; and third – the allowed LEs 
should not ‘unreasonably prejudice the author’s legitimate interests’.  
 
Under the criteria of the three-step test, national LEs vary according to their particular social, 
economic and historical conditions. International treaties acknowledge this diversity by 
providing general conditions for the application of LEs and leaving national legislators space 
to decide if a particular LE is consistently applied and, if it is the case, to determine its exact 
scope. Basically, the national LEs can be classified into two main categories: open-ended LEs 
and closed-listed LEs. The common law fair use doctrine 402, originated from the United States, 
is deemed an open-ended system which mainly relies on judicial development. The fair use 
doctrine is a general limit that applies to all copyrights, including those rights that also are 
subject to more specific exceptions. The fair use doctrine began as a judge-made limitation to 
the rights of copyright owners. Thus, it leaves more discretion to courts to interpret the general 
principles in light of the social function, and excuse acts that would normally amount to 
infringement. The US Copyright Act also contains a specific list of exceptions in §108-§122.403 
It has been argued that fair use is deliberately open-ended to accommodate use in a variety of 
contexts.404 There are different opinions about this flexible rule. Supporters believe that the fair 
use doctrine based on a case-by-case approach is more flexible and better for fulfilling fairness 
when determining whether an infringement occurred.405 However, Bartow describes fair use as 
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‘an elastic and evolving concept that perplexes even those charged with applying the 
doctrine’.406 Crews calls fair use simultaneously the most important and most misunderstood 
aspect of copyright law. 407  Judges can also recourse to external mechanisms, whether 
originating from general principles of civil law, competition law or fundamental rights.408 
Okediji claimed that the breadth of the fair use doctrine violates the Berne Convention standard 
for permissible exceptions to authors’ rights. With particular reference to the TRIPS Agreement, 
the fair use doctrine may be challenged as a nullification and impairment of the expected 
benefits that trading partners reasonably should expect under the TRIPS Agreement.409 Indeed, 
the primary difficulty is the potential incompatibility with the international obligations 
stipulated in the first part of three-step test – only be allowed in “certain special cases”. It is 
unlikely that the fair use exception will comply with this standard since there will no longer be 
reference to specific cases but rather to a potentially broad range of cases.410 This leads to 
unpredictability and uncertainty.  
 
Another parallel common law doctrine of fair dealing exception is deemed as evolving out of 
the British common law copyright system and now exists in most common-law jurisdictions. 
Fair dealing is designed to permit reasonable access to copyright works for purposes deemed 
to be in the public interest, such as research or study.411 Unlike fair use, fair dealing is a closed 
system that a full list of exceptions formulated into the copyright act beforehand. Only those 
actions falling within these categories are able to apply this doctrine. This is consistent with 
the criterion of “certain cases” of the three-step test. Fair dealing has been criticised since 
permitted uses ought to be defined with great specificity and for very limited purposes.412 The 
defined scope may render fair dealing under threat within an international copyright context 
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because copyright law today has greatly increased in both breadth and complexity with the 
rapid development of the digital environment.  
 
In addition to the two common law doctrines of exceptions, most civil law countries adopt 
closed exceptions which have been listed in national copyright law. Most countries recognise 
a need for LEs to copyright owners’ exclusive rights. But, they historically have not used a 
doctrine like fair use to help define those limits. Instead, they designate specific types of uses 
that are to define privileged uses of copyrighted works. Continental European countries, such 
as France, Germany, and Belgium, provide only narrow, specific limitations to exclusive rights. 
Japan has a reference to “fair practice” as a copyright limitation. 413  In this Continental 
European approach, courts rarely, if ever, depart from these statutes to find limitations of their 
own for other types of conduct not envisioned ex ante by the legislature. The closed exception 
method is also problematic. It becomes an obstacle to the harmonisation of copyright norms at 
the global level. More importantly, foreign creators’ interests might be prejudiced under this 
method because of the rigidly stipulated limited exceptions.  
 
The Canadian Supreme Court is one of the most active debaters to the nature of copyright law. 
They explicitly expressed the view that copyright law is about balancing competing interests: 
those of rights-holders, on the one hand, and those of ‘users’ of copyright works, on the other.414 
The LEs system of Canadian copyright has experienced a dramatic change from closed 
exceptions to an open approach. This shift can be found from the decision of CCH Canadian 
Ltd v. Law Society of Upper Canada.415 The court stated that ‘user rights are not just loopholes. 
Both owners’ rights and users’ rights should, therefore, be given the fair and balanced reading 
that befits remedial legislation’.416 This decision is absolutely different from a former decision 
in Michelin v CAW Canada which held that ‘exceptions to copyright infringement should be 
strictly interpreted’.417 Hence, ‘fair dealing’ in Canadian copyright law is interpreted in a broad 
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and expansive manner now in light of a balance between the owner’s copyrights and user’s 
rights. 418  
 
It is, however, an absolute challenge to take equal treatment of both rightsholders and users in 
which neither interest is over the other. Although the doctrine of users’ rights has been 
recognised by Canadian copyright act, it is still a challenge to practise users’ rights in reality.419 
As demonstrated above, the implementation of the three-step test has led to broad categories 
of LEs by signatories. International copyright treaties, indeed, leave member countries 
considerable discretion to determine where to draw the line of balance between copyrights and 
public interest within the domestic copyright system. It is important to attain a balance, but this 
balance is extremely difficult to strike. Due to the considerable flexibility of application of the 
criteria, however, it seems that policy makers have employed varied approaches to copyright 
LEs. The reason behind the different attitudes towards LEs is mainly because the embodied 
rationales underpinning national copyright LEs are different. Consequently, there are many 
different categories of LEs. The legitimacy of copyright LEs needs to be explored and 
accordingly a balanced copyright LEs system established. In order to do this, the next section 
will examine the different rationales behind the various existing national LEs, and compare 
them to Rawls’s theory based LEs system. 
 
3.4.2.2 Rationales behind the Domestic LEs 
Due to different national political, social, economic and cultural needs, national policy-makers 
conclude different rationales to copyright LEs. Domestic copyright law in some countries only 
stipulates such LEs without providing a proper justification for them.420 Some of them may 
provide the LEs based on political considerations or national policy.421 Some only express in a 
copyright act that the LEs to copyright are just a part of national policy for social goals. Some 
researchers claim that the concept of public interest is not sufficient to protect users’ interests, 
and recommend adopting the concept of fundamental rights as a defence of the public 
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interest.422 Others argue that copyrights should be protected as a human right423 which has been 
explicitly provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Meanwhile, some 
scholars believe that copyright LEs should be recognised as ‘user rights’424 which, in fact, have 
in some jurisdictions received an explicit supreme court imprimatur.425 It has been argued that 
users’ rights should be weighed against copyrights, sharing with equal values and with 
collective interests.426  
 
The debate in academia on the nature of copyright LEs is also extensive.427 Generally, the 
various arguments about the rationale can be categorised in the following way. First, scholars 
assert that the rationale behind the exceptions, such as for the purposes of parody, citation, 
criticism, and news reporting, is based on fundamental rights like freedom of expression.428 
Second, Buydens and Dusollier claimed that exceptions for public lending, disabled people, 
teaching, libraries and archives should be imperative as well as the exception for normal use, 
as these exceptions are based on the general interest.429 Third, other economic limitations (eg 
the first-sale principle) and some exceptions (eg private copying) are based on market failures. 
The first-sale doctrine is based on the impossibility to control the following uses of a purchased 
copyright work, but it also allows great access to the work by the public, thus enhancing the 
circulation of culture.430  
 
Nonetheless, none of the asserted rationales can cover and underpin all categories of copyright 
LEs. Also, the LEs system is dynamic and has kept developing new forms of exceptions in 
practice along with the ever-changing technologies. The exceptions founded on market failure 
are bound to disappear in the digital environment,431 since copyright owners can enforce their 
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rights through digital rights management (DRM) devices, preventing the private copying of 
works. They have also developed equipment, such as Kindle and Kobo, for reading e-books; 
and utilise cloud computing services or software to lock off copyrighted works against resale 
of the digital works.  
 
Additionally, there is not a clear boundary between different underpinnings of the open-listed 
copyright exceptions. Exception based on freedom of expression can have implications for the 
fundamental right to learn, to access to information, to freedom of thought, opinion and 
expression, to receive and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of 
frontiers.432 It is hard to distinguish which type of underpinnings a right belongs to. These 
fundamental rights announced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) interact 
with each other. One category of exception might be based on two or more fundamental rights.  
 
Moreover, fundamental rights conflict with each other. Copyright has been internationally 
recognised as a human right - the right to IP can be found in Article 27(1) and (2) of the UDHR 
and Article 15(1) of the International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights. 
Copyright law requires a balance between exclusive rights and other fundamental rights. 
However, there is never such a situation that one right completely triumphs the other. Since all 
rights, even the most basic human rights, have substantial limitations arsing both from internal 
theoretical constraints (eg universalisability) and external pressures (eg the scope of others’ 
rights).433 It is completely consistent to assert individuals’ freedom of speech while at the same 
time to admit this fundamental right is limited by another’s right to protect the work of which 
he/she is the creator. The evaluation of rights is not a choice between two substantive rules so 
that a status necessarily makes the entitlement of a right “all or nothing”. But the fact is both 
the conflicting rights exist throughout the whole process of evaluation.  
 
To have an overview of copyright legislation worldwide, there is not yet a consensus on the 
justification of copyright LEs. Some national policies may be too protective to rightsholders, 
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while others may be concerned too much about users’ rights without providing proper 
justification for them. The various approaches employed by national copyright law have caused 
discrimination to foreign works when cross-border licensing happens. Based on the analysis of 
LEs above in the international context, there is not yet an answer to which approach, eg closed 
or open, is better to balance the competing interests. Indeed, it is impossible to conclude all the 
LEs into a specific nature. But, it is possible and feasible to partly harmonise copyright LEs in 
some aspects in the context of global JCM. Scholars observe that LEs are not overly broad,434 
they can be classified and entrenched with normative principles by international copyright law. 
Hugh Breakey demonstrates that users’ rights is not justified in every instance it is used. The 
evaluations of users’ rights must be made on a case-by-case basis.435 It has to be noted that 
different types of rationale determine the scope and detailed design of the LE provisions.  
 
3.4.2.3 Rawls’s Theory and Users’ Rights for Education 
In this section, Rawls’s theory is applied to justify users’ rights. According to Rawls, the 
difference principle would allocate resources in education so as to improve the long-term 
expectation of the least favoured. Initial assets such as talents and abilities are arbitrarily 
distributed. The difference principle represents an agreement to regard the distribution of 
natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it 
turns out to be.436 Those who have been favoured by nature, whoever they are, may gain from 
their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.437 In 
doing this, social justice will be fulfilled by social cooperation between the better off and worse 
off. It has to be observed that the value of education under the difference principle should not 
be assessed solely in terms of economic efficiency and social welfare.438 Its role is to equally 
enable a person to enjoy the culture of their society and to take part in its affairs, and in this 
way to provide for each individual a secure sense of their own worth.439 The justification of the 
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provision of education should not be explained as social welfare by means of a redress scheme. 
Rather, users’ rights to access educational resources are to improve the long-term expectation 
of the least well off, since they equally have the rights to enjoy the culture of society and take 
part in its affairs.  
 
The term users’ rights do not have the identical meaning as public interest. To balance the 
interests between rightsholders and public interest, there is an essential question that what 
constitutes public interest or how to define the scope of public interests? This question is 
important in that different understandings of the public interest will lead to divergent 
conclusions of the social function, and thus influence the shape, use and enforcement of 
copyrights. Some literature refers to user’s rights and public interest as one and the same thing. 
In fact, these two terms have different meanings and scopes. Public interest is an aggregate 
concept which includes a range of interpenetrated rights. No one single right can explain and 
justify the contours of the public domain. The public domain is as muddled and interpenetrated 
as the property regime that forms its silhouette.440 However, user’s rights have the equal value 
as to the rightsholders’ copyrights. There is not a weaker category between the two rights.441 
Both the rights are based on the rights-based discourse, justified by Rawls’s theory.442 
 
As a general objective of social function, users’ rights should not be paid lip service without 
specific targets. It has to specify which groups of people fall within the meaning of users’ rights. 
Indeed, some researchers disagree with entrenching copyright LEs as users’ rights, but either 
as users’ interests or liberties or as a ‘claim to the application of a rule of objective rights’.443 
Others claim there are rights of users, and there should be a clear definition and protection for 
them in copyright law.444 In reality, users’ rights in some jurisdictions have received explicit 
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Supreme Court imprimatur in Canada,445 and recent First Amendment decisions in the United 
States have a substantial users’ right tenor. The Supreme Court cited with approval, Professor 
David Vaver’s statement that ‘user rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user 
rights should therefore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial 
legislation’.446  
 
The purpose here is not to join the debate, but there is an essential question that needs to be 
considered: to ensure copyright law to be more balanced, is it appropriate to entitle users a 
general right as a conflicting fundamental right against owners’ copyright? In the broad sense, 
the difference principle of Rawls’s theory sets out to arrange the basic structure to enable 
undeserved inequalities to ‘work for the good of the less talented’.447The less talented people 
are, in this context, small creators and the users who are also potential creators. In doing so, 
everybody in the society will benefit through this social cooperation. 448  The undeserved 
economic inequalities have to cover the costs for training and education for re-creation and the 
sustainable development of creative works.449 Thus, it has to be observed that not all uses are 
qualified for this purpose. Therefore, those users who are potential creators have to be 
distinguished from those general users who are purely exploiters and/or potential users. The 
scope and types of users is broad but not all of them enjoy the equal legal position as to 
copyright LEs.  
 
3.4.2.4 Relevant Unsettled Issues Regarding Social Justice  
Based on what has been found it is appropriate to employ social justice to justify and design 
copyright LEs, there are remaining issues that need further study for designing concrete 
enforceable provisions. First, the overridability of LEs has to be explored. If they are not 
overridable, to what extent have they been respected in practice? if this is not the case, is it 
necessary to reform the current LE system. Second, it needs to be discussed whether it is 
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appropriate to codify users’ rights into copyright law as a justification of LEs. To answer this 
question, it is necessary to investigate the nature of users’ rights. Although the doctrine of users’ 
rights has been recognised by some copyright law, there is no normative analysis as to their 
nature; and, more importantly, it is necessary to define the scope of users’ rights since users 
are numerous but not all copyright-users enjoy the same legal position. Users’ specific rights 
have to be discussed according to their different nature. Third, as a vitally important area, LEs 
for education and research purposes will affect creative activities and social objectives so this 
needs detailed research. However, international treaties do not address this LEs directly, but 
only generally mentioned in the preamble of WCT450 and WPPT451, and in the Appendix of 
Berne Convention it says “the copies are to be used only for the purpose of teaching, 
scholarship or research”452 as a special exception to developing countries. LEs for education 
and research purposes, rights for libraries in particular, as an instance, will be reviewed in the 
context of global public interest in chapter VII. For fulfilling the social objective at the global 
level, the balance of interests between developed and developing countries needs to be 
considered. This issue has been neglected by academia and policy-makers. 
 
3.4.3 The Objective of Cultural Diversity 
As discussed in the theoretical framework in chapter 2, the cultural function as one 
multifunction of the copyright legal system, is another important function that JMOs are 
supposed to perform. The objective of cultural diversity is of equal value as the objectives of 
economic fairness and social justice.453 This topic has been rarely discussed in academia. The 
definition of culture is notoriously difficult to ascertain as it can refer to two disparate concepts 
– cultural expression (centred in art and literature) and sociological and anthropological issues 
(centred in lifestyles, basic human rights, value systems, traditions and beliefs). 454 This thesis 
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will focus on cultural expression – musical works – to discuss the preservation and promotion 
of cultural diversity.  
 
3.4.3.2 Cultural Justification of JMOs  
Culture is the essential condition for genuine development, since the widest possible 
dissemination of ideas and knowledge on the basis of cultural exchanges and encounters is 
essential to humankind’s creative activities and to the full development of the individual and 
of society.455 With respect to the designation of a preferable legislative tool, only if the goal of 
promoting cultural diversity takes a heightened role can a true balancing of interests be 
reached. 456  The maintenance of cultural diversity among cultural industry goods is of 
fundamental importance for long term sustainability of cultural markets and human rights.457 
Cultural conditions must be established which will facilitate, stimulate and guarantee artistic 
copyright creation without political, ideological, economic or social discrimination.458 These 
are social contingencies. 
 
When assessing the justness of the copyright legal system to nurture cultural diversity, it has 
been found that free market competition of the music industry has eliminated small 
rightsholders and threatened small repertoires, especially ones from developing countries. To 
fulfil the cultural function means to maintain the cultural diversity achieved directly by 
enriching the sources, and indirectly by the copyright industries. 459  In other words the 
promotion of creativity by copyright is the promotion of culture.460 A wave of scholars has 
demonstrated the importance of culture and the maintenance of the diversity of cultural 
products,461 and criticised the current international copyright regime as not sufficient to support 
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the diversity in cultural goods. 462  However, cultural function has not been explicitly 
acknowledged by the international copyright regime. In the EU, CMOs’ cultural function has 
been emphasised by means of recitals of the copyright Directive, but without any hard-law 
provisions to enforce it. This thesis will appreciate the full cultural purpose of CMOs with an 
international angle from a manifold way – within a repertoire, between repertoires within and 
between developing and developed countries – for balancing small rightsholders’ interests 
within CMOs; taking small repertories’ interests into account; and supporting small CMOs in 
developing countries.  
 
International copyright treaties do not recognise cultural objectives. The discretion of copyright 
law for cultural development has been left to national policy-makers. Interestingly, outside 
copyright treaties the requirement of cultural diversity is emphasised by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). In 2001, UNESCO issued the 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity which is without legal binding effect. Article 7 
provides that “creation draws on the roots of cultural tradition, but flourishes in contact with 
other cultures”, and “heritage in all its forms must be preserved, enhanced and handed on to 
future generations as a record of human experience and aspirations, so as to foster creativity in 
all its diversity”.463 In 2005, Article 1, objectives of the UNESCO Convention 2005 (often 
referred to as the Convention on Cultural Diversity) provides that “to give recognition to the 
distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles of identity, values and 
meaning”.464 This legal document is a binding international legal instrument. It makes cultural 
diversity a necessary condition of other principles, most notably freedom of expression and 
communication. Proponents and human rights supporters believe that the adoption of this 
international treaty will offset the negative effects of economic globalisation.465  
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The later binding Convention on Cultural Diversity466 has reflected the spirit of cultural justice. 
The preamble states that “taking into account the importance of the vitality of cultures, 
including for persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples, as manifested in their 
freedom to create, disseminate and distribute their traditional cultural expressions and to have 
access thereto, so as to benefit them for their own development”.467 In addition, Article 1,468 
principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, indicates the equality of 
cultural expression; and Article 3,469 principle of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures, 
emphasise the rights of recognition of cultural assets. Article 7, 470 principle of equitable access 
to ensure equal access to all cultural assets, requires the accessibility of all cultural assets. 
Article 8,471 principle of openness and balance, requires all repertoires and cultural supportive 
mechanisms to be open to all right-users, and this can be done via the internet in the digital 
environment. Article 4, 472  principle of international solidarity and cooperation, ensures 
national CMOs’ cooperation. The Convention on Cultural Diversity has set out the general 
principles of cultural justice that can well serve the cultural objective of the copyright legal 
system.  
 
The EU has increasingly placed more emphasis on the cultural objective of copyright policies 
by means of the EU Directive 2014 which recognises the role of CMOs in contributing “to the 
development and maintenance of creativity”,473 and that “CMOs play, and should continue to 
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play, an important role as promoters of the diversity of cultural expression, both by enabling 
the smallest and less popular repertoires to access the market and by providing social, cultural 
and educational services for the benefit of their rightsholders and the public”.474 European 
legislators are clearly in favour of the promotion of culture and creativity as well as cultural 
diversity via copyright law. This can be found in a range of European Directive recitals.475 
 
These bodies’ concerns with cultural diversity might be regarded as a response to the processes 
of globalisation and McDonaldisation, each seen as containing a threat to national or ethnic 
identities and cultures.476 However, none of the international treaties have provided concrete 
or explicit provisions to maintain cultural diversity. The Convention on Cultural Diversity by 
UNESCO is the only international treaty that requires countries to respect cultural diversity as 
a human right. However, it is not a copyright specialised treaty and lacks professional and 
specific protection of interests within the copyright area. 
 
As to the roles JMOs playing to promote cultural diversity, national copyright policies have 
their own attitudes. Many, if not all CMOs are committed to promoting cultural value by 
national copyright laws. They are charged with contributing to the quality of the music culture 
of their territory. This is what Kretschmer has called “solidarity rationale” – which means 
supporting domestic creators, the cross-subsidising of small rights-holders by larger ones, and 
“discrimination between genres”.477 It can also take the form of a commitment to cultural 
diversity. The principle of state sovereignty allows for states to protect the diversity of cultures 
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within the nation.478 Usually, the cultural diversity objective is compared to CMOs. IMEs are 
less restrained by such cultural objectives.  
 
3.4.3.1 Rawls’s Theory and Cultural Justice  
Rawls’s theory provides a different perspective to justify copyright’s cultural objective. Its first 
principle sets out equal political rights between all people which requires equality in the 
assignment of basic rights and duties. When this principle is applied in this context, it indicates 
that people in a society enjoy cultural justice which includes at least equality of cultural 
expression, equitable access, and more importantly, equal recognition of the dignity of and 
respect for all cultures.479 All people, whether famous musicians or small creators, enjoy equal 
political rights of cultural expression, and the rights of equal recognition of the dignity of and 
respect for their cultural expression. All creators equally enjoy the rights to join a JMO 
regardless of their cultural background and social and political status. All musical creations, 
regardless of their origins, should not be rejected from a JMO. Right-users, whether common 
users or potential creators or users with disabilities, have equal rights of access to all cultural 
assets if their purpose is under the justification of the education and research purpose. These 
are fundamental rights and cannot be traded-off for economic purposes. As Rawls pointed out 
that the two ‘principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle prior to the 
second’.480 This ordering means that ‘a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required 
by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, greater social and economic 
advantages’.481 Thus, as a political liberty, rights of cultural expression and access to cultural 
goods have to be ensured and protected by copyright provisions.  
 
When this theory is applied to the digital environment where all cultural assets are able to freely 
flow across-borders and copyrights can be easily managed, licensed, and exploited 
internationally, net-users enjoy universal cultural justice by means of the internet. To fulfil the 
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objective of cultural diversity, JMOs should play their roles to embrace as many as possible 
musical works from all over the world into the repertoire, and at the same time ensure the end-
users’ rights to access all the musical works.  
 
3.4.3.3 Relevant Unsettled Issues Regarding Cultural Diversity  
Since the cultural objective of copyright law cannot stay as a general goal without specified 
provisions and mechanisms, some remaining issues need further research. First, it the scope of 
the meaning of cultural diversity has to be defined in practice and the standards for measuring 
the effectiveness of cultural function played by copyright intermediaries need to be set out. In 
this context these intermediaries are JMOs, whose performance will impact on music cultural 
diversity. More importantly, the scope has to be defined of the less well-off of copyrighted 
assets in different contexts, eg cultural expression and equal access to cultural assets. What is 
needed is a more systematic overview of the role played by JMOs and assessment of their roles 
in promoting cultural diversity. UNESCO uses the concepts of variety, balance and disparity 
to analyse levels or quantities of diversity. However, the copyright legal system has to entrench 
more specified goals and mechanisms to enforce the cultural objective.  
 
A wave of scholars has criticised the current international copyright regime as obstacles to 
cultural diversity, but few reform suggestion has been provided.482 The existing discussions are 
conducted mainly through the lenses of preservation and protection of global musical diversity 
and the diversity of cultural expressions, and emphasised the significance of the cultural goods 
to people; but less discussion has been conducted on the cultural objective by concrete 
provisions and supportive mechanisms, especially the cultural function played by JMOs. The 
international copyright regime should explicitly entrench the cultural diversity goals, and 
moreover, appropriate provisions and effective enforcement measures should also be provided 
and ensured. These issues will be further researched in chapter 7. 
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3.5 Conclusions  
A promising international legal framework is imperative for facilitating cross-border flow of 
musical works. In order to achieve this goal, some essential questions need to be taken into 
consideration, such as how JCM of musical works is performing and evolving in the light of 
the changes brought about by the growth of the internet, digitisation, and an increasingly 
globalised market for digital content, and how the theoretical underpinnings of copyright law 
should be evolved due to these developments and changes in practice. In licensing practice, it 
was supposed that CMOs and IMEs are acting side-by-side in peaceful coexist.483 After the 
investigation of different copyright licensing models worldwide – both CMOs and IMEs, it 
was found that unregulated licensing activities by means of either CMOs or IMEs, have raised 
many issues. The interrelation between the two systems is intermingled and the model of IMEs 
dramatically influence the performance of CMOs. The current music licensing market is 
unregulated and unfair due to the lack of harmonised rules, and it is in need of standardisation. 
If CMOs are established by a voluntary model, they would eventually be completely replaced 
by IMEs. There is not a uniform definition to CMOs and the models of CMOs vary dramatically 
worldwide. But the common problem as to CMOs is they are constantly criticised by 
rightsholders due to their poor performance, partly because CMOs and IMEs are competing 
with each other in an unfair market. This is jeopardising CMOs’ performances further, since 
copyright laws do not regulate licensing activities via IMEs. In addition, IMEs do not have the 
obligations and burdens to fulfil social-cultural functions required by copyright law, usually 
through different social and cultural schemes. In such an unfair licensing market, CMOs are 
facing the threat of being out competed by IMEs. A harmonised copyright framework is needed 
to regulate both CMOs’ and IMEs’ licensing in musical works, by which to facilitate a fairer 
and common arena for all kinds of copyright licensing organisations. 
 
According to the EU’s experience of cross-border licensing in musical works, it can be 
concluded that the European legal framework for CCM and cross-border licensing of 
copyrights have shifted from the wish to harmonise rules on the good governance of CMOs to 
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the need to solve the more pressing multi-territorial licensing issues.484 The most significant 
improvement is that social, cultural and educational uses have been codified, although they are 
not perfectly designed. The Directive, however, is unlikely to strike a proper balance between 
interests at stake. The economic objective of the Directive has focused too much on the internal 
market without considering the issue of economic fairness; and it lacks concrete rules to 
enforce social-cultural benefits.  
 
In the last section, the optimal multifunction of JMOs is analysed and proposed. The analysis 
of the multifunctional objectives of the copyright legal framework are founded on Rawls’s 
justice theory, which has been adopted to assess whether JMOs have appropriately fulfilled the 
requirement of fairness economically, socially and culturally. It finds that firstly, Rawls’s 
theory of justice provides an optimal justification to copyright’s economic objective compared 
to economic analysis justification. Economics analysis cannot sufficiently justify JMOs by 
analysing the reduction of various costs. The scheme of JMOs need to pay more attention on 
economic fairness rather than economic efficiency. Based on the analysis of the difference 
principle it finds that the model of CMOs can pass the assessment test of difference principle 
if they meet some conditions such as mandatory licensing and social-cultural obligations, while 
IMEs do not. Copyright regime should re-establish the balance between different rightsholders, 
and this goal of economic fairness can only be achieved under the Rawls’s difference principle. 
 
Secondly, Rawls’s theory can perfectly justify users’ rights as one of the social objective of 
copyright. A social deduction from JMOs’ revenues is not merely for the purpose of social 
welfare by means of a society scheme for redressing the public interest. Rather, users, as the 
least advantaged, are equally entitled to the rights to enjoy the culture of their his/her society 
and take part in its affairs. The deduction for the purpose of education is to improve the long-
term expectation of the lease off. This justification optimally solves the problem of 
inconsistency of the rationales of LEs existing across member countries. After the Rawlsian 
analysis of social objective and the investigation of issues existing in the current LEs system, 
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some unsettled issues, eg LEs for education and research purposes and libraries’ rights, need 
further detailed study.485 
  
Thirdly, the current business model of IMEs violates Rawls’s principles. JMOs should be 
committed to promoting and protecting the diversity of musical works. However, such an 
obligation has not been written into copyright treaties. Since cultural value has equal position 
to economic and social values in cultural products, cultural function has to be explicitly 
provided by copyright law. In doing so, small rightsholders’ musical works and small 
repertoires have to be included rather than left to the free market.  
 
This chapter has extended the study of the proposed theoretical framework of copyright law 
discussed in Chapter IV to the concrete discussion of multi-objectives of JMOs. In doing so, a 
more functionalised JMOs model founded on the multi-objective copyright legal system has 
been developed to justify and assess JMOs worldwide. This chapter has discussed the 
justification of the multi-objectives of JMOs from a general perspective. The following two 
chapters will research further the multifunction of JMOs, studying the core legal issues in depth 
related to economic fairness, social justice and cultural diversity.   
                                                 




Chapter 4 – The Objective of Economic Function – International 
Copyright Contract Issues 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter studies in depth the core legal issues regarding the objective of economic fairness 
of the international copyright legal framework. This will be done under the multi-objective 
theoretical framework established in chapter 2. As demonstrated in chapter 3, economic 
fairness is of fundamental importance in terms of balancing economic interests between 
different interests at stake, especially for those less better-off. This aspect is currently neglected 
by academic discourse. This chapter intends to fill this research gap. Since this study is from 
the perspective of the international level, the discussed issues will mainly focus on balancing 
interests of the less advantaged group in the context of international copyright contracts. 
 
Substantive copyright law authorises creators to exclusively control their creative works. 
Copyright itself does not generate economic interests for creators. Copyright contracts do. 
Copyright commercial activities through contracts allow an incentive mechanism function by 
which rightsholders get their economic returns.486 At first glance, it is the case that the more 
commercial exploitation of copyrighted works, the more economic interests the creators will 
receive. In practice, however, this is not necessarily true. The core problem here is that the two 
terms of creators and rightsholders have been misconceived. Musicians and performers are the 
people who create musical works. But they usually transfer some or all of their copyrights to 
an intermediary (eg publishers/producers, distributors, adaptors, agents, and CMOs) through 
agreements (exploitation contracts) for managing their musical works and making profits. As 
pointed out by researchers, under copyright law the first owner of a work is usually the 
creator(s). In practice, however, most works are owned by a third-party specialising in 
commercial exploitation, such as a publisher or producer.487 As a result, the stronger party of a 
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commercial agreement gains more part of the revenues. It has been argued that there exists a 
disparity between the parties’ negotiation power to a copyright contract that leads to unfair 
terms and conditions being present in the contracts.488Creators and intermediaries are not a 
community of interest.489 Empirical research has shown that the music industry is a winner-
take-all market prevalent all over the world.490  
 
The reasons behind this phenomenon are multifaceted. First, modern copyright law is not 
especially in favour of individual music creators. Instead, it concentrates power in the hands of 
the intermediaries who control most works which block-up the conduit between creators and 
their audiences. When such gatekeepers control the music market, copyright law cannot play 
its role to balance interests at stake. Second, international copyright contracts have not been 
regulated by a predictable system of choice of law. In practice, creators usually transfer 
copyrights to a third party, authorising them to exploit the works in a commercial way. Too 
many investors are involved in the business chain of the production of musical works. Investors 
take away most of the profits by licensing contracts although they are not the person who 
creates the works.491 Third, there are some critical hurdles to the cross-border exploitation and 
licensing of musical works resulting from the private international law and regulation of the 
collective management of musical works in the online environment.492 To identify appropriate 
choice of law rules, the only solutions would be the creation of a special convention or special 
contract choice of law rules for contracts relating to the international exploitation of 
copyrights.493  
 
So far the research on copyright contracts is less explored, in particular in the context of a 
global copyright legal framework.494  Also, doctrinal discourse on the nature of copyright 
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licences and explanation on the justification of a separate copyright licensing contract law are 
extremely insufficient. 495  To bridge this gap and explore a balanced legal framework to 
enhance creators’ interests, this chapter starts with a positive analysis of the economic function 
of copyright law to investigate what the current legal framework is and why it is in that way, 
and how the law affects the music industry. In section 3, Rawlsian analysis is adopted to discuss 
what the copyright legal system ought to be, and to explore the best, right and justifiable 
copyright legal framework to achieve the objective of economic fairness. After theoretical 
discussion about the general issues existing in the current international copyright licensing area, 
the main issues existing in the two specific areas – practising and enforcing copyrights – will 
be examined in section 4. Copyright practising activities are mainly through various copyright 
contracts in the form of commercial licensing and collective management of copyrights. With 
regard to the enforcement of copyrights, section 4 focuses on the analysis of private 
international law in search of balanced and harmonised rules for cross-border copyright 
licensing.  
 
4.2 A Positive Analysis of Economic Objective  
Although there is not a unified definition of the economic function of the copyright legal system, 
the economic objective has been widely recognised by most copyright legislation. Basically, 
this economic objective can be understood from micro and macro levels. The micro-economics 
of copyright emphasise how much of a right-holder’s total income is generated from copyright 
products, to see how creativity itself is affected. At a macro-economic level, copyright law has 
also provided the foundation for many of the great business fortunes, and has been used rather 
effectively to promote economic power and wealth for a given society.496 This section mainly 
examines the present copyright policies from both micro- and macro-economic perspectives, 
investigates the winner-take-all copyright practice of music industry, to demonstrate what the 
present copyright’s economic objective is, what the relevant legal issues are, and why we need 
to regulate copyright contractual activities. 
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4.2.1 Micro-Economic Function of Copyright  
The principal justification for IP laws in the Anglo-American tradition is economic.497 The 
influence of economics in shaping the copyright regime has hardly been questioned.498 This 
idea is conceptually simple. The rights conferred by copyright law are designed to assure 
contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labours, and been legally 
entrenched as economic interests of rightsholders. Herein, the micro-economic function of 
copyright specifically means the financial aspects of the proprietary rights granted by copyright 
laws. These rights have been recognised in one form or the other since the fifteenth century, 
internationally protected by the oldest and most important international treaty – the Berne 
Convention.499 In addition, the latest international instruments in the field of copyright and 
related rights, the WCT500 and the WPPT501, the so-called “WIPO Internet Treaties”, have also 
explicitly entrenched authors’ economic rights.  
 
Theoretically, creators can rely on copyrights to control their works and gain proper financial 
revenues. This term is used in a very wide sense to include songwriters, composers and 
performers. In general, the creator is the person whose creativity leads to the protected work 
being created, although the exact definition varies from country to country. Composers and 
songwriters have a recognised set of economic rights on their compositions and lyrics. 
Performers and record producers are also entitled to some economic rights, the so-called related 
or neighbouring rights,502 respectively on the fixations of their performances and on the first 
fixation of the sound recording. Since economic copyrights can be transferred partly or wholly 
from creators to a third party, in practice, mostly copyright licences are issued by intermediaries 
instead of creators, to end users. Although composers and performers are the people who create 
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music, they usually assign their economic rights to intermediaries, such as publishers and 
producers through exploitation agreements 503  - copyright licences, because they need 
investment to produce and commercialise their musical works. As a result, the stronger party 
of commercial agreement would arguably beneﬁt more than the actual creators.504 It has been 
argued that a disparity of power between the parties to a copyright contract exists that leads to 
unfair terms and conditions being present in the contracts. 505  This is due to creators’ 
inexperience and unspecialised and/or lack of information during the contractual negotiation 
progress. In the music industry, successful musicians derive the bulk of their incomes from live 
performances and merchandising506 which are commercialised by means of investment from 
intermediaries – IMEs. Only a few creators live their life by revenues from copyright 
royalties. 507  The most frequent point of view is that contracts between creators and 
intermediaries that make the works available publicly, are unfair to the creators who actually 
create the works.508  
 
Free marketing of musical works would worsen this situation. When authors are divested of 
the copyrights of their musical works due to the transferring of rights to intermediaries, the 
issue of unbalanced copyright revenues has arisen. According to economic analysis of 
copyright, intermediaries are essential entities in terms of increase of revenues. By creating a 
market for musical works, they both provide the money that acts as an incentive for creators to 
make new works, and move copies or performances of those works to where users can enjoy 
them. Although intermediaries’ economic interests, mostly the entertainment industry, are in 
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alignment with authors’, their participation in the copyright system is fuelled primarily by self-
interest whereas authors’ motivation regarding creative activities is not necessarily associated 
with economic interests.509 Apparently, the incentives of creators and intermediaries are not 
aligned. Although JCM is justified on the ground of the increase of aggregate revenues of 
copyright, in practice there is a huge unbalance in the distribution of copyright revenues 
between small and large rightsholders. The issue of fair distribution of revenues is more 
pressing to the current music market. Neglect of fairness has led to the legitimate crisis of 
copyright law that the public and some scholars have criticised as favouring rightsholders’ 
private rights.510  
 
Copyright contracts should be regulated. In most jurisdictions, no specific legal framework 
exists at national, regional or international level to regulate copyright licences.511 In practice, 
the formation, contractual content and interpretation of copyright licensing contract apply to a 
range of relevant norms, eg copyright law, general principles of contract law, competition law, 
and commercial law. The investigation of the legal framework of European countries in this 
area has shown a rather fragmented situation in terms of the extent and means of protection of 
the authors who are in a weak position.512   
 
The existing research has widely investigated the issues of copyright licensing contracts513 and 
the measures to enhance small rightsholders’ bargaining power during licensing contract 
negotiation. However, the conclusions obtained are inconclusive or even contradictory. The 
first strand of literature finds that “IP commercial law” has to be designed to support commerce 
in intangible IP as the world moves to an information economy.514 They argue further that this 
IP commercial law should not be a regulatory law but an “enabling” law to support commerce 
by validating common practices, while allowing parties autonomy to tailor specific approaches 
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in different situations.515 On the contrary, another strand of literature claims to adopt a global 
regulatory framework on IP contract law which shall regulate the relationship between IP rights 
and contracts’.516 To fulfil fairness, copyright contracts have to take further action, in the 
legislative field, to regulate commercial transfer of contracts in order to better protect authors’ 
interests.517 The existing contractual protection of authors, as included in copyright law and, 
indirectly, in general contract law, appears not to be sufficient or effective to secure a fair 
remuneration to authors or address some unfair contractual provisions. 518  The lack of 
regulation of the contractual relationship between authors and intermediaries is a factor that 
inﬂuences the protection of authors even where rights are originally granted to them. As a result, 
the aims of protecting individual creators can hardly be attained.  
 
4.2.2 Macro-Economic Function of Copyright and Its Implications 
The free cross-border flow of informational commodity depends on an effective legal 
framework for promoting the cross-border flow on copyrighted goods. The legal framework 
governing cross-border trade of copyrighted content is basically governed by private 
international law and TRIPS. This section will mainly deal with the legal issues within the area 
of international music trade, to examine from a macro-economic perspective whether the 
current copyright legal framework is fair enough to balance copyright interests between 
developed and developing countries. 
 
Copyright can generate economic benefits not only for rightsholders but also for the economy 
of a given society. If we look at income generated from copyright royalties more generally 
from a macro-economic level, we will find that copyright law has provided the foundation for 
many of the great business fortunes, and has been used rather effectively to promote economic 
growth and innovation for societies. As the Hargreaves’ Report519 has pointed out that ‘it is 
widely accepted that the most important driver of long term economic growth is improved 
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productivity. Over the last decade, the majority of productivity growth and job creation has 
come from innovation’. As Article 7 of TRIPS says: ‘The protection and enforcement of IP 
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation… in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations’. The TRIPS 
encompasses a section on enforcement of IP rights, and issues largely untouched by the WIPO 
conventions. 
 
The importance of the macro-economic function of IP law has been highly recognised by most 
countries, especially developed ones. The objective of economic growth can be easily found in 
most copyright legislation.520 In the internet age, it is obvious that music flows across borders 
and is intensively exchanged on a global scale legally or illegally. In any case, in today’s 
interdependent global economy, all countries have an interest in understanding and assessing 
the policy issues which can affect the cross-border exchange of musical assets, either for import 
or for export purposes. Therefore, it is important to design a balanced and fair policy framework 
to promote the cross-border flow of copyrighted commodities. Legal hurdles to the cross-
border flow of music are, firstly, the potential differences in the substantive level of protection 
of music (as resulting from the substantive copyright laws) which may exist between national 
or regional copyright regimes; and secondly, more importantly, from other fields such as 
private international law and the regulation regarding the CCM.521 The cross-border exchange 
of copyrighted goods is particularly critical for smaller countries which have no or limited 
natural and/or cultural resources and which thus rely on the import or export of copyrighted 
assets for their continuing economic development and social and cultural welfare. For instance, 
Switzerland is not a major producer of cultural products such as music and films.522 As a result, 
Switzerland largely imports foreign cultural products for its local population and would thus 
have an interest in creating a legal framework under which the import of music should be 
promoted.  
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It is also of great significance for developed countries to promote cross-border flow of musical 
works to developing countries for the following reasons. First, the copyright regime of 
developing countries is comparatively weak. The promotion of legitimate exploitation of 
musical works in developing countries would be helpful to nurture the awareness of copyrights 
protection among the general public. Secondly, it is also able to curtail online piracy which 
nowadays continues to be a widespread problem in developing countries.523 It has been proven 
that the anti-piracy campaigns can hardly be successful alone due to the uncontrollable 
dissemination of information goods by digital technologies. The best way is to encourage new 
business models and legitimate exploitation of musical works.524 Accordingly, relevant JCM 
law is needed. Moreover, developing countries are opposed to the proposal of stopping piracy 
because they claim they have the right of free access to technology and scientific developments 
in order to be able to develop.525 In 1994, the TRIPS agreement was introduced, aiming at 
reducing those distortions and impediments to international trade of IP assets. This pressure, 
led to the expeditious enactments and reforms of IP laws in developing countries and 
subsequent setting of enforcement measures before allowing enough time prior to enforcement 
during which these countries can adapt their political, economic, social and cultural situations 
for such enforcement. That is one of the reasons why developing countries are still facing many 
critical problems which hamper the promotion and protection of IP rights such as enforcement 
of their laws, although they have enacted laws for IP protection which include enforcement 
provisions. 
 
The law regulating cross-border trade of copyrighted works has been basically harmonised at 
the global level by TRIPS even though differences in the substantive scope of protection may 
exist between the relevant national regulations in particular with respect to new technological 
developments. However, since TRIPS came into force, it has been subject to criticism from 
developing countries and academics. Many advocates of trade liberalisation regard TRIPS as 
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poor policy.526 As the needs of the global exchange of musical works increase, issues within 
international licensing contracts have become another concern which law-makers have to pay 
more attention to. One critical element and difficulty in this assessment is to adopt a balanced 
approach between the protection of local interests and meeting global needs. Even though 
globalisation is a phenomenon which cannot be avoided, local interests must not be sacrificed 
at all costs for the purpose of removing barriers to the free flow and exchange of copyright 
assets.527 A global regulatory framework could be considered, as such a balanced approach 
which ensure an appropriate protection of copyright works and promote the cross-border 
transfer and use of copyright assets, without threatening the cross-border flow of human 
resources and technology for the benefit of creative entrepreneurs and of industries, and for the 
society as a whole.  
 
4.2.3 Is “Winner-take-all” just? 
Empirical research has shown that roughly 10% of copyright related income goes to 90% of 
artists and, vice versa, 90% goes to 10%.528 For the payments of CMOs, the top 10% of authors 
receive 60-90% of total income. 529  Such “winner-take-all” markets are prevalent in most 
cultural industries. Interestingly, some researchers believe that this does not conflict with the 
aims of copyright law.530 Throsby asserts that the arts market shows an oversupply of creative 
ambitions.531 This is because more products want to enter the market than can be consumed.532 
So they believe it is important to ensure high quality products enter into the market, and this 
role is performed by IMEs acting as selectors or gatekeepers. In the music industry, publishers, 
producers, various online ISPs, and broadcasters can play this role for different markets. Most 
musicians would like to get into the market, but only famous celebrities with a track record, 
about one in ten releases, will win the chance to get repaid their initial investment.533  
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There are three main assumptions underlying the belief that the winner-take-all distribution of 
copyright earnings is just and does not conflict with the objective of copyright law to maintain 
sustainable development of cultural goods. The first assumption is that it is just for the market 
to pick the winner534 and that copyright law must not presume cultural judgement. Based on 
this argument, ‘best’ means bestselling, and bestselling titles are indeed the only ones that 
copyright law is meant to incentivise and reward. The second is that creators are risk takers535 
and without the prospects of potential superstar earnings, nobody would become an author or 
artist. However, it is unlikely that artistic production by lower earning creators would cease 
without the incentive of copyright royalties from a possible bestseller. The oversupply of 
creators, and the resulting failure of many authors and artists to make a sustainable living, may 
be simply due to an overestimation of their chances of financial success. The third assumption 
is that oversupply leads to gatekeepers536 Who perform a valuable function by weeding out 
lower quality works in favour of “the best”. A gatekeeper’s objective is to find the works that 
have the best chance of being commercially successful.  
 
The arguments above reflect the position of enabling law to support commercialisation of 
musical works in a free market, while allowing parties’ autonomy to tailor specific approaches 
in different situations. It believes that the free market is the most efficient model for the 
distribution of wealth in an economic entity, and is accordingly efficient for creation and 
distribution of copyrighted resources. The falseness of this view is apparent in that it fails to 
distinguish the difference between copyright creative activity from copyright practice. The 
former is a social behaviour conducted by people consciously or unconsciously, whereas the 
latter is a commercial activity aimed at pursuing profits. They are different in nature. Based on 
the recognition of this difference, this thesis will argue against the position above from three 
main aspects as follows.  
 
                                                 





First, creators are not risk takers. Intermediaries are. The creative activities are not for the 
purpose of marketing.537 There will never be oversupply of cultural creations or creators.538 
For one thing, cultural expression is one of the universal human rights of each person which 
has been recognised by the UDHR, whether they are creators or potential creators. Each person 
has the freedom of creativity. For the other thing, creative activities are one of the human social 
and communicated behaviours which benefit the conservation and development of cultural 
goods. The basic idea is that the bigger the repertoire of cultural products, the better for re-
creation. More cultural products will enrich the storage of resources for recreation.539 Hence, 
creativities should be supported and encouraged. Not every artist wants their work to become 
commercial. Some of them would like their works to be enjoyed freely by as many people 
around the world as possible.540 The intermediaries take the risk to choose to invest in some 
works, which are actually a tiny part of the whole repertoire. The purpose of such commercial 
investment is obvious in that they see the potential commercial values and hope to make profits 
from the works. Some musical works do make huge revenues for intermediaries while some 
do not. Intermediaries take this risk.  
 
Second, intermediaries do not create. Intermediaries’ contribution to a musical work is purely 
investment and commercial activities, not creation. Two of the largest music publishers, EMI 
and Warner, are owned or controlled by investment firms. 541  The role of marketing is 
commercially important, but is quite different from making a creative contribution. The 
erroneous belief that copyright law is the engine of creativity in the popular sense is based on 
a misperception of the role of copyright in the marketplace. In any commodity business, the 
most benefits flow to gatekeepers because they have most leverage in contracts for the purchase 
and sale of the commodity.542 Even the winner has to pay different fees and cannot get too 
much at the end. Intermediaries get most commercial profits.543  
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Third, one of the objectives of the copyright legal framework is to balance economic interests 
and fulfil economic fairness. However, in practice, most commercial profits generated by the 
creative works go into the intermediaries’ pockets, not creators. This has always been done by 
various means of commercial contracts between creators and gatekeepers. Authors with weak 
bargaining power have not received their due. Modern copyright law is not especially in favour 
of either creators or users; instead, it concentrates power in the hands of the intermediaries who 
have controlled most works which block-up the conduit between creators and their 
audiences. 544  Acting as gatekeepers, those intermediaries use their influence and their 
proprietary rights to obstruct one another’s exploitation of copyrighted works. 545  When 
gatekeepers commercially control the market of cultural products, copyright law is not able to 
play its role to balance interests at stake.  
 
This section adopts a positive analysis to examine the economic objective in the present 
copyright legal system from micro- and macro-economic perspectives. It finds that the 
economic objective based on the principle of efficiency leads to “winner-take-all” in the free 
music market. Then it argues against the position of approving “winner-take-all” by analysing 
three assumptions of this argument. To further prove the unjustness of “winner-take-all”, the 
following section will analyse the issue by a normative Rawlsian analysis.  
 
4.3 A Rawlsian Analysis of the Economic Fairness  
The aim of this section is to conduct a Rawlsian analysis to demonstrate why JMC should be 
regulated to fulfil economic fairness. As discussed above, the traditional belief as to the 
rationale of JMC is their economic value546 due to the fact that economics is elementary to 
copyright practice. This section is not going to contest the economic values brought by 
copyright practice or the potential benefit of the opportunity for creators to reap profits from 
their works. Rather, its purpose is to examine the inappropriateness of the principle of 
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efficiency to underpin copyright’s economic function, aiming at searching for a more 
reasonable principle to justify JMC’s economic objective.  
 
The relation between the economic concept of efficiency and the principle of fairness is usually 
cast as an adversarial one. Economic efficiency is a broad term that implies an economic state 
in which every resource is optimally allocated to serve each person in the best way while 
minimising waste and inefficiency.547 The principle of efficiency is originally intended to apply 
to particular configurations of the economic system. So, it is also usually applied by economic 
studies to assess the efficiency of the distribution of musical works by JMOs.548 Under this 
principle, the resulting efficient distribution is accepted as just. According to the dominant 
economic analysis, copyright attempts to achieve the optimal allocation of scarce resource in 
order to enhance social welfare, roughly interpreted as the maximum production of wealth at 
macro level.549 The only distributive principle in economics is that a given resource should be 
allocated by the most efficient use, regardless of other individuals or fairness.550 Economic 
theory trusts in the power of the market to produce efficient outcomes, completely disregarding 
the consideration of distributive fairness. Some economic analysis believes that there is a trade-
off between efficiency and fairness – as Landes and Posner contend, ‘striking the correct 
balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law’.551 An optimal 
level of copyright protection must trade off the benefits in terms of dynamic efficiency of 
creating incentives to supply information goods against the costs in terms of the allocative 
efficiency of restricted access. Economists’ usual attitude is that copyright law should be 
shaped by efficiency concerns, and fairness can be achieved through taxing and spending 
policies.552  
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Rawls’s justice as fairness is often concerned with the distribution of wealth. This is highly 
relevant to the distribution of copyright resources. Rawls pointed out that the difference 
principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency,553 that it also has such an effect to 
represent efficient distribution. According to Rawls, when the difference principle is fully 
satisfied, it is indeed impossible to make any one representative man better off without making 
another worse off, namely, the least advantaged representative man whose expectations we are 
to maximise.554 So, the defined justice is consistent with the principle of efficiency, at least 
when Rawls’s principles are perfectly fulfilled.555  
 
For considering designing a just social and economic process which would be compatible with 
the two principles, Rawls has outlined a set of political and legal institutions that would ensure 
a just basic structure, Firstly, Rawls assumes three background conditions – a just constitution 
that secure equal liberties of citizenship;556 fair equality of opportunity that all are assured equal 
chances for education;557  and government actively enforces free choice of occupation by 
“policing conduct of firms.558 Secondly, Rawls specifies further background institutions to 
ensure the basic structure is just –four branches of government, namely an allocation branch, a 
stabilization branch, a transfer branch, and a distribution branch.559 The allocation branch is to 
keep the price system workably competitive and to prevent the formation of unreasonable 
market power.560 The stabilization branch strives to bring about reasonably full employment” 
so that whoever wants to work can find it, and the free choice of occupation and the deployment 
of finance are supported by strong effective demand.561 These two branches together are to 
maintain the efficiency of the market economy generally.562 The essential idea of a transfer 
branch is that ‘it takes needs into account and assigns them their appropriate weight’, since 
Rawls believes ‘competitive price system gives no consideration to needs and therefore it 
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cannot be the sole device of distribution’.563 The distributive branch aims ‘to preserve an 
approximate justice in distributive shares by means of taxation and the necessary adjustments 
in the rights of property’.564 The distribution branch has two aspects. First, it imposes a number 
of inheritance and gift taxes, which ‘gradually and continually…correct the distribution of 
wealth and…prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty 
and opportunity’. The second part ‘is a scheme of taxation to raise the revenues that justice 
requires’: to pay for public goods and make the transfer payments necessary to satisfy the 
difference principle. 565  When these institutions meet all the requirements, the distribution 
resulting from the designed social system is just, however things turn out. 
 
Rawls’s theory embraces the principle of efficiency of the free market, by the allocation branch 
and stabilization branch, and at the same time to maintain social justice by the transfer branch 
and distributive branch. The notable feature is, however, in Rawls’s justice as fairness the 
principles of justice are prior to the consideration of efficiency.566 Rawls suggests that justice 
has priority over efficiency and liberty over social and economic advantages, and that fairness 
is an independent normative criterion to assess whether a law is just or unjust. 567 He believes 
that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory 
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and 
institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they 
are unjust’.568 When a scheme is not just, justice requires some changes even it is efficient in 
this sense. So, the standard of fairness under the meaning of Rawls’s theory is higher and 
stricter than the principle of efficiency. 
 
When Rawls’s theory is applied to ensure distributive justice in copyright revenues, the 
requirements of background conditions are explained like this. First, each stakeholder, 
including creators, intermediators and users, is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
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basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. As to the supply side of 
copyrights, they expect to be authorised the same bundles of copyrights and equally protected 
by copyright law, and equally enjoy economic and moral benefits generated from their creative 
works. However, in practice, small rightsholders usually are not able to enjoy the same 
proprietary rights as large rightsholders due to the fact that small rightsholders possess less 
business resource. For increasing copyright revenues, rightsholders authorise the exploitation 
of their works through licensing contracts. Due to asymmetry of information and inexperience 
of negotiation, individual creators are usually in a weaker position in licensing contracts 
negotiation.569 Second, all rightsholders have to be ensured fair equality of opportunity in the 
commercial activities. Rawls demonstrated that the meaning of fair equality of opportunity is 
‘to be not only open in a formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them’.570 
Rightsholders have to be given equal opportunity in economic activities, such as to join or 
withdraw from a JMO, receive investment from an intermediary, and sign a copyright licensing 
contract in an equal negotiating position. This is impossible in practice since intermediaries are 
gatekeepers who only select to invest in business potential works. Also, since each person is 
born with different talents and abilities, and these contingencies are accumulated over a period 
of time, one of the schemes is to allocate resources in education so as to improve the long-term 
expectation of the least favoured.571 Thus, musicians and potential musicians should be assured 
equal chances for education (either through public education or subsidized private schools). 
Third, musicians have equal opportunity in free choice of occupation. This is achieved by 
policing the conduct of JMOs, including both CMOs and IMEs, and by preventing the 
establishment of monopolistic restrictions and barriers to the more desirable positions.572 In 
addition, the government should function to establish these background institutions, to ensure 
the efficiency of the music market economy generally, and takes small creators’ needs into 
account and assign them their appropriate weight, to preserve an approximate justice in 
distributive shares. 
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According to the principle of fairness, business models of copyright licensing have to be 
regulated by just governmental and legal institutions. No free market is perfect to 
spontaneously fulfil distributive justice.573 The social system has to be designed so that the 
resulting distribution of copyright revenues is just. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to set 
the social and economic process within the surroundings of suitable political and legal 
institutions. Without the proper arrangement of these background institutions the outcome of 
the distributive process will not be just. Thus, this study adopts Rawls’s principle of fairness, 
rather than economic efficiency, to assess and evaluate copyright’s economic objective.  
 
4.4 International Copyright Contract Issues  
As discussed above, copyright contracts need to be regulated since they affect the balance of 
economic interests between different rightsholders. The discussion of copyright contract is not 
new. However, the topic of international copyright and global contracts is a tough one.574 Legal 
scholars do not endorse any international legislation concerning copyright and contracts due to 
the natural inﬂexibility of international conventions, so it is a global consensus of the absence 
of copyright contract law.575 Contractual provisions in the context of copyright transactions 
appear to be overreaching which would harm users’ interests.576 Thus, the main task of this 
section is to analyse international copyright contract rules under the copyright legal system in 
accordance with the objective of economic fairness. 
 
4.4.1 The Relationship between Copyrights and Contracts  
In the music industry, contract negotiation occurs within each stage of the commercial process 
of musical works. The value chain of producing music works involves many investors. 
Contracts can be used to help a rightsholder to exercise copyright, but contracts may also be 
used to prejudice creators’ interests, due to their weak bargaining power. The use of contracts 
can influence copyright balance in a number of ways, affecting the proprietary process and the 
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relationship between creators and publishers/producers; right-owners and users. As Halbert 
observes, ‘authors transfer their bundles of sticks to the publisher then holds sole proprietary 
interest over the work and continues to profit with very little going back to the authors’.577 It is 
not surprising, then, that in practice the creators’ rights did not remain with creators for long, 
as creators continue to assign their works outright for lump sum payments. Copyright law 
emerged as a publisher’s but not an author’s right.578  
 
Contracting is important to copyright enforcement. Copyright law provides proprietary rights 
to creators for creative works that meet certain criteria, but copyright by itself does not generate 
revenues for creators. Contracts enforcing copyright law do and allow an incentive mechanism 
to operate. 579  The main difference between a copyright legal relationship and contractual 
relationship is that a contract only binds those who are a party to the contract, whereas a 
copyright binds the entire world. Nonetheless, this distinction in the sense that a contract is 
between individuals and copyright is against the world, is, in the digital context, breaking down. 
The acceptance of a standard licensing contract before using a copyrighted work by individual 
users has become prevalent in practice. For example, when an online music subscriber registers 
as a member of iTunes, Spotify or Kugou, he/she has to agree a standard agreement with all 
the default terms and conditions before using the music services.  
 
As we know, copyright exploitation has become increasingly global in nature in the digital 
era,580 since copyright products, musical works particularly, flow beyond borders easily and 
frequently. However, copyright laws remain national or territorial. There is a mismatch 
between the patch-work of national protection on the one hand and the single global 
exploitation of copyright, with the accompanying needs in the enforcement field, on the 
other. 581  There is a growing need to develop common legal rules to guide and support 
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international commercial contracting practices involving copyright. The regulation of cross-
border copyright contracts could also enhance authors’ contractual position, protecting their 
legitimate economic rights authorised by law. 
 
Copyright issues usually involve two aspects under international private law in that certain 
issues can be qualified as being part of the copyright as such, while other issues should rather 
be qualified as contractual ones.582 The distinction between issues concerned with copyright 
itself and issues concerned with copyright contracts is not always obvious.583 It has to be noted 
that it is important to distinguish issues between the two aspects to decide what is negotiable 
and what is not. Copyright issues are regulated by national or territorial copyright laws which 
have been minimally harmonised by some international copyright treaties. When dealing with 
a relevant case in practice, both the elements of copyrights and contracts as such would be 
involved. For example, the court has to distinguish between, on the one hand, the question 
whether and under which circumstances the copyright could be assigned or transferred that are 
governed by the law of the protecting country; and, on the other hand, the interpretation of the 
contract and the determination of the rights and duties of the parties that are decided under the 
law of contract. In the context of cross-border copyright contracts, this issue would become 
more complex due to the involvement of choice of law.  
 
4.4.2 Distinguishing Features of Copyright Contracts  
In most jurisdictions, copyright contracts are most often of a hybrid nature of both copyright 
and contract, for which no specific legal framework exists at national, regional or international 
level.584 De Werra states that a copyright contract is a blended contractual covenant in that it 
blends features of contract and copyright. As such, breach of a licence condition covenant can 
trigger copyright infringement, not merely breach of contract.585 The main difference between 
copyright contracts and other common contracts is that a central element of copyright is 
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involved. Copyright contract mainly contains two elements. First, there is the determination of 
the rights and duties of the parties and, secondly, there is the transfer of proprietary rights, i.e. 
all or part of the copyrights.586 A contract is supposed to be a key element and a powerful 
instrument by which rightsholders bargain for and preserve their interests. Proprietary 
entitlements cannot be effectively used or implemented without the involvement of contracts. 
The right to decide how their work is used, exploited, transferred, assigned, licensed, or 
distributed, either for commercial or non-commercial purposes, is in the hands of rightsholders. 
This central principle and feature has been authorised by international copyright regime and 
national copyright law.  
 
The principle of freedom of contract is of importance in the context of international trade. This 
principle allows right-owners to decide freely to whom they will offer their goods and by whom 
they wish to be supplied, as well as the possibility for them freely to agree on the terms of 
individual transactions. These are the cornerstones of an open, market-oriented and competitive 
international economic order. However, the principle of freedom of contract also has 
drawbacks, especially when the contractual parties are at different negotiating positions. There 
is an unbalanced negotiation power between copyright contractual parties. Freedom of contract 
suggests that parties should be allowed to bargain freely over their rights. The initial 
endowment of rights and obligations under the international copyright regime may be 
subsequently modiﬁed, transferred, limited, suppressed, waived, disposed of, or bargained 
away by contracts or through voluntary agreements between parties following the principle of 
freedom of contract. 587  It assumes that assenting parties who voluntarily enter a private 
exchange have reached a bargain that makes them both better off, or else they would not have 
entered into it.588 This conclusion holds true only in the absence of any market failure that 
would undermine the fundamental proposition that both parties acted voluntarily or that they 
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were fully informed. In the absence of a perfect market, limitations on the parties’ abilities to 
engage freely in transactions may be a more preferable way.589  
 
Creators lose control when subsequent contractual parties participate in the exploitation of 
copyrights. Copyright contracts concluded between creators and transferees will govern their 
relation from the negotiation of the contract to its execution and termination. Protection of 
creators is necessary at each stage of contract – during the negotiation to counterbalance the 
weaker position and lack of information; during the exploitation of works to guarantee the 
creators’ fair remuneration and control over the enforcement of the contract, if needed; in the 
termination of contract to enable the creators to escape from an unfair deal.590 That the creator 
effectively gets a fair share of the revenues of her work along the whole value chain will 
strongly depend on elements other than the first contract.591 The first transferee of the copyright 
will enter into contractual relationships with subsequent exploiters (broadcasters, retailers, 
online platforms, video-on-demand providers), in which authors will have no say.592  
 
In the context of international copyright law, cross-border copyright contracts involve foreign 
elements and consequently the issue of conflict of laws. Contracts in relation to the 
international exploitation of copyrights have always given rise to complex private international 
law problems. These problems have, in recent years, been aggravated by the growing 
importance of this international exploitation. Increasing numbers of copyrighted works are 
exploited internationally and many of the contracts now cover the worldwide exploitation of 
the copyrights concerned. Neither the Berne Convention nor the Rome Convention 1980 has 
solved these problems conclusively yet. Basically, the formation, contractual content and 
interpretation of copyright contract apply to a range of relevant norms, specifically copyright 
law, general principles of contract law, competition law, and commercial law. The 
investigation of the legal framework of EU Member States in this area has shown a rather 
fragmented situation in terms of the extent and means of protection of the authors who are in a 
                                                 
589 ibid, 108. 





weak position.593 Many difficulties arise when national choice of law rules are applied to 
international contracts for the exploitation of copyrights. This issue of choice of law rules will 
be discussed further according to the specific type of copyright contracts. 
 
4.4.3 International Copyright Contracts in Musical Works  
This section examines copyright contract issues in the music sector, recommending the 
harmonisation of international private law rules in this area and provision of predictable rules 
for cross-border copyright licensing. The flow of rights and royalties in the music industry 
shows a complicated process in practice, especially when different licensing models, eg 
business-type licensing and CCM in musical works, are mingled together in practice. In 
business-type licensing, authors tend to join a publisher which can take care of their copyrights 
more efficiently than CMOs, and potentially bring more royalties and pay more quickly. Others 
may choose to join a society due to their weak negotiation to gain an advanced transferring 
contract with publishers. At the same time, publishers can also join a CMO through which 
worldwide licensing could be performed by means of a reciprocal agreement with their sister 
CMOs. Then CMOs will collect royalties on behalf of their members and distribute them to 
their members. In addition, some recording labels develop musicians, working with producers, 
paying for and arrange studio time, mixing, mastering, designing graphics, packaging, 
distributing, and marketing.594 All these services are performed based on copyright contracts 
between the recording label and authors/performers. As illustrated by the following diagram, 
the copyright licensing of musical works in the UK is very sophisticated (diagram 6.1). When 
put in the larger environment of global copyright licensing, the relationship between different 
stakeholders would be even more complicated. Thus, a classification of the different copyright 
contracts beforehand would be apropos for clarifying the contractual relationships and defining 
the scope of the discussion. 
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Diagram 6.1 The Flow of Rights and Royalties in the UK595 
 
According to the different stages of the flow of copyrights, this study classifies copyright 
contracts into three main categories: contracts of copyright ownership, exploitation contracts 
and licensing contracts. The exploitation contracts, from the supply side, are between 
creators/rightsholders and intermediaries; whereas licensing contracts, from the demanding 
side, are between right owners and end-users (including commercial and non-commercial 
users), normally launched by large rightsholders. This section will focus on discussing the 
issues of international copyright contracts.596 First it will analyse the issues of initial ownership. 
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Then, it will move on to discuss the issues of exploitation contracts and, finally, the issues of 
licensing contracts between right-owners and users. 
 
4.4.3.1 Authorship and Initial Ownership Relevant Contractual Issues  
The initial ownership can be a copyright contract issue because initial ownership can be 
negotiable in some countries but not in others. The drawback of treating initial ownership as 
an issue accessory to a contract is that in contract law there is a measure of freedom of 
disposition to choose the applicable law. Since authors are usually in a weak position in 
contractual negotiation, the terms of an employer-friendly copyright law are easily made. So, 
initial ownership issues can influence the copyright balance, affecting the interests of the 
original creators. It is, therefore, important to identify who owns the factual authorship rather 
than ownership. This is the first step to balance real creators’ interests. 
 
However, the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention are virtually silent 
on this economically salient question597 - who qualifies as the author and original owner of 
rights in a literary or artistic work? Indeed, there is not a universal legal definition of “author” 
of a work so they substantially differ between national laws. International treaties do not 
specify the issue of beneficiaries of protection. The preamble of the Berne Convention refers 
to the ‘rights of authors in their literary and artistic works’, whilst Article 2(6) lays down that 
protection under the convention is to operate for the benefit of the ‘author and his successors 
in title’; but the Convention neither designates who is an author, nor establishes general rules 
concerning the transfer of title. It is not clear whether the convention limits authorship to natural 
persons or individuals or whether authorship can be vested in a legal entity. The absence of 
clarification leads to different implementations of the Convention and legal traditions between 
member countries.  
 
Also, the importance of acquirement of authorship or initial ownership should not be 
overlooked since these are preliminary issues needed to be determined before copyright 
                                                 




enforcement and this would also influence authors’ economic interests. If a person wants to 
enforce copyright, he/she must have the ownership first. So, the ownership of a copyrighted 
work becomes the basis of any follow-up activities, for example licensing or transferring the 
ownership of the work. In the international law context, it is of fundamental importance to 
identify the factual authors when a multi-national authorship happens, especially when more 
than two natural persons jointly own a copyrighted work. But this has not been paid enough 
attention yet by policy-makers.  
 
It has to be noted that initial ownership is not exactly the same as authorship even though the 
term often coincides with it, or denotes the actual creator. Indeed, in most jurisdictions, whether 
common law or civil law, the individual ownership of copyright is usually vested initially in 
the flesh-and-blood author of the work, that is, the natural person who creates the work. But, 
in some countries initial ownership of works is not necessarily authorised to the factual authors 
who created it. For example, in some circumstances before starting to produce copyrighted 
products, creators might contract with certain entities, usually in forms of employment 
contracts, commission contracts or other bilateral agreements for the supply of services to 
acknowledge the initial ownership of the promising works. In this situation, the initial 
ownership can be vested to employers or commissioners under some national copyright laws. 
This is the case in many common-law countries, the US, UK and Netherlands for example, that 
authorship is vested ab initio in employers who can be legal persons. 598 Other countries, 
Germany for example, strictly stipulate a general rule that an employee is the owner and author 
of the copyrighted work produced under the course of his employment,599 and the author must 
of necessity be a natural person.600 Under the French code, the right to ownership of a copyright 
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work is given to the natural person who creates the work, irrespective of his/her status.601 Thus, 
the issue of authorship and initial ownership is something totally dependent on national laws 
or regional laws with a distinct divergence between the civil law and common law 
approaches.602 International law does not regulate the authorship within employment either. As 
a result, it generally leaves the determination of authorship, ownership to national law but those 
national rules often diverge.  
 
Where two or more authors have collaborated in creating a single work, legislation in most 
countries will treat them as co-authors and co-owners and will measure the work’s term of 
protection from the death of the last surviving co-author.603 Choice of law does not solve the 
problem of multi authorship. The position of the commissioned work in civil law countries is 
simple – the author is usually the owner of copyright in the work, with very rare exceptions 
such as commissioned advertising work under French copyright law.604 Under UK law, where 
a work is commissioned, the ownership of copyright usually belongs to the creator of the work, 
but in certain circumstances, the court may find that the commissioner of a work has implied 
licence to exploit the work in a limited manner, or that the commissioner of the work has 
equitable title to the copyright in the work.605 Under US copyright law, the category of ‘works 
made for hire’ comprises not only employee works, but nine categories of specially 
commissioned works.606  
 
In the music industry employment contracts and commission contracts have been widely used 
nationally and transnationally between songwriters/performers and producer/publishers. 607 
However, there is no private international law that offers a uniform choice of law rule for the 
identification of factual authorship. Neither the copyright conventions nor the TRIPS 
                                                 
601 ibid, 86. 
602 ibid, 84. 
603 Goldstein (n 597) 207. 
604 Dutfield and Suthersanen (n 600) 86. 
605 ibid. 
606 ibid. 
607  See Jean Vincent, ‘10 Music Contracts’ (2009) UNESCO 
<http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/diversity/pdf/WAPO/10Music_en.pdf> accessed 28 
May 2017; See also iMusician, ‘Licensing Agreements in the Music Business’   
<https://www.imusiciandigital.com/en/licensing-agreements/> accessed 28 May 2017. 
  
143 
agreement contain a minimum standard or choice-of-law rule for establishing who is a work’s 
author or, apart from Article 14bis (2) of the Berne Paris Act dealing with rights in 
cinematographic works, for determining who is the work’s initial owner. Case law on this issue 
is sparse.608 The absence of supranational norms of authorship and ownership means that 
claimants may encounter varying outcomes depending on which domestic rules a court finds 
competent to resolve a conflict of authorship or ownership.609 While the facts of many cases 
present a question of what law should be applied to determine authorship and ownership, courts 
rarely address the question directly; choice of law is typically implicit in the results of these 
cases.610 
 
4.4.3.1.1 Lex Loci Protectionis  
There is a position that believes that issues of authorship and initial ownership of literary and 
artistic works are as a rule to be determined under the law of protecting country. 611 
Traditionally, the choice of law rule of lex loci protectionis (the law of protecting country) 
governs non-copyright issues.612 Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention provides the law of the 
protecting country that ‘… apart from the provisions of this convention, the extent of protection, 
as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed 
by the laws of the country where protection is claimed’.613 This law of the protecting country 
is the law of the country in which the work is being used, in which the exploitation of the work 
takes place.614 Under this approach, if A, a US national, creates and first publishes a work in 
the US under circumstances in which A’s employer B, as the work’s author and first owner. If 
A’s works are being used in France then the protecting country’s law, French law, will be 
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applied so that A will, nonetheless, be considered the work’s author and first owner because in 
France the usual case is that only flesh-and-blood creators are recognised as a work’s author. 
Thus, the lex protectionis is a problem because it demands the question of who initially owns 
a work to the laws of all the countries where the work is protected. If one were to let the lex 
protectionis govern issues of initial ownership, the result would be legal uncertainty as to who 
qualifies as initial right owner.615 And the potential worse situation is foreign rightsholders’ 
legitimate interests would be discriminated by local institutions. The law of lex protectionis 
does not necessarily give the creator the best protection available vis-a-vis other potential right-
owners such as a producer, employer or investor.616  
 
4.4.3.1.2 Country of Origin 
Another position believes that authorship and initial ownership are to be determined according 
to the law of the work’s country of origin rather than the law of the protecting country.617 In 
the preceding example, where the United States was the work’s country of origin, this approach 
would require treating the corporate employer B, and not the creative employee A, as the 
work’s author and initial copyright owner in all protecting countries. Ricketson seems to 
suggest that it is for the provisions of the private international law of each individual country 
to determine freely which rule on jurisdiction it will operate in relation to the creation and the 
validity of copyright. 618  He clearly rejects an overlap between the country whose law is 
applicable and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of that country. 
 
Both the lex protectionis and lex fori rules do not contribute to legal certainty in the context of 
private international law. Even if copyright laws were very different, the lex protectionis still 
is not the obvious choice if one favours a truly pro-author conflict rule (author in the sense of 
actual creator). The multiplicity of laws that govern ownership questions not only creates legal 
uncertainty for the actual creator as to his or her position but applying the lex protectionis 
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means applying the law of the country where exploitation of the work is taking place. That law 
does not necessarily give the creator the best protection available vis-a-vis other potential 
rights-owners such as a producer, employer or investor. 
 
4.4.3.1.3 Proposed Solution  
In the digital environment, however, universal ownership of copyrights would be a better 
solution to the issue of legal uncertainty, since conflicts between coexisting rights in a global 
medium would vanish.619 It has to be observed that the legal uncertainty is not derived from 
the fact that it is unpredictable which law applies, but from the fact that a multitude of laws 
apply simultaneously.620 Therefore, it is proposed that rather than making ownership subject to 
the different laws of the different countries in which the work is exploited, which could lead to 
uncertainty in the exercise of rights, it makes more sense to identify an owner who will, initially, 
be considered the owner of these copyrights throughout the member countries of the Berne 
Convention.621 
 
Some researchers propose the creator’s law based on functional allocation 622 as an alternative 
choice-of-law rule to deal with the issue of legal uncertainty caused by the application of 
multitude laws of initial ownership. The objective of functional allocation is to protect weaker 
parties. It is used to guarantee that the “weaker” party is protected according to the laws of the 
country where the economic or social activities of the party are typically concerned. Functional 
allocation as a principle with a protective function could also be made the leading principle for 
issues of initial ownership. Using a creator oriented connecting factor corresponds well with 
the objective of copyright and related rights law where rights allocation is concerned, namely 
to reward and stimulate authors – notably the actual creators of works. Given the protective 
function of the law of copyright and related rights towards the actual creators or performers, 
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who are regarded as the weaker parties compared to other parties involved in the production 
and dissemination of works (producers, publishers), functional allocation should be the guiding 
principle for initial ownership.623 
 
The creator’s law, meaning the law of the country where the actual creator has his/her habitual 
residence, should be the principal candidate to determine who owns copyright.624 This goal is 
also in accordance with the objectives of most copyright laws which primarily seek to protect 
and reward actual creators.625 To achieve the objective of addressing legal certainty while 
giving due respect to the diversity in allocation regimes, the term “author” should be given an 
autonomous “super-national” interpretation, and a predictable choice-of-rule should be 
provided.  
 
Generally, if one were to let initial ownership be governed by the author’s law, one would first 
have to determine which law’s definition of author should be used. As discussed above 
international treaties have not given a proper definition of author but only provide that to 
benefit an “author and his successors in title”. 626  It has to be specified clearly whether 
authorship is limited to natural persons or authorship can be vested in a legal entity. If a natural 
person as the author is a rule, employment contract should be able to opt-out (general rules 
concerning the transfer of title). What is more, that author’s habitual residence has jurisdiction 
is a better choice of law rule. That means the use of connecting factors linked to the actual 
creator or performer, notably the habitual residence at the time the work was created or first 
performed. If the author changes their habitual residence during the creation, the last habitual 
residence, i.e. the one at the time of completion of the work, rather than the one at the beginning 
or in between, seems the more appropriate connecting factor.627 
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4.4.3.2 Exploitation Contractual Issue 
The Berne Convention and WIPO Internet Treaties have also recognised that the author’s 
economic rights can be transferred or assigned to a third party.628 This rule is intended to allow 
the author or right-owner to profit financially from their creation, and includes the right to 
authorise the reproduction of the work in any form.629 The performers also have the rights to 
authorise the public performance of their works.630 
 
Certainly, the owner of a copyright is free to exploit the right himself. “Exploit” in this context 
means to develop or make use of it. In many cases, however, that exploitation is, at least 
partially, carried out by third parties. In such cases, a contract for the exploitation of the 
copyright is concluded between the owner and another party who will exploit the right. A 
contract for the exploitation of copyrights can take various forms.631 The most common forms 
are assignments and licences. 632  A licence allows someone to use the work, for example 
reproduce it, in a specified way in a specific territory for a limited period of time. But in practice 
they may also use an assignment to sign away part or all of the rights to another party. An 
assignment can be registered in scope and in time. A copyright transfer is not necessarily 
similar to the assignment of the complete right.633 It is possible to transfer only part of the rights 
or to stipulate that, at the end of a certain period of time, the transfer will be undone and that 
all the rights will return to the original owner of the copyright at that time. In practice, however, 
it can hardly ever happen. Since, after a period of time the ownership of rights might have been 
transferred to subsequent licensees, or the first licensee cannot be allocated because they cannot 
be found. Copyright assignment is the complete transfer of all copyrights and is also called sale 
of copyrighted works. 
 
Exploitation contracts influence copyright balance which is announced to be protected by 
copyright law. In the music industry, copyright exploitation contracts, basically, happen 
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between authors/performers and producers/publishers/CMOs which are also called 
intermediaries, exploiters, investors or gatekeepers (hereafter intermediaries). All these types 
of contracts have in common the fact that they involve a transfer of certain rights to do certain 
acts which would otherwise have constituted an infringement of the copyright in question. 
When copyright involves a commodity business usually in forms of transferring contracts, 
authors’ interests become secondary.634 In any commodity business, the most benefits flow to 
gatekeepers because they have most leverage in contracts for the purchase and sale of the 
commodity. This is particularly true in the case of creative works, where there is a large 
oversupply of people who want to get through the gate.635 Contracts with such gatekeepers are 
hardly ever negotiable and are drafted by the gatekeepers for their own benefit. Gatekeepers 
most often have superior bargaining power. The creators of copyrighted works are not 
guaranteed to receive substantial or even fair benefits under copyright contracts. The existence 
of copyright merely means that the creators have something to bargain away, according to 
whatever leverage they may have, which is most often very little.  
 
In the digital environment contracts are increasingly used by copyright owners to control the 
use of their works online.636 Three types of contractual clauses can be identified that have 
potential to undermine the balance protected by copyright law between authors and exploiters 
– those that inhibit future copyright holders from exploiting their rights; those that extend 
copyright style controls into new areas; and those that exclude copyright style controls contrary 
to the rules found in copyright law.637 These three types of contractual clauses affect the ability 
of right holders to exploit their copyright, for contracts can require both wider and narrower 
degrees of exploitation.  
 
However, creators’ weak position has not been paid enough attention yet, although some 
countries have formulated some regulatory tools that attempt to balance the bargaining powers 
of the parties. For example, the provisions relate to ownership, requirements of form, scope of 
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rights transferred, rights to remuneration, effects on third parties, revision and termination and 
unfair contracts. 638  The evidence to prove the effectiveness of these provisions is very 
limited.639For example, the new Dutch copyright contract law aims to strengthen the position 
of the author and performer in exploitation agreements, and will ideally lead to them receiving 
a fairer share of the profit from their work.640 It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
changes will have the desired effect. 
 
Increasing numbers of copyrighted works are exploited internationally and many of the 
contracts now cover the worldwide exploitation of the copyright concerned. Contracts in 
relation to the international exploitation of copyrights have always given rise to complex choice 
of law problems. These problems have, in recent years, been aggravated by the growing 
importance of this international exploitation. However, there is no private international law that 
offers a uniform choice of law rule for copyright contracts. The comparative analysis of the 
contractual protection of authors in the legislation of the member states reviewed shows a lack 
of harmonisation and great disparities in the application of the existing rules, from legal 
regimes with very detailed provisions to regimes favouring a higher degree of contractual 
freedom.  
 
4.4.4.2.1 There Is a Choice of Applicable Law 
Contractual parties are free to choose the law applicable to the contract. This principle is 
internationally acknowledged and it applies equally to both copyright licensing and copyright 
assignments, and thus, also to copyright contracts. In the EU, the Rome I Regulation provides 
that parties can select the law applicable to all or part of their contract. The choice may be 
expressed or implied so long as it is ‘demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of 
the contract or the circumstances of the case’.641 When the parties make an express or implied 
choice of law, this choice will be the applicable law that does not need to have a particular 
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connection with the contract.642  Likewise, the newly approved Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts has also adopted the same principle in Article 2(4) which 
is applicable to copyright contracts – ‘no connection is required between the law chosen and 
the parties or their transaction’.643 
 
The freedom of choice of law would lead to practical difficulties to contractual parties, 
especially for creators. For example, country A’s composer and country B’s producer reached 
a music production agreement which chooses country C’s copyright law as the applicable law 
since the law is from a neutral third-party country. However, the national copyright laws of the 
three countries have stipulated different formal requirements for effecting a copyright 
assignment. Country A requires the assignment of copyright should be made in a formal writing 
agreement, but countries B and C do not have such requirements; country C’s copyright law 
also forces the composer to assign/waive his/her moral rights which is also contrary to country 
A’s law; in addition, the transferrable economic rights have been listed under country A’s 
copyright law which, however, do not have such categories under country C’s law. Besides, 
there might be another practical problem raised by the language barriers. It is not realistic to 
expect a composer to have command of different languages and comprehend the terms and 
conditions of the contract written in foreign languages, in either countries’ laws.  
 
Territoriality, the principle that a country’s prescriptive competence ends at its borders, is the 
dominating norm of international copyright cases.644 Due to this principle and the minimum 
harmonisation of copyright law, national copyright laws usually have set up national copyright 
rules, such as exemptions and limitations and provisions of mandatory national copyright 
contract law in the first place. On the one hand, the practical problems mentioned above occur 
when national mandatory rules have to be respected. That is to say in the context of global 
                                                 
642 Stamatoudi (n 580) 55; art 3, Rome I Regulation. 
643 HCCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, Art 4. The Hague Principles are 
not formally binding. They provide a comprehensive blueprint to guide users in the creation, reform, or 
interpretation of choice of law regimes at the national, regional, or international level. 
644 Eugen Ulmer, Intellectual Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws: A Study Carried Out for the Commission 
of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1978) 13-14. 
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exploitation of copyright works, copyright and copyright contract law still remain national or 
territorial in nature in the digital era. On the other hand, if the mandatory national copyright 
rules are allowed to be overridden by copyright contracts,645 another problem of unbalanced 
protection of creators, which is the main concern of this chapter, will occur due to creators’ 
weak negotiating position. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are two problems with the 
principle of territoriality. First, the grant of copyrights comes from the activity of creation as a 
universal right rather than an authorisation from a national copyright law, especially in such a 
digital world where copyrighted works can easily be shared globally. Second, the territorial 
principle also raises serious problems in private international law. Thus, in the copyright area 
this principle should be removed. 
 
4.4.4.2.2 Non-Choice of Applicable Law 
Another situation is in the absence of a choice of law where the law of the country of the 
assignor/licensor shall govern.646 For some reasons the parties to an international copyright 
agreement fail to choose an effective applicable law in the contract. The law that applies to the 
agreement will be the law with the most significant relationship to the contract.647 If the parties 
omit the choice of law, courts will, if the facts allow, imply the presumably intended choice of 
law into the agreement. If, however, the parties intentionally omit the choice of law, courts will 
commonly weigh generalised interests in contract certainty against particularised party 
interests of efficiency and equity.  
 
In the case of a relatively simple contract of transferring copyright interest in return for payment 
or an ongoing obligation to pay royalties, it is the act of transferring the copyright interest that 
constitutes the contract’s characteristic performance. So, the applicable law is the law of the 
country where the copyright transferor resides or has its central business office. In the more 
complex, and far more common, international copyright arrangement, where the licensee 
                                                 
645 Copyright contractual terms override national mandatory rules are usually in three forms: exceeds the limitation 
of copyright law; include clauses which are not protected by copyright law; and inhibit future holders from 
exploiting. See Pedro Alberto De Miguel Asensio, The Law Governing International Intellectual Property 
Licensing Agreements (A Conflict of Laws Analysis) (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 312.   
646 Drexl and Kur (n 619) 130. 
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undertakes not only to pay royalties but also affirmatively to exploit the copyrighted work, the 
contract’s characteristic performance will usually be identified with the licensee. The rationale 
for this conclusion is evident. The licensee is investing his/her labour and capital in exploiting 
the copyright, and the contract’s economic success, for both licensor and licensee, will depend 
on this investment. Therefore, it is the investment rather than the assignment that constitutes 
the characteristic performance. In the case of some complex copyright contracts, the country 
with the closest connection will be the country where the work is actually exploited – for 
copyright purposes, the protecting country.  
 
In a nutshell, the drawback of the rule of non-choice of applicable law is that it will not always 
be clear which choice a court will make. The applicable law in the absence of choice, therefore, 
has to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. For highly complex IP contracts, recourse will 
frequently be had to the closest connection escape route.648 This will cause extreme uncertainty 
and unpredictability to contractual parties, especially to authors who are deemed in the weak 
position. 
 
4.4.4.2.3 National Treatment  
Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention stipulates the national treatment, that is, that the same 
substantial rights are to be granted to foreigners and nationals.649 The Rome Convention also 
obligates member countries to “grant national treatment”.650 National treatment is a rule of non-
discrimination, promising foreign creators who come within the treaty’s protection that they 
will enjoy the same treatment for their creations in the protecting country as the protecting 
country gives to its own nationals.651 This can only be achieved through the application of the 
law of the protecting country. So, national treatment also embodies a choice of law rule that 
makes the law of the protecting country govern the scope of protection for a foreign work. Any 
alternative interpretation favouring the application of the law of the country of origin or the 
                                                 
648 Jan Rosén, Intellectual Property at the Crossroads of Trade (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 28. 
649 Article 5, Berne Convention. 
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law of the forum as a general rule is no longer acceptable as it would be in breach of Article 3 
of the TRIPs agreement.   
 
In brief, it is imperative to establish uniform private international law rules to deal with 
international copyright contract issues in such a digital era where increasing numbers of 
copyright contracts happen every day. Such choice of law rule should be legislated in 
accordance with the objective of economic fairness, not only for local small rightsholders but 
also for foreign rightsholders due to their weak negotiating position. The only solutions would 
be the creation of a special convention or of special contract choice of law rules for contracts 
relating to the international exploitation of copyrights.652  
 
4.4.3.3 Copyright Licensing Contract Issues  
In the digital era, cross-border licensing happens more frequently and has become the primary 
trend of exercising copyrights. For example, a foreign musician grants a licence for a copyright 
which he/she owns in country B to a company in country C. Or another pervasive phenomenon 
is musicians grant a global licence through the internet. When a foreign element is brought into 
the licence, private international law and choice of law will get involved and raise both 
contractual issues and copyright infringement issues.   
 
Although cross-border licensing of copyrights has become so essential, the research in this area 
is not certain enough that there is not even a standard definition or understanding of the nature 
and scope of copyright licensing at international level. This is because copyright contracts can 
be very different in nature. As CLIP (the European Max-Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in 
IP) commented, ‘the wide variety of contracts relating to IP rights calls for a differentiated 
solution instead of one strict, clear-cut rule’.653 In the music industry, cross-border licensing is 
of utmost importance for owners in terms of exercising copyrights. A better use of musical 
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works by means of licensing and commercial exploitation is central to successful business 
models, 654  and technology opens the music market to the whole world. Accordingly, 
stakeholders need a certain and predictable legal framework which not only defines and 
protects copyrights as such but also enables and facilitates copyright transactions and, 
particularly, copyright licensing transactions. To design a predictable copyright licensing 
policy, first of all it the nature of copyright licensing agreements has to be made clear. Whether 
a copyright licensing agreement is a contract or not determines what private international law 
rule would apply. 
 
4.4.4.3.1 The Nature of Copyright Licensing 
There is a contested debate about the question whether a copyright licence is a contract or not. 
Moglen explains the difference between a contract and a licence: a licence is a unilateral 
permission to use someone else’s property; a contract, on the other hand, is an exchange of 
obligations, either of promises for promises or of promises of future performance for present 
performance or payment.655 Therefore, the distinction between licence and contract is very 
clear, a copyright licence is a unilateral permission in which no obligations are reciprocally 
required by the licensor; however, parties of a contract have obligations to perform the contract. 
 
The interesting Falco case656 in the EU has discussed further about this question. It was decided 
by the ECJ in April 2009.657 The ECJ held that a licence agreement – defined as a contract 
                                                 
654 See Brussel, COM (2011) 287 final, Communication from The Commission to The European Parliament, The 
Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions. “Single market for 
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655  Eben Moglen, ‘Enforcing the GNU GPL’ (GNU Operating System, 10 September 2001)  
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656 Falco Privatstiftung v. Weller-Lindhorst [2009] ECR I C-533/07. 
The case concerned the exploitation of rights in the music of Falco. Falco was an Austrian rap, pop, and rock 
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defendant domiciled in Germany was Gisela Weller-Lindhorst, a media seller. The parties entered into a licence 
agreement under which the defendant was licensed to distribute in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland a video 
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to the audio recordings. 
657 For more analysis about this case from a private international law perspective, see Benedetta Carla Angela 
Ubertazzi, ‘License Agreements relating to IP Rights and the EC Regulation on Jurisdiction’ (2009) 40 IIC 912. 
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under which the owner of an IPR grants its contractual partner the right to use that right in 
return for remuneration – does not constitute a contract for ‘the provision of services’ under 
Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels Regulation.658 The court answered negatively to this question 
by stating that ‘the concept of services implies, at the least, that the party who provides the 
services carries out a particular activity in return for remuneration’. 659 In the light of this 
requirement, the court decided that it cannot be inferred from a licence agreement that the 
licensor provides such a service,660 because ‘the owner of an IP right does not perform any 
service in granting a right to use that property and undertakes merely to permit the licensee to 
exploit that right freely’.661 A common sense approach to the concept of ‘services’ implies that 
the ‘provider’ at least carries out a particular activity in return for remuneration. The ECJ took 
the view that the owner of an IP right does not perform any particular activity in granting a 
licence to a third party to use that right, but merely undertakes not to challenge the use of that 
right by the third party.662 Therefore, according to the ECJ’s judgement, a copyright licence, in 
which a mere payment does not constitute a provision of service, is distinct from a contract 
which binds both parties to perform their obligations. 
 
Another position describes the obligation of the author or his/her successor in title with a term 
of “characteristic performance”. This method focuses on the nature of copyright licensing but 
avoids distinguishing copyright licensing agreements from copyright contracts. Researchers 
classify copyright licences into four different situations according to whether an obligation of 
characteristic performance exists between the contractual parties.663 First, the countervailing 
obligation to pay an agreed sum of money, which is an obligation that is found in a great variety 
of entirely different types of contract, cannot constitute the characteristic performance of a 
certain contract. Second, the assignment or transfer of a copyright from one publisher to 
another is a pure sale in which no characteristic performance is involved. Third, if in a licence 
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663 Stamatoudi (n 580) 58. 
  
156 
a grantee undertakes the obligation to exploit or exercise the rights, then the characteristic 
performance is performed by the exploiter of the work. This often happens in CCM when 
CMOs perform the characteristic performance and publication contract. The last situation is 
the assumed obligation of characteristic performance which is not contained in the copyright 
contract.  
 
One of the purposes to analyse the nature of a copyright licensing agreement is to apply a 
proper law. If the terms of a copyright licence are violated, it will be enforced as a violation of 
copyright law, not contract law. For example, the licence may restrict how the music can be 
streamed, downloaded or modified. If an exploiter violates the terms of the licence, he/she will 
lose the licence and may be blocked to use it in the future. If the issue is still not resolved, the 
right-owner might go to court to sue for infringement of his/her copyright, rather than sue for 
violation of contract. However, the difference between licence and contract is very subtle, and, 
under some conditions, a licence can also be deemed as a contract. The principle of 
“characteristic performance” has, in fact, provided an alternative to solve the question. To 
decide which law can apply depends on whether there is a characteristic performance obligation 
rather than defining the agreement if it is a licensing agreement or copyright contract.  
 
4.4.4.3.2 Applicable Law to Copyright Licensing Contracts 
Because there is no standard conflict of law rules for cross-border copyright contracts, the 
current tradition is that the law applicable to contractual obligations will apply. So, the principle 
of the parties to freely choose the law applicable to the contract applies to copyright licence as 
well. The parties are free to choose any law that does not need to have a particular connection 
with the contract. In the absence of a contractual choice of law, the copyright licensing 
agreement shall be governed by the law of the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected. The closest connection is usually decided by court.  
 
The close connection rule, however, still cannot solve the problem of legal uncertainty and 
unpredictability, and more importantly it will break the balance of interests of small 
rightsholders. Take the EU Rome I regulation for example, when Article 4 of the Rome I 
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Regulation is applied, issues can arise by the complex nature of copyright licensing contracts. 
The closest connection can refer to the country of the author, right-owner, and the country of 
the publisher, recording company or broadcaster, as well as the protecting country. When 
considering the characteristic performance of the contract, Article 4(1) refers to the law of the 
habitual residence of the exploiter or licensee or transferee for distribution contracts, franchise 
contracts or other exploitation contracts. Article 4(2) then deals with all types of contracts that 
are not found in the list. It means under the situation where the licensee or transferee does not 
have the characteristic performance obligation, the law of the habitual residence of the licenser 
or transferor will apply. But, when a musical work is jointly created by more than two creators 
who are from different countries, the habitual residence rule cannot lead to a single applicable 
law. Another situation is when CMOs, as the characteristic performance party of the licensing 
contract, manage the copyrights on behalf of creators in more than one country, as the country 
cannot be determined easily when rights are granted in many countries.  
 
In summary, the current conflict of law rules do not provide optimal solutions to deal with the 
issues concerning international copyright contracts. Cross-border copyright contracts call for 
independent predictable conflict of law rules. To fulfil economic fairness in cross-border 
copyright licensing, further action has to be taken in the field of private international law to 
provide certain and predictable conflict rules for copyright contracts in order to balance creators’ 
interests nationally and internationally. 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
One copyright law’s multifunction is to balance economic interests between stakeholders and 
to achieve economic fairness. But this balance has been broken by copyright licensing activities, 
usually, by means of various forms of copyright contracts, which eventually leads to the 
“winner-take-all” phenomenon. The unbalanced distribution of copyright revenues between 
rightsholders is mainly caused by ineffectively regulated copyright contracts and collective 
management of copyright. This chapter primarily deals with the former issue in the context of 




After a positive discussion and Rawlsian analysis of economic fairness of the copyright legal 
system, it has been found that international commercial copyright licensing activities call for 
independent, uniform and predictable conflict of law rules for balancing small rightsholders’ 
economic interests nationally and internationally, and for facilitating the free cross-border flow 
of musical works in a just way. To achieve this objective, a harmonised conflict of laws system 
for dealing with international copyright contract disputes is essential and imperative. The 
current conflict of law rules cannot deal with the copyright contract issues properly. The 
uncertain and unpredictable rules have caused economically and timely inefficiency for 
individual rightsholders, especially for foreign rightsholders. 
 
This chapter has analysed these issues existing in the area of private international law from 
three main copyright contract perspectives: initial ownership contracts, exploitation contracts 
and licensing contracts. It finds that either when there is a choice of law between the contractual 
parties or there is not an effective choice of law, the present rules of conflict of law are not in 
favour of individual creators. Both the rules of jurisdiction and applicable law are out-of-date 
and have not properly taken the individual creators’ interests into account. The harmonisation 
of the rules of conflict of laws is necessary because the present network of international 
conventions does not provide a complete set of tools for resolving such conflicts. 664 
Rightsholders, especially individual creators, need a more certain and predictable conflict law 
system to rely on for effectively enforcing their economic rights. As discussed above, private 
international law is one of the hurdles of the free cross-border flow of musical works.665 It 
proposes that with regard to the authorship and ownership, which are relevant contractual 
issues, the definition of authors has to be harmonised internationally, and that the author’s 
habitual residence has jurisdiction, is a better choice of law rule. It also has to pay attention to 
balance interests of foreign rightsholders who are in a position in international copyright 
contractual negotiations. As to licensing contracts, the close connection rule needs to be 
reformed since it cannot solve the problem of legal uncertainty and unpredictability, and more 
importantly it will break the balance of interests of small rightsholders. 
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The mission of a balanced copyright law is not only to balance small rightsholders interests, 
but also to balance users’ interests and preserve and develop cultural diversity for the society. 
Following on from the discussion of the multifunction of copyright law, the next chapter will 





Chapter 5 – The Objectives of Social and Cultural Function – International 
Public Interest and Cultural Diversity 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The objective of social function is to take public/general interest into consideration.666 The 
method to achieve this objective is to allow the rights of individuals to be weighed against their 
competing rights, to balance competing interests. The role of law is to assure the peaceful 
coexistence of human groups or, as is often said, to harmonise the activity of members of 
society.667 Thus, the role of copyright in disseminating information products and promoting 
welfare can only be effectively realised when copyright law reflects a real balance between the 
competing interests of protection and access.668 In a word, it is the basis for the social order, 
which could only be achieved through a balance between opposing interests.669 The clause of 
social function, however, does not appear in any of the EU texts, where it is generally 
substituted by the notion of general/public interest. 670  Scholars draw an analogy between 
general interest and social function.671 There is a recognition and provision for the public 
interest goals of copyright at international level.672 However, the term “public interest” is a 
vague concept that needs to be clarified. Public interest should not be a general concept without 
specific targets. It has to identify the specific types of uses that can benefit from the copyright 
LEs. Put differently, which groups’ interests fall within the public interest? There are at least 
three existing justifications claiming public interest, 673  but none of them offer a perfect 
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explanation. Although references to an overarching public interest purpose for copyright 
protection has been made throughout the history of the international copyright system, there 
has been insufficient attention directed at infusing these public interest ideals with definitive 
content, scope, and character. Hence, this chapter discusses the nature of copyright users’ rights, 
for the purpose of defining the meaning, scope and character of public interest and copyright’s 
LEs. In order to achieve the goal of establishing a more balanced copyright legal system aiming 
at fulfilling justice between different interests at stake, a consolidated LEs system for the 
exercise of copyrights needs to be formulated. 
 
Musical works as cultural goods have cultural values. As demonstrated in chapter 2, cultural 
values of musical works interact with their economic and social values. However, the study on 
the cultural objective of copyright law in musical works is extremely insufficient. Thus, this 
chapter will also discuss the cultural objective of copyright law. This chapter starts with a 
doctrinal analysis on users’ rights in section 5.2. This section examines copyright LEs in 
international copyright treaties and identify their main issues within the international copyright 
legal framework. Then, it investigates the existing national LEs worldwide and the trend of 
recent development of the research in public interest, and argue to codify users’ rights for the 
type of uses for music education and study purposes. Section 5.3 offers a Rawlsian analysis of 
the social function of copyright legal framework, aiming to provide an ethical justification for 
codifying users’ rights for music education and study purposes. Section 5.4 specifically studies 
the LEs system for education and research purpose and libraries’ rights at the global level, and 
suggests to codify global public interest and a mandatory LEs system for libraries and explores 
the feasibility of a compensation scheme for it. However, this chapter will focus on the 
justification and nature of mandatory LEs for libraries rather than researching the detailed 
provisions. Section 5.5 navigates to the discussion on cultural function of copyright legal 
framework. It examines the current legislation regarding cultural diversity and demonstrates 
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Libri Octo’ (1672), the translation of 1688, Charles Henry and William Abbott Oldfather(ed) (New York, London, 
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the justification, desirability and feasibility to incentivise cultural diversity at global level in 
music sector. 
 
5.2 LEs in International Copyright Legal System 
In order to maintain a just balance between the interests of rightsholders and copyright-users, 
the embodied principle of social justice by means of LEs is used to restrain exclusive rights. 
Accordingly, the protected works may be used without the authorisation of the right-holder(s), 
and with or without payment of compensation. As a specific mechanism to implement the goals 
and objectives of international copyright law, a just international copyright LEs system is a 
challenging mission for policy-makers in that they have more considerations for designing LEs 
at the global level. Firstly, at national law level, this appropriate balance between owners/users 
is a dynamic experiment that is not easily achievable, particularly in an environment where 
social and economic expectations by users and creators are changing along with the ever-
shifting development of technologies. Second, in the global context, determining the 
appropriate balance is understandably more complex because the following need to be 
considered: international protection of LEs and the extent of domestic discretion; and the 
interests between developed and developing countries which have different practical 
situations.674 The second balance can be called the “domestic / international balance.”675 In 
addition, the digital age impels a greater demand for the development of a robust public interest 
ideology to balance the rights of owners and users, and to preserve the basic building blocks of 
future innovation and creativity. 
 
The existing international copyright treaties, including the Berne Convention, WCT, WPPT 
and TRIPS Agreement, have recognised the importance of LEs to secure the promise of 
knowledge goods to improve the social welfare as a whole by means of a three-step test.676 
This recognition, however, is only a guidance for legislating national copyright law. 
International treaties leave enough sovereign discretion to national lawmakers. 677  No 
                                                 
674 Okediji (n 668). 
675 ibid. 




institutional or doctrinal mechanisms fulfilling social objectives have been explicitly 
established in these treaties. Therefore, copyright LEs, in fact, remains national. In practice, 
the actual substance and scope of LEs is determined by courts in the course of adjudication. In 
some parts of the world, particularly in developing countries, administrative agencies, law 
enforcement offices, public institutions, such as libraries, and even collecting societies, wield 
significant authority over the determination of what uses are permissible and the applicability 
of a specific LEs.678 Nevertheless, the actual practice of these enforcement agents – both 
private and public – indeed gives practical meaning to the statutory provisions that provide for 
access to knowledge goods through LEs.679 National legislature experience and practice are 
vital for the design of international copyright LEs system. However, the three-step test which 
has been sufficiently discussed in chapter 5, has attracted criticism from researchers.680 The 
elemental goal of the Berne Convention is to build consensus on basic norms and thus eliminate 
discrimination against works of foreigners. But apparently, this goal has not been achieved by 
national copyright laws in that the national implementations are various.681 Some of them have 
dramatically changed the scope of LEs provided in the Berne Convention.682  
 
It can be concluded that there are four main issues of the current LEs system of international 
copyright law. First, due to the open-ended and flexible provisions on LEs, the three-step test 
has placed a difficulty upon courts to identify use privileges based on the test’s abstract 
criteria.683 Second, due to the flexibility of application of the criteria, however, it seems that 
policy makers have different understandings on the rationale behind them. And this leads to 
distinct domestic attitudes towards the issue of overridability of LEs. Third, the evolution of 
LEs did not take place at the same rate or in a corresponding manner to the evolution of rights 
for creators. The rights of creators were specifically identified and articulated, while copyright 
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LEs are general and ambiguous. The model is regarded as “mandatory rights” versus 
“permissive limitations” one dominating all the international treaties,684 and the modified 
three-step test under TRIPS has reinforced the primacy of this approach in modern international 
copyright relations. The permissive language in the Berne Convention has also been utilized 
by many member countries in a non-mandatory way.685 The minimum copyrights provided 
under the Berne Convention are mandatory, while LEs are discretionary and without any real 
force in the absence of state action. Fourth, from a macro perspective to consider 
domestic/international balance,686 the sovereign discretion of enacting LEs radically conflicts 
with the free trade doctrine. The relationship between copyright LEs and free trade principles 
has to be dedicatedly considered so as to draw a proper balanced line between international 
harmonisation and domestic discretion with regard to the designation of a just LEs system.687 
Following on from this section, these main issues will be analysed in depth. 
 
5.2.1 Overridability of LEs  
As discussed above, unlike the identified position of “mandatory copyrights”, copyright LEs 
are regarded as “permissive exceptions” in all the international treaties. Therefore, the national 
practice shows different attitudes of domestic copyright towards the issue of overridability of 
LEs. The doctrinal debate has expressed four different attitudes. Some researchers believe that 
some or all copyright LEs should be essential to protect public interest.688 Public interest is a 
right for consumers and cannot be overridden by commercial contracts or private 
agreements.689 Another stream believes that freedom of contract is indirectly protected by 
fundamental human rights.690 In order to protect consumers as the weaker party of this bargain, 
legislators have issued a number of statutory limits to contracts.691 Therefore, they believe that 
contracts and TPMs are more efficient than copyright law to protect public interest, and ‘fair 
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use’ can be safely replaced by ‘fared use’. 692  In this case, copyright exceptions can be 
overridden by contracts. In addition to the supporters of copyright limits and proponents of 
contracts, there is a third group of scholars who commented that contracts and copyright belong 
to different but complementary worlds, that act in useful synergy.693 Werra argues that the 
problem is not the conflict between contract and copyright limits, but the problem of price of 
access to those copyright works.694 Guibault concludes that the limits on freedom of licensing 
contract, including consumer protection law, completion law, constitutional principles and 
copyright law, appear insufficient to ensure users’ legitimate interests being respected by 
copyright licensing agreements.695  
 
At the international level, the diverse approaches to copyright LEs make it difficult for 
negotiators of multilateral treaties to settle on an approach acceptable to all signatories. 
Therefore, the designation of this LEs system under international copyright law becomes vital 
and is a challenging mission for policy makers. The nature of each copyright LEs is crucial to 
determine its overridability by some forms of agreements. In practice, this is currently decided 
on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the overridability based on 
different categories of LEs. The most important aspect of the issue is the access price. It has 
been widely accepted that fair use does not mean free access.696  
 
5.2.2 Are Copyright LEs Right, Privilege, Or Permitted Use? 
To further define and determine an appropriate scheme of LEs, the exact nature of different 
uses has to be examined. In recent years, the concept of users’ rights has been emphasised and 
entrenched in some countries, Canada and the US for example.697 Some have defined copyright 
limits not as rights but either as interests or liberties698 or as a ‘claim to the application of a rule 
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of objective right’.699 Others claim they are rights of the user, and there should be a clear 
definition and protection for them in copyright law. Similarly, in American doctrine the 
entitlements of the user have been sometimes qualified as rights, and sometimes as a mere 
remedy against market failures.700  
 
There is, however, no consensus as to the question of whether users should be authorised with 
equal competing rights to right-owners. Before proceeding to discuss further the question of 
the foundation of LEs, the nature of users’ rights has to be delved into, answering why they 
exist and which interests should they protect. Only in this way can it be determined whether 
the law has been properly conceived because questioning the justification of a rule also makes 
it possible to evaluate critically whether it achieves its objective. If this is not the case, then it 
must be corrected. 
 
The concept of “users’ rights” has drawn great attention in discussions of the limits of IP in 
general, and of copyright in particular. For balancing users’ interests, some national copyright 
laws have entrenched user’s rights,701 but the precise nature of user’s rights has not been 
defined or fully discussed. The nature of LEs has important legal ramifications for consumers 
and other users and the ambiguous nature of copyright user’s rights damages the coherence of 
copyright law and copyright’s legitimacy. Generally, the nature of LEs has been defined as 
rights, privileges, mere defences, or permitted uses. Sometimes these terminologies have been 
interchangeably used. Hence, it is necessary to clarify the nature and function of these different 
concepts for the purpose of defining the precise nature of the so-called users’ rights and, 
accordingly, design a just LEs system. 
 
Rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or 
entitlements that others (do not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.702 If users 
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have an equal competing right against copyright owners, they can defend their rights to access 
copyrighted works, in court; if users have not been given deserved right, they can actively sue 
and claim for judicial remedy. But, the practice has proved that copyright-users have never 
been given such defended rights against copyright-owners.703 Privilege is one’s freedom from 
the right or claim of another.704 According to Wesley Hohfeld’s theory of rights,705 there are 
four basic components of rights: the privilege, the claim706, the power and the immunity, and 
he arranged the four elements as opposites as follows: 
If A has a privilege, then A lacks a duty;  
if A has a claim, then A lacks a No-claim.  
and correlatives 
If A has a claim, then some person B has a duty;  
if A has a privilege, then some person B has a No-claim. 
 
Whether an exception is a right or privilege depends on the rationale that the exception is based 
on. As discussed above, there are mainly three different rationales of national LEs that have 
been formed based on fundamental rights, public interest and market failure.707 As to the first 
category of LEs, based on fundamental rights, eg freedom of expression and parody, citation, 
criticism, and news reporting, they are user’s rights in which users’ have a claim of freedom of 
expression; and other persons have a duty to not violate this right. However, the second 
category of LEs, eg for public lending, disabled people, teaching, libraries and archives, that 
are underpinned by public interest, should be authorised as user’s privilege. Such users have a 
user’s privilege, and have no duty/freedom to comply with the copyrights, or to say they have 
immunity of liability to infringement; then, meanwhile, copyright holders have no-claim to 
users who have privilege, to take the reliability of copyright infringement. 
 
Another terminology, “permitted use”, means the use of a copyrighted work is permitted by 
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law as an exception to copyright. So, exceptions whether based on user’s rights or user’s 
privilege are permitted uses under copyright law or other rules. If a right-holder claims 
copyright exclusively, users of this work are under a positive duty to not breach it; likewise, if 
a user claims user’s rights, the right-holder is under the duty of not disturbing the use of the 
work based on the user’s right theory. This is the essence of rights that all rights – even the 
most basic human rights – have substantial limitations arising both from internal theoretical 
constraints and from external pressures.708 It is fully consistent to assert individuals have rights 
to free speech while accepting these freedoms will be limited by others’ rights not to be 
slandered.709 The permitted uses performed by consumers are a de facto infringement to owners’ 
copyright, but they negate infringement because law permits them to do so and prevents their 
liability when users have a contradictory entitlement which has a liberty-immunity structure.  
 
To further defend the arrangement of rights/privilege to different LEs, the French case Warner 
Music710 will be cited to illustrate its significance and necessity. The nature of user’s rights 
becomes particularly relevant when TPMs restrict the exercise of an otherwise permitted act. 
In this case, Christophe bought a CD by Phil Collins, “Testify”, to discover later that he could 
not play it on his laptop, nor could he make copies from the CD because of TPMs in place. The 
defendants insisted that Christophe had no active legitimation to bring the case to court, that a 
right to private copying was non-existent, and that the private copying exception would have 
to be interpreted in the light of the so-called three-step test.711 The Court of Appeals concluded 
that  
 
TPMs must respect certain exceptions, including the private copying exception; and it 
is a task of the DRM user, the phonogram producer, to make sure that private copying 
remains possible, despite the application of TPMs… The complete blocking of any 
possibilities of making private copies was an impermissible behaviour under French 
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copyright law.712  
 
The difference between a right and privilege is that first, if an exception to copyright is a 
privilege, it does not impose any duty on copyright holders, such as requiring to facilitate the 
performance of a permitted act. Second, if the exceptions to copyright infringement are rights, 
the right-holder has the duty to facilitate the access to the works, and in this case the TMPs 
have to be removed. Any attempt by copyright holders to restrain the exercise of the exceptions 
is not enforceable.713 That is the substantive part of copyright LEs. However, the Court of 
Appeal made the decision that the private copyright exception to authors’ rights was neither on 
the ground of rights or privilege, but a defence. Unlike the Canadian CCH case714, the French 
Court did not specify the precise nature of the user’s rights as to whether it was a right or a 
privilege. But, positively, exceptions have been acknowledged from the perspective of users 
rather than rightsholders. 
 
Therefore, LEs to copyrights which are based on fundamental rights and thereby represent 
basic democratic values within copyright law, are substantive rights which are of equal value 
as the exclusive right, and not mere interests to be taken into account. This hypothesis is also 
consistent with the Rawls’s principles that political liberty together with freedom of speech and 
freedom of thought, are primary goods715 that cannot be compromised for any reasons except 
when it conflicts with another basic right, copyright for example. Therefore, such a category 
of LEs should be explicitly entrenched as mandatory so that user’s exercise of statutory 
limitations cannot be restricted by contract or prevailed over by TPMs. LEs based on public 
interest are users’ privilege that ensure that users are free from the sanction by copyright law, 
but it might be subject to some conditions, for example copyright law may set up a 
compensation condition for legitimate use without rightsholders’ permission. 
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5.2.3 Diverse Music Users  
Music users are numerous, but not all users enjoy the same legal position in terms of consuming 
musical works. The purpose of examining the different users is to explore the meaning of public 
interest and to define the scope of lawful uses. The idea of users’ rights is primary and 
fundamental; the notion of public interest is secondary and derivative. The nature and 
boundaries of public interest are where our normative analysis should finish, not where it 
should begin.716 It is important to identify what kinds of uses are lawful that fall under the legal 
exceptions, because only lawful uses have the legitimacy to negate infringement to copyright. 
That is to say the purpose or the inferred purpose of uses that fall under the enumerated LEs 
are permitted and negate infringement to copyrights. Some users, in particular music learners, 
are potential creators. Music creators themselves are often music users and, therefore, 
themselves are dependent upon a robust public domain.717 This is how public domain being 
built up that all authorship is fertilized by the work of prior creators, and the echoes of old work 
in new work extend beyond ideas and concepts to a wealth of expressive details.718 In music 
sector, the public domain has expanded to the whole world due to the development of digital 
technology.  
 
Because of the different characters, music users can be generally classified as commercial users 
and non-commercial users. Commercial users are those entities who consume music in 
businesses related activities (eg sports clubs, dance classes, hotels or motels, eating and 
drinking establishments, and night clubs); or those sound and audio-visual producers who 
provide music services. They normally directly interact with rightsholders, negotiating the 
terms and conditions of licensing agreements to their best advantage. Some organisations and 
leisure businesses pay blanket licences to CMOs. Commercial users exploit musical works for 
the purposes of making profits, but hardly for re-creations. Non-commercial users, however, 
include organisational users and individual consumers, who are normally consumers of music 
for self-appreciation or for non-profit uses, eg music libraries, research institutions, archives 
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and museums. They play an important role in terms of promoting the sustainable development 
of music knowledge and maintaining the diversity of culture.  
 
From the different purpose or inferred purpose of use, individual copyright consumption can 
be classified as transformative use and non-transformative use;719 active use and passive use;720 
creative use and pure consumption.721 Transformative use (or active use; creative use) takes 
place when the user creates a new musical work incorporating an earlier one into it. The good 
examples are derivative works, such as caricatures, parodies, and pastiches, as well as uses 
such as quotations for teaching, criticism and scientific research. Non-transformative use (or 
passive use; pure consumption) is pure consumptive activity in which the user accesses and 
uses musical works without embedding it into a new musical work. Non-transformative use 
includes activities such as reading, watching, listening to, and copying for purposes of 
entertainment, private study, information and communication. For the former category, 
individuals’ transformative use of music is typically for the purpose of re-creation which is 
consistent to users’ rights discussed in last section.722 But, non-transformative uses cannot pass 
the assessment of social justification or either be justified as users’ rights. 
 
Since there is a big difference between the natures of diverse music-users, it is inappropriate to 
authorise an aggregated users’ rights to all types of users. It has to identify carefully which 
category of users they are before authorising them relevant LEs. LEs based on defined users’ 
rights, should be mandatory and non-overridable rights competing against right-holders’ 
copyrights. Those uses based on users’ privilege are free from the liability of infringement to 
copyrights; however, they may be subject to other rules such as the requirement of 
compensation.  
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5.3 A Rawlsian Analysis of the Social Justice 
The above doctrinal analysis to justify users’ rights has clarified the natures of different 
categories of LEs. It has demonstrated the differentiated legal statuses of different types of 
music-users. It has also proposed to authorise users for music education and study purposes 
substantive rights which constitute conflicting rights to exclusive copyrights. This section 
defends this argument further by a normative legal theory analysis based on Rawls’s justice 
theory, aiming to provide an ethical justification for codifying music-users’ rights for education 
and study purposes. It explores the precise nature and scope of public interest in the light of 
Rawls’s theory, and examines whether this broader concept of public interest can be a general 
defence against copyrights.  
 
Rawls’s theory provides criteria to assess whether a law is just or unjust. To Rawls, social 
justice is about assuring the protection of equal access to liberties, rights, and opportunities, as 
well as taking care of the least advantaged members of society.723 Thus, whether something is 
just or unjust depends on whether it promotes or hinders equality of access to civil liberties, 
human rights and opportunities, as well as whether it allocates a fair share of benefits to the 
least advantaged members of society. Rawls’s theory says that when the rules determine a 
proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life and no arbitrary 
distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties, institutions 
are just.724 The law offers the basis of social order, which can be achieved only by a just balance 
of the different interests.  
 
According to Rawls, all social people are born behind a veil of ignorance in a society, and they 
are placed in a situation which is called the “origin position”.725 People are born with different 
goals and talents, and they would only agree with principles that govern a just society where 
all of them ought to have a fair opportunity to develop their talents and to pursue those goals – 
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fair equality of opportunity.726 They choose this society because they agree to cooperate among 
all so that there may be a reasonable life for everyone. Behind a veil of ignorance, people would 
not agree to a copyright scheme in which knowledge, information, ideas are in complete 
privileged private ownership. Alternatively, they would only agree free sharing of those 
“primary goods”, 727  whatsoever their social or economic status or their talents may be. 
Information is a social primary good, and it may be the most important primary good when we 
consider its role in political, social, and economic life, especially in the digital era.  
 
Creators are entitled to receive profits from intellectual commons as well as their own talents 
but the generated economic inequalities are allowed only when these profits are used to serve 
all, in particular those with fewer opportunities. To Rawls, intelligence, imagination, natural 
talents, innate creative abilities are natural goods;728 although their possession is influenced by 
the basic structure, they are not so directly under its control.729 Natural goods are arbitrarily 
distributed and morally underserved and are social, rather than personal, resources.730 Some 
people show higher creative ability in music but others do not. According to the second 
principle,731 all artists should have a fair chance to attain fair equality of opportunities. This 
point is explained based on the social and natural contingencies. Natural contingencies cause 
enormous economic inequalities, which is unjust. This social injustice is what Rawls’s theory 
aims to address, and indeed ‘the existence of innate differences in ability makes Rawls’s 
concept of social justice especially acute and eternally relevant’.732 The natural distribution of 
musical talents is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at 
some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that 
initiations deal with these facts.”733 For Rawls, rewarding talent or rewarding the efforts of 
talented people to develop their inborn abilities is justifiable ‘only on instrumental grounds’, 
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namely for social cooperation, rather than on the grounds of desert.734 Reward in the form of 
market prices ‘is not so much to reward people for what they have done as to tell them what in 
their own as well as in general interest they ought to do’.735 Rawls thinks justice should seek 
to “correct the social inequalities stemming from the arbitrary natural distribution of talents 
and abilities”.736 
 
Thus, in order to provide genuine equality of opportunity for those who are less-talented in 
musical creativity and to treat all persons equally, ‘society must give more attention to those 
with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favourable social positions’.737 In pursuit 
of this social justice to redress social contingencies, ‘greater resources might be spent on the 
education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life, say the 
earlier years of school’.738 The less talented people are, in this context, copyright users who are 
also potential creators. Therefore, Rawls’s theory offers convincing justification for the scheme 
of social deductions to be provided by JMOs for supporting young musicians’ study and 
research purposes. 
 
In the broad sense, the difference principle sets out to arrange the basic structure to enable 
underserved inequalities to ‘work for the good of the least fortunate’.739 This signifies ‘an 
agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the 
benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be’.740 Having intellectual commons freely 
shared by all not only reflects a fair solution to the arbitrary distribution of talents, but also 
fulfils the difference principle’s goal of long-term solution in nurturing talents by education 
schemes and directing them to develop in a way compatible with society. 
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Rawls is concerned with the construction of ‘a just scheme’ whereby each person is given their 
due or entitlement by the scheme itself.741 This is different from utilitarianism which focuses 
on general benefits for general society that it does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons. Utilitarianism allows the sacrifices imposed on a few to be outweighed by the larger 
sum of advantages enjoyed by many. For maximising the welfare or benefits of the whole 
society, individuals’ interests could be sacrificed. 742  Rawls fully acknowledges such a 
distinction and aims to achieve justice for each and every member of society – hence the 
involvement of all based on justice.  
 
Rawls does agree with incentives theory743 but based on different grounds. If incentives are 
given, they are aimed at the efficient use of the talents, so the legal regime should be designed 
in a way to promote the best use of talents with the welfare of all. This regime, unlike labour 
theory,744 is not to reward labour per se, though a collateral effect may result in that, but this is 
not the main concern in the design of the regime. Rawls acknowledged that the talented create 
more works than the less talented. Their natural assets are theirs for them to tap into to create 
works; they are in the best position to use their assets. The aim of Rawls’s theory is to address 
the generated economic inequality. In the view of Rawls, the benefits people gain from 
exercising their talents are determined by a structure of rules that makes that distribution of 
talents work to everyone’s advantage, with priority given to those who are worse off.745 To 
achieve social justice, a sound regime with a sound structure of rules should be put in place to 
determine the allocation of copyright resources. Therefore, the copyright legal system should 
facilitate copyright licensing activities, providing an incentive for copyright practice under the 
condition that this regime must be designed to benefit everyone, in particular for those who are 
less-talented. In this case, less-talented people are by no means all copyright users. Rather, they 
are those users for the purposes of study, education and research. Copyright law fulfils this 
function in many ways, mainly by LEs to copyrights. 
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5.4 Uses for Music Education and Private Study Purposes 
As discussed above, LEs for the purposes of music education and private study are an important 
type of LEs justified as users’ rights. They are highly related to re-creative activities and 
important to the development of public domain for all human being. They are worth detailed 
research. LEs for some purposes such as for disabled people, personal use, criticism or review, 
and parody, have attracted academics’ and policy-makers’ concerns. However, the literature of 
LEs for education and research purposes, particularly for the rights of libraries, is not sufficient. 
In practice, library users have not been ensured appropriate rights of access to music library 
resources.  
 
5.4.1 Current Scenario of Library Exception 
The LEs for education and research purposes are highly important for the development of 
social-cultural values, but legislators have not paid enough attention to this area yet. The public 
interest for education and research purposes mainly involves two rights – accessibility to 
copyright resources746 and fair use of copyrighted works with or without a compensation 
system.747 Accordingly, accessibility in this study refers to the availability to music resources 
with or without compensation. Some countries provide LEs without providing authorised 
organisation to enforce it. For example, disabled people are entitled to copy but which 
organisation provides the resource? The accessibility to music resources for educational 
purposes can also be used to assess to what extent the LEs have been respected in practice. The 
restraint of access to musical works not only impacts on domestic users, but also on foreign 
users. This is highly relevant for the internet environment where national boundaries have been 
broken down. So, copyright’s social function should also be investigated from the perspective 
of balancing the interests between different countries. 
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Music libraries are the windows of music-related materials to be licensed to individual users 
for music education and research purposes. E-libraries are playing a more important role than 
ever before for promoting the development of the outputs of musical works. Although Article 
10(2) of the Berne Convention does provide limitations of some free uses of works: quotations; 
illustrations for teaching; indication of source and author, which refers to limitation for 
educational purposes,748 the effect of this provision, however, is very limited. Although almost 
all countries have an exception that preserves the right of libraries, some countries, through the 
enactment of domestic legislation, have significantly narrowed the scope of this Berne 
exception.749 For example, in the US, librarians with an interest in electronic reserves were, for 
the most part, disappointed by The Technology, Education, And Copyright Harmonisation 
(TEACH) Act.750 The Act provides classroom instructors with clear guidelines as how they 
could use music materials in online classes without violating the law; however, it provides no 
direct guidance for what sort of library musical materials could be placed on the internet.751 
This Berne Convention provision of LEs has been overridden by national legislation.  
 
Moreover, national implementations of library exception vary a lot. In practice, library LEs 
have been dramatically overridden by TPMs and licensing agreements. The empirical study is 
not sufficient in this area, but based on some of the empirical study in the UK, where 90% 
legitimate LEs have been overridden by licensing agreements.752 The British Library carried 
out an empirical study of over 100 library contracts for electronic resources and found that over 
90% of contracts had terms that were more restrictive than exceptions in the copyright law, 
such as lending, reproduction for education, research, and private use, for preservation, and for 
the benefit of disabled persons, and inter-library loan. 753  In addition, they found that the 
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contracts did not make any reference to any exceptions from the UK copyright law or from 
another jurisdiction.754 In the conclusion of this study the British library required the UK 
Government to take action against this practice of the copyright industry, in order to preserve 
the national literary heritage.755  
 
Technology offers more means and convenience to users for the purpose of education and 
research, but also technologies can be used in licensing practice to restrain the access of users. 
Technology is allowing greater access to books and other creative works than ever before for 
education and research, but the supreme irony is new restrictions threaten to lock away digital 
content in a way we would never countenance for printed material,756 that is ‘the ease of access 
enabled by the digital age actually leads to greater access restrictions’.757 Akester declared that 
the biggest challenge faced by the British Library is not the technology but the licensing 
practices.758 He indicated that most of the licences imposed on the British Library are more 
restrictive than copyright law, including restrictions around copyright, such as only copy one 
percent, copy once, only copy in the same medium or no wholesale copying, which prevent 
archiving and inter-library loans.759 
 
According to the study by the IFLA,760 some of the library exceptions are mandatory, others 
are not. In most countries, these exceptions apply only to resources that exist in traditional 
formats.761 In other countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America, there are no exceptions 
safeguarding the services of libraries and archives at all.762 This overridable library exception 
leads to high difficulty to protect users’ interests, in particular for online users. Current LEs 
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system does not accommodate appropriate mechanisms to recognise the role of libraries in a 
digital environment. There is a need for clearly specified exceptions, especially for libraries.  
 
Libraries are the custodians of public interest as they are the primary access point of 
copyrighted works for the vast majority of the public.763 Libraries are major purchasers of 
copyright protected works, both analogue and digital, and make such works available for 
patrons to browse, read and use. Librarians and information professionals should, where 
possible and to the best of their ability, protect against copyright abuse of library material in 
collections. Libraries have the capabilities to reproduce copies, simultaneously lend works to 
large groups of people, and store such works for an infinite period of time. How libraries 
display digital works to the public could also involve the public display right, reproduction of 
excerpts, and even possibly the right of distribution.764 In essence, as digitalisation allows an 
unprecedented level of versatility in using copyrighted works, they will have opportunities to 
serve the public in new and different ways.765 Thus, the rights and obligations of libraries have 
to be more clearly specified and their limits defined, especially in the digital environment, 
where words associated with the print age such as “publish” “storage”, or “distribute” have a 
radically different scope and meaning.766 Therefore, libraries should be able to enjoy the widest 
possible privileges to strengthen their role and capacity to serve as knowledge custodians, and 
the primary access point for knowledge to the vast majority of the public.  
 
5.4.2 Financial Mechanisms Supporting Public Interest 
The authorisation of users’ rights does not mean free use of copyrighted works or excluding 
the legitimacy of compensation to rightsholders. Although some copyright LEs are regarded as 
users’ rights, they cannot unreasonably prejudice authors’ legitimate economic interests. 
However, the library sector should not be left to commercial licensing of copyrighted works 
either. If access to knowledge is dependent upon an individual’s capacity to pay, then the less 
                                                 






privileged will be placed at a significant disadvantage. In particular, this can play a part in 
perpetuating poverty and the lack of educational opportunities. As specified before, the essence 
of LEs is to allow lawful music-users to perform certain acts on musical works without 
authorisation by rightsholders with or without remuneration. Thus, exclusive right can be 
converted into a remuneration right, with royalties paid every time, and the use of an existing 
creation makes it possible to create a new work. However, the amount of compensation must 
be carefully decided and the process of collection regulated. 
 
With respect to the other important question on whether financial compensation is required, 
there is a great distinction among countries in the world. Countries have different 
understandings and have designed distinctive compensation mechanisms. Although the library 
and archive exception has been recognised by most countries, international copyright treaties 
have not recognised a uniform right authorised to library users. Under the national financial 
mechanisms, right-owners’ will be forced to give up economic rights to a certain extent 
according to national copyright law or other legislation. For the purpose of supporting the 
development of creative works on the one hand, and compensating creators for the potential 
loss of sales from their works being available in public libraries, on the other hand, some 
countries have constructed the public lending right (PLR) system to balance the interests 
between owners and users. There is not a uniform definition of PLR although it does exist in 
some countries.767 But basically it refers to a remuneration right which is the right of a creator 
(not necessarily the copyright owner) to receive monetary compensation for the public lending 
of his/her work.768  
 
                                                 
767 Public Lending Right International Network website, “53 countries are known to have recognised lending 
rights in their copyright or other legislation. 33 of these have taken the next step of setting up a PLR system. 
(Systems exist where payments are being made, or where there is PLR legislation and funding has been committed.) 
29 of the PLR systems are in Europe: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
The other working systems are in Canada, Israel, New Zealand and Australia. There are no working PLR systems 
yet in the United States, South America, Africa or Asia.” 
<https://www.plrinternational.com/faqs/faqs.htm#recognise> accessed 15 February 2017. 
768 IFLA, ‘The IFLA Position on Public Lending Right’ (29 April 2016)  <https://www.ifla.org/publications/the-
ifla-position-on-public-lending-right--2016-> accessed 30 May 2017.. 
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Not all national PLR systems are included in the copyright legal system.769 Some countries 
have constructed PLR systems as a separate remuneration right recognised by law770 or as a 
part of national support for culture.771The EU has regulated PLR since 1992 by Directive 
92/100/EEC on rental right and lending right, which was reconstituted in 2006. Nonetheless, 
European countries have designed distinctive schemes to implement the Directive. But the PLR 
schemes in the EU vary from country to country.772  
 
There are two main methods to calculate payments to qualified creators: a) payment on the 
basis of how often an author’s works are lent out, and b) payment per copy of an author’s work 
held in libraries.773 The IFLA, as a leading international body representing the interests of 
library and information services and their users, reviewed that the access to public libraries 
must remain free at the point of use.774 Furthermore, the costs of PLR should not in any way 
impinge on the quality and variety of the services publicly accessible libraries provide. 
Therefore, in order to best support national cultural and educational objectives, the funds for 
establishing and maintaining PLR systems and remunerating rights holders must not come from 
library budgets but should be separately funded by the state.775  
 
In practice, the IPLA systems either compensate creators from governmental funds, or sacrifice 
a part of the economic profits for free access to library resources. Apart from these 
remuneration systems discussed above, there is another important compensation mechanism – 
10% deduction from CMOs’ revenues to a social fund to support national arts.  Nérisson 
commented that the fixed amount of the 10% rule is to be found in all reciprocal agreements 
between CMOs in the domain of public performance rights upon musical works. He believed 
                                                 
769 The copyright-based approach can be found in Germany and Austria. 
770 PLR as a right to remuneration outside copyright exists in the UK. The 1979 PLR Act gives authors a legal 
right to receive payment from the government for the lending out of their books by public libraries. This is a right 
to payment, not an exclusive right allowing authors to prohibit or license the lending of their books. The PLR 
system is administered by the PLR office which, since October 2013, is part of the British Library. 
771 PLR as part of State support for culture exists mainly in the Scandinavian countries where, for example, 
payments are made only to authors of books written in a country’s native language. 
772 See Nérisson (n 44). 
773 PLR international, ‘How Are Payments to Authors Calculated and Who Qualifies?’ 
 <https://www.plrinternational.com/faqs/faqs.htm#recognise> accessed 15 February 2017. 




that the recognition of the 10% rule in an international convention would confirm copyright 
law’s role of interest balancing. 776 Indeed, the social function of copyright law is mainly 
mirrored by the social function of CMOs. As discussed in the beginning of this section, the 
social function performed by CMOs is one of the most distinct features that are different from 
other IMEs. Once the social function of copyright has been entrenched by legislation, it should 
be enforceable by concrete provisions, rather than a nominal right existing in the preamble of 
international treaties or only a guidance of copyright acts. CMOs can and have to perform the 
obligation to balance the interests with a well-designed compensation system. At the same time, 
some developed countries have built up financial compensation mechanisms in research and 
education sectors to compensate rightsholders’ legitimate economic rights. The 10% rule has 
to be confirmed in an international copyright convention.777 
 
The 10% deduction rule has also been criticised for some reasons. First, deduction is normally 
from all revenues of a national CMO from uses of both national and foreign works. Many 
European CMOs have this function as part of their statutory duty.778 As the deduction is made 
from the aggregate revenue of a whole CMO, obviously, the minority of high-earning CMO 
members would afford most of the deduction. This burden would cause the high-earning 
rightsholders to switch off from CMOs to other commercial management agencies if the 10% 
rule is not mandatory and only applicable to CMOs. Second, it has been argued that the 10% 
rule practice may infringe the national treatment principle in the Berne and Rome Conventions 
as well as by the WIPO.779 If international cross-border licensing is taken over by a few of the 
largest societies, these societies will most likely be established in the most prosperous countries. 
This would be unfair if the 10% deduction collected from cross-border licensing only benefits 
the public of the headquarter countries. For dealing with these issues, a proposed GRP780 which 
would integrate copyright licensing information into a one stop platform and require all types 
                                                 
776 Nérisson (n 44). 
777 ibid. 
778 Towse and Handke (n 36). 
779 See Matulionyte (n 52); Ferdinand Melichar, ‘Deductions Made by Collecting Societies for Social and Cultural 
Purposes in the Light of International Copyright Law’ (1991) 22 International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 47.  
780 See chapter 6. 
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JMOs to perform this social-cultural deduction obligation at the same level, is recommended 
as an alternative solution. 
 
5.4.3 Establishing Global Public Interest for Education and Private Study Purposes  
Right owners are able to exercise their copyrights by TPMs or licensing contracts which can 
largely restrain the access and usage of copyrighted works and render them private rights. The 
balance between rightsholders and users has historically been reserved mainly for the sphere 
of domestic regulation. Because authors’ rights have been more explicitly defined in 
international copyright law, LEs must correspondingly be the object of more specific attention 
internationally as well. In the global context, determining the appropriate balance is 
understandably more complex.781 The Berne Convention has left discretion to enact national 
LEs. However, developing countries are usually not able to tailor domestic copyright laws to 
their domestic circumstances for nurturing the development of local copyrighted works. This 
is because for entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), developing countries normally 
trade off some of their discretion to enact harsh copyright law to protect right-holders’ 
copyright. Too protective copyright, in fact, hinders the free trade of copyrighted works, and a 
worse consequence is that it harms social welfare and public interest not only to local users but 
also to foreign users. In the long term, it harms the sustainable development of creativity. Thus, 
a pertinent question has to be taken into consideration about how deeply the international 
copyright system should intrude on domestic priorities and how best to meaningfully 
incorporate domestic welfare concerns into the fabric of international copyright regulation. Put 
differently, the relevant balance for international law purposes is between the mandatory 
standards of protection established in treaties and the scope of discretion reserved to states to 
establish LEs specifically directed at domestic concerns. This can be called the 
‘domestic/international balance’.782  
 
                                                 




The growth of general social welfare and the economy depends on the flourishing production 
and distribution of knowledge assets; high quality production of knowledge outputs relies on 
the growth of quality of productive inputs and, more importantly, the accessibility of existing 
knowledge assets.783 Undoubtedly, global licensing of copyrighted works will promote the 
dissemination of knowledge goods, and accordingly benefit rightsholders. This is true for both 
developed and developing countries. And this free trade of copyrighted goods will increase 
social welfare gains for each member country.784 Poor access to copyrighted works, however, 
will adversely affect social welfare. The most disproportionately affected groups of users are 
the poor, uneducated, non-English speaking, women, and the elderly in the least developed and 
developing countries.785 For flourishing domestic innovation, developing countries need to 
ensure resources are accessible to users under a just LEs system. First of all, they need to avoid 
extreme protectionist measures evident in developed country legislation, implementing TRIPS 
and other international agreements. Second, each country must outline an industrial policy that 
is effectively coordinated with related macroeconomic policies, particularly education and 
science policies. Education is critical for building the national capacity to absorb, utilise, and 
adapt innovation to local needs. Third, developing countries need to enact just LEs system 
under international copyright law to their domestic circumstances.  
 
In the digital era, a computer can replace an entire library, and the significance of access to 
knowledge for developing countries becomes obvious. Unlike in developed countries, the 
sources for education and knowledge are limited in transition countries, and not every city or 
village has a public library which provides comprehensive access to information for the public. 
The particularities of these countries must therefore be taken into account in the scope of a 
global regulation on copyright LEs. It is better to provide differentiated structures between 
                                                 
783 Peter Hall, ‘The Theory and Practice of Innovation Policy: an Overview’ (1986) Technology, Innovation and 
Public Policy Oxford: Phillip Allan 1. 
784 See e.g, Anne O Krueger, ‘Global Trade Prospects for the Developing Countries’ (1992) 15 The World 
Economy 457; Deepak Lal, A Liberal International Economic Order: the International Monetary System and 
Economic Development (International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University 1980). 
785 Ruth Gana Okediji, ‘Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective’ (1999) Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 117. 
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developed and transition countries to enable detailed provisions to address specific and ongoing 
problems.786 
 
5.5 The Cultural Objective of Copyright Legal System 
Since social and cultural functions are connected to each other and sometimes hard to 
distinguish,787 the discussion of copyright law’s cultural value is integrated into this chapter. 
Not only economic and social objectives of the copyright legal system are important, the 
cultural objective is another independent function played by JMOs. As a political liberty, rights 
of cultural expression and access to cultural goods have to be ensured and protected by 
copyright provisions.788 As demonstrated in chapter 2, unlike economic values, social and 
cultural values increase with usage.789 As such, for maintaining and developing creativity and 
cultural diversity, musical works should be encouraged to be used rather than restricted from 
accessing. CMOs’ role is not only in efficient administration of copyrights and the impartial 
and rapid as possible distribution of the revenues they have generated, but also to ensure that 
they achieve the cultural objective of the copyright legal system, and equalise and correct the 
imbalance between the exploitation of large and small international repertoires.790   
 
5.5.1 Incentivise Cultural Diversity 
The essence of the notion of cultural diversity is the production and diffusion of diverse cultural 
expressions. To assess whether the current copyright system incentivises the diversity of 
musical works, the accessibility of users to these musical works, and how individuals and 
communities make use of copyright works to improve their capabilities has to be looked at.791 
Due to the features of cultural goods, culture will flourish with its use. The line between 
creators and users is by no means clear in relation to cultural works.792 Each user, whether their 
                                                 
786 Abovyan (n 135) 77. 
787 See section 2.5 and 3.4. 
788 ibid. 
789 Section 2.5. 
790 Dietz (n 8). 




purpose is creative use or pure consumption, needs adequate access to the raw materials for 
their learning, study, and creations, in many cases building on the works of others in some way.  
 
It has to be observed that the term used to identify the objective of cultural policy should be 
cultural diversity rather than cultural innovation, since these two terms have different meanings. 
A commitment to cultural diversity is different from a commitment to cultural excellence. As 
Barry suggests, they are incompatible and one cannot be delivered by the other.793 Cultural 
diversity will not guarantee excellence, and vice versa.794 What copyright protects is originality 
rather than innovation. Also, it does not necessarily mean that the value of innovated works is 
more than an original work. Even the trashiest popular culture gives pleasure and meaning to 
some people’s lives.795 As to a society, both cultural diversity and innovation are important, 
since originality constitutes the elements of innovation. All kinds of copyrighted works as 
elements of the intellectual commons constitute diverse social cultural products.796 
 
Competition promotes market-friendly musical works, however, it harms cultural diversity. 
Some researchers assume that the more intense and open the competition, the greater the 
innovation and diversity to be found in the resulting music.797 But, the free market will of 
course compete out minority cultural goods. Free competition of the music industry is 
threatening non-mainstream music and small and less popular repertoires.798 Competition law 
or anti-trust law cannot foster the diversity of musical works. Rigorous application of anti-trust 
rules appears too negative to cultural diversity. This legislation pushes the societies to compete, 
which is not appropriate in this sector.799 
 
                                                 
793 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Harvard University Press 2002) 
198. 
794 ibid. 
795 Parker (n133). 
796 See more discussion about intellectual commons in section 5.3. 
797 Street (n 476). 
798 See section 6.5.2. 
799 Dietz (n 8). 
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5.5.2 The Impacts of Cross-border Flow of Cultural Goods  
In the field of music, the essence of cultural diversity lies in the creation and distribution of 
varied musical content. Proper rewards for creators and access to a wide range of music 
repertoires are unconditional for the preservation and further stimulation of cultural wealth.800 
Music copyrights management has major repercussions for creative activity and the market 
availability of diversified musical content. The business model of IMEs used for the collection 
and distribution of revenues to right holders affect the volume of creative output and condition 
the presence of different types of music repertoire in the market.801  
 
The practice of the music industry shows a greater interdependence between developed and 
developing countries for their cultural development. Whether the CCM in musical works in 
developed countries is more efficient or shows more advantages than in developing countries, 
there is no definitive conclusion. Various western musical works are quite popular in Asia. 
Developing countries, China for example, need licensed western music flows into their music 
market.802 At the same time, Asian music also shows their enthusiasm to enter into western 
music markets.803 Two typical examples are the Asian pop songs, Gangnam Style804 and Little 
Apple805, which have achieved a great success in western countries. From the international 
trade perspective, there is a mutual benefit between different countries by the cross-border flow 
of musical works.   
 
The preamble of the UNESCO Convention 2005 claims that ‘cultural activities, goods and 
services have both an economic and a cultural nature, because they convey identities, values 
                                                 
800 Hoeren and others (n 461). 
801 ibid. 
802 IFPI, ‘China: Moving Towards Paid Services’   <http://www.ifpi.org/China.php> accessed 30 May 2017. 
803 In Stanford University, a Pan-Asian music festival has been annually held each year since 2005 and the 
response are quite whelming. Pui Shiau, ‘Jindong Cai directs the Stanford Pan-Asian Music Festival’ (Stanford: 
Office of International Affairs, February 02, 2014)  <https://international.stanford.edu/info/news/jindong-cai-
directs-stanford-pan-asian-music-festival> accessed 30 May 2017. 
804 It is a K-pop song created by a South Korean musician. Since the first release of Gangnam Style in July, 2012, 
it has become the first YouTube music to reach a billion views and attracted millions western people to learn the 
dance of the song. 
805 It is a Chinese song. Since its release, it has quickly attained great popularity in Chinese cyberspace, making it 
a widespread internet meme. 
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and meanings, and must therefore not be treated as solely having commercial value’.806 Music 
as a cultural product has highly economic, social and cultural values that make it indispensable 
in terms of cross-border exchange between developed and developing countries. This is 
especially worthy for smaller countries which have no or limited natural or cultural resources 
and which thus rely on the import or export of music assets for their continuing economic 
development and social and cultural welfare.807 The exchange of cultural goods will impact on 
both the economy and society at large.808 As scholars point out,  the reforms themselves to 
promote creativity and cultural diversity in the music industry, in seeking to change the role 
and behaviour of CMOs, will have profound consequences for the market in music, and for 
creativity and cultural diversity within the market.809 
 
5.5.3 Supporting Cultural Diversity Globally 
Culture is dialogue, the exchange of ideas and experience and the appreciation of other values 
and traditions; it withers and dies in isolation.810 JCM is beneficial to the exchange of musical 
ideas, values and access to different cultural goods, encouraging diversity of musical works all 
over the world; on the contrary, it would destroy musical diversity when the world’s cornucopia 
of music is mixed and assimilated by some dominant cultural goods and eventually, the world 
will be awash in the culture of only one nation.811 Johnlee Scelba Curtis believes that copyright, 
by its nature, serves to support and stifle innovation and the diversity of cultural offerings.812 
He believes that the copyright chimera is born this way with two differing facets. 813  He 
demonstrates the debate by reviewing various approaches and arguments, and concludes that 
‘the current copyright regime hurts cultural diversity’.814  
 
                                                 
806 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005. 
807 De Werra (n 71). 
808 WIPO Draft Guidelines on Assessing the Economic, Social and Cultural Impact of Copyright on the Creative 
Economy (2013). 
809 Street (n 476). 
810 UNESCO (n 455). 
811 Curtis (n 454). 
812 ibid. 
813 For a unique analysis of the copyright debate, see Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture (翔泳社 2004) 179. 
814 Curtis (n 454). 
  
189 
A comprehensive international repertoire is indispensable for supporting cultural diversity, and 
could provide a platform for culture exchange between musicians from different countries. 
Society must make substantial efforts with respect to the planning, administration and financing 
of cultural activities. The first practical trial to facilitate the multi-repertoire and multi-
territorial licenses, the so-called Santiago Agreement, was concluded by nearly all the major 
European CMOs, representing authors in the area of performing rights. 815 This is a great 
opportunity for small repertoires from developing countries to join the one-stop-shop and 
operate beyond their territory. As previously mentioned, without such a multi-territorial 
agreement, small repertories are constantly under the threat of being out competed by large 
repertoires on the free market. For fulfilling the objective of promoting cultural diversity, 
disadvantageous repertories have to be supported by legal institutions nationally, regionally 
and internationally. However, the Santiago Agreement was called back in that it was announced 
to be in violation of EU competition rules.816  
 
Generally, the cultural mission of JMOs is embodied in their role in balancing small 
rightsholders’ interests, including small repertoires, and managing their copyrights under the 
principle of economic fairness. The objective of cultural justice is in line with the objective of 
economic fairness. If JMOs treat all musical works, wherever they come from, equally and 
fairly, generate corresponding revenues for all creators, and operate according to a well-
designed copyright legal system, the objective of cultural function namely to promote cultural 
diversity, would be fulfilled at the same time. Therefore, in the next chapter a comprehensive 
one-stop-shop, a GRP is proposed to fulfil this objective.  
 
5.5.4 Current Legislative Scenario  
Most constitutions of European countries do not provide a constitutional guarantee of the 
cultural function of copyright law.817 This has been solved politically by a series of recitals 
                                                 
815 Ficsor (n 24). 
816 Stef van Gompel, ‘Santiago Agreement Potentially Incompatible with European Competition Law’ (2006) 





within the European Copyright Directives, 818  which underline in various aspects the 
importance of copyright law for the development of creativity and culture. To say “politically” 
rather than “legally” is because these recitals do not have legal binding force, but merely appear 
as guidelines for national legislative activities.819However, EU Directive 2014 addresses the 
role of CMOs in promoting cultural diversity in two ways: a) ‘enabling the smallest and less 
popular repertories to access the market’;820 and b) ‘providing social, cultural and educational 
services for the benefit of their rightsholders and the public’.821 Accordingly, Directive 2014 
has also provided a number of provisions to enforce the objective of cultural diversity.822 These 
are positive improvements to recognise the objective of cultural diversity by legislation. The 
international copyright legal system should have introduced far more concrete and explicit 
explanations and provisions to demonstrate how the principle of respect for cultural diversity 
would be realised. 
 
Due to the lack of effective legal recognition of cultural objective, the current international 
copyright regime hurts cultural diversity through its observed impact on innovators, artists, 
consumers, and inextricable ties to oligopoly interests.823 As the main institutions operating to 
achieve copyright’s multiple functions, JMOs should play an essential role to protect and 
promote the diversity of cultural expressions by ensuring all kinds of copyrighted works be 
able to join a JMO and enabling the smallest and less popular repertoires to access the market. 
Only when the goal of promoting cultural diversity takes a heightened role and concrete 
provisions are respected and enforced by JMOs, can a true balance of interests be reached. 
Therefore, cultural function should be codified in forms of concrete enforceable provisions into 
the copyright legal system. And at the same time, assessment provisions should be established 
to ensure this policy has been respected and is not paid mere lip service.  
 
                                                 
818 Recital 9, 11,12, and 22, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society  
819 Curtis (n 454). 
820 Preamble 3, Directive 2014/26/EU (n 25). 
821 Preamble 3, 28, 44, Directive 2014/26/EU (n 25). 
822 Eg provisions about deductions for the purposes of social, cultural and educational services, see article 12 (4), 




In a nutshell, to appreciate the full cultural purpose of JMOs, this section takes a manifold way 
to consider promoting cultural diversity – balance small creators’ interests, take small 
repertories’ interests into account, and support small repertoires from developing countries. As 
many as possible musical works, whether owned by larger corporate rightsholders or small 
creators, managed by larger repertoires or smaller ones, from developed or developing 
countries, have to be included and treated fairly within a comprehensive international repertoire. 
Encouragement should be given, in particular, to cooperation among developing and developed 
countries, so that knowledge of other cultures and of other experiences of development may 
enrich the lives of such countries. Thus, a well-designed GRP is vital and essential in terms of 
fulfilling this objective. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
In order to maintain a just balance between the interests of rightsholders and music-users, the 
embodied principle of social justice by means of LEs is used to restrain exclusive rights. Thus, 
one of the aims of this chapter is to explore a consolidated LEs system at the global level. This 
is a challenging mission due to the various stipulations on LEs at national level.824 It has 
examined the overridability of various LEs and found that not all uses are justified to deserve 
substantive rights against exclusive copyrights. The issue of overridability depends on the 
nature of LEs due to the diverse types of music-users. Some types of uses are qualified as users’ 
rights; however, some are better to be regarded as users’ privileges or permitted uses. Through 
a doctrinal analysis on the nature of different LEs, it finds that uses for the purposes of music 
education and research are qualified as users’ right. For defending on this argument further, the 
Rawls’s theory of justice is applied to justify the social function of copyright, particularly to 
justify the rights of uses for music education and research purposes. The Rawlsian analysis on 
music users’ rights offers an alternative ethical justification – the reward that people gain from 
exercising copyrights of musical works is determined by a structure of rules which arrange 
social and economic benefits to everyone’s advantage, with priority to the worse off. Music 
resources in education and research are allocated so as to improve the long-term expectation of 
                                                 
824  Stipulations of national LEs are various worldwide and they are explained with or without appropriate 
justifications. See the discussion in section 3.4.2.2.  
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the least favoured. The uses for education and research have been emphasised since they enable 
a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to 
provide for each individual a secure sense of their own worth. Certainly, they are also highly 
related to re-creative activities and important to the development of public domain and social-
cultural values for all human being. But, legislators have not paid enough attention to this area 
yet. 
 
Given the advancement of technology, the scope of public interest has been broadened in digital 
era, and the social welfare between developed and developing countries interacts with each 
other, it suggests to establish a concept of international public interest for music education and 
research purposes. This important role is played by libraries which are the custodians of public 
interest and represent the majority of public users. It is imperative to establish mandatory 
library exceptions for facilitating access by lawful users. At the same time, the feasibility of 
international compensation schemes to compensate authors’ economic rights and balance users’ 
rights is explored. In a nutshell, for establishing a consolidated LEs system, international 
copyright treaties have to include normative principles as to the user’s right and privilege, and 
explicitly entrench them as mandatory LEs. For promoting the dissemination of knowledge 
assets worldwide and improving the bulk access of copyrighted works in developing countries, 
music library exceptions should be codified into international copyright treaties. 
 
Cultural diversity is another independent objective of copyright legal framework. Due to the 
lack of effective legal recognition of cultural objectives, the current international copyright 
regime hurts cultural diversity through its observed impact on innovators, artists, consumers, 
and inextricable ties to oligopoly interests. As the main institutions operating to achieve 
copyright’s multiple functions, JMOs should play an essential role to protect and promote the 
diversity of cultural expressions by ensuring all kinds of copyrighted works be able to join a 
JMO and enabling the smallest and less popular repertoires to access the market. The cultural 
function should be codified in forms of concrete enforceable provisions into the copyright legal 
system, and, at the same time, assessment provisions should be established to ensure this policy 
is respected and is not paid mere lip service. For enhancing the multiple functions of JMOs at 
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global level, it proposes to establish a global repertoire platform by which to manage copyrights 




Chapter 6 – A Global Repertoire Platform for Joint Copyrights 
Management in Musical Works 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
With regard to the globally cross-border licensing of copyrights through reciprocal 
representation agreements between CMOs, it has been proved that “multi-territorial” licences 
are actually “multi-repertoire” licences by which right-users should approach each national 
CMO and obtain a licence in each state.825 Segmented repertories have caused many problems. 
First, right-users, especially commercial users, need to pay crossed payments to repertoires if 
those musical works they need are managed by different repertoires. This is the case especially 
in online cross-border licensing of music. For picking up those they need, users may need to 
pay two or more repertoires. IMEs who manage larger rightsholders’ works have made the 
music repertoires more segmented. Second, segmented repertoires are also uneconomic for 
right-owners because they are obliged to pay membership fees to all the CMOs they have joined 
all over the world. Third, segmented copyrights information causes difficulties to licensing 
practice, especially for cross-border licensing in the digital era. Updated and accurate 
information is essential for successful licensing practice. 826 Fourth, Co-existence of many 
repertories allow rightsholders to transfer copyrights from CMO A to CMO B, which leads to 
instability in the licensing practice and makes it more complicated, making relations of CMOs 
completely obscure. Therefore, the global JCM lacks a one-stop-shop licence system across 
different repertoires. 
 
                                                 
825 See Enrico Bonadio, ‘Collective Management of Music Copyright in The Internet Age and The EU Initiatives: 
From Reciprocal Representation Agreement to Open Platforms’ (2010) International Federation of Library 
Associations and Institutions (IFLA). 
826 Global Repertoire Database Working Group, Global Repertoire Database Working Group Recommendations 
For: the Way Forward for the Development of A Global Repertoire Database (2010). 
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The hypothetical solution to deal with the segmented repertoires in this thesis is to establish a 
common copyright licensing infrastructure named GRP by which to simplify and facilitate the 
current online cross-border licensing practice of musical works. This chapter comes to test the 
feasibility of this and draw a conclusion by the hypothesis of a proposal for the GRP. To 
achieve this goal, it starts with a brief introduction in section 6.2 to the project of Global 
Repertoire Database (GRD) in musical works and concludes the possible reasons for its failure 
from political, technological and legal perspectives. Section 6.3 examines the nature and 
features of the GRP to justify the necessity and feasibility of global JCM in musical works. 
Section 6.4 offers an alternative justification of global JCM in musical works by applying 
Rawls’s justice theory, demonstrating the essential irreplaceable function of the GRP. And then 
two core legal obstacles to establish such a GRP, namely the issues of prohibition of formalities 
and natural monopoly, are analysed in section 6.5. At the end, a comprehensive conclusion will 
be drawn on the existing discussions.  
 
6.2 Is Globally Collective Management of Copyrights Feasible and Essential?  
A central information system of copyrights by establishing a global infrastructure would be 
useful for online cross-border music licensing. Lobbied by some music companies, including 
EMI Music Publishing, Universal Music Publishing, Apple, Amazon, PRS for Music, a GRD 
working group was established in 2009827  to achieve this goal but eventually failed. The failure 
of the first attempt does not mean it is impossible to establish such a database, rather it has 
revealed the practical issues which successors have to learn from and avoid in the future. This 
section starts with the introduction of the global repertoire database project and analyses the 
main issues which lead to the failure.  
 
The GRD was initiated by the music publishing sector to create a central database that provides 
access to authoritative, comprehensive, multi-territory information about the ownership and 
control of the global repertoire of musical works around the world, and that should be openly 
                                                 
827 GRD was a project which aimed to establish a single, global, authoritative source of multi-territory information 
platform about the ownership or control of the global repertoire of musical works. See GRD, ‘Global Repertoire 
Database Progress Update’ (March 2013)  <https://ec.europa.eu/licences-for-europe-dialogue/sites/licences-for-
europe-dialogue/files/Music-GRD_0.pdf> accessed 30 May 2017. 
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available to rightsholders, publishers, producers, CMOs, users, and the public at large. The 
GRD aimed to facilitate locating and identifying the copyright information of musical works 
for licensees, and enable more efficient distribution of royalties to the corporations and/or 
individuals who are due payment.828 The GRD was supposed to improve the transparency and 
efficiency of distribution of royalties by providing accurate licensing data of musical works 
worldwide in the digital era, which would be accessible online as requested by the public at 
large at any time and any place.  
 
With the support of this uniform data managing platform, the GRD would, first, benefit right-
owners, especially those individual creators, by providing various updated and accurate 
copyright licensing information such as ownership/authorship, transferring information, usage, 
royalties’ collection and distribution information. Second, the GRD would be also essential for 
licensees who are willing to legally access copyrighted works, facilitating the identification of 
correct copyright information in time. Third, for those publishers, they also look forward to a 
simplified licensing framework in the music business not only for increasing their members’ 
royalties but also for increasing their own revenues. Fourth, individual CMOs could benefit 
from the GRD by saving the operational costs and improving transparency and cooperation 
between sister CMOs. Moreover, standardised data by a singular platform would also facilitate 
the flow of musical products across-border more smoothly. This is because the licensing data 
managed by individual CMOs coming from national standards are inconsistent to each other. 
It is another obstacle to cross-border licensing practice. The current scenario, however, is it is 
difficult to access copyright licensing information, and licensing practice is inefficient, 
especially for foreign works, due to many barriers 829  to the free cross-border flow of 
copyrighted works. Thus, a central point of information of copyrights becomes increasingly 
imperative and crucial for standardising the information of copyrights worldwide, especially 
in the digital era where licensing activities become much easier online and are growing faster 
than before.  
 
                                                 
828 Global Repertoire Database Working Group (n 826). 
829 Some core legal barriers will be analysed in section 6.5. 
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In 2014, the GRD project was officially announced as having failed. It is believed that the main 
reason was due to the cut-off of funding.830 The combined loss of significant funding and 
information left the GRD unable to move forward.831 Some sources suggested that the CMOs 
feared losing revenue from operational costs under a more efficient GRD system.832 In addition 
to these practical reasons, members involved had some other concerns, for instance, the control 
of the global database.833 If, potentially, there were a way to fully realise this project, the 
question would be who would have control over the data and who would have been 
administering the catalogue. The third potential reason is there was a concern that the presence 
of CMOs would become redundant if publishers started to license musical works directly, with 
no intermediaries in between.  
 
In general, the issues that concerned the GRD participants, can be concluded as follows. First, 
from the political perspective, who has the administrative power to control the data supervise 
the operation of the distribution of royalties.834 Second, from the technological perspective,835 
the standardisation of data is also a problem since this will be an international super database 
which will include hundreds of different languages and information modes. The inconsistent 
information standards will generate huge barriers to those people who want to access to it. 
Another big challenge is how to integrate all the registration information all over the world into 
one single point. A high-quality technological service will be essential for the success of the 
super database. Third, from the legal perspective, another difficult barrier is that the 
harmonisation of some aspects of copyright licensing policy at international level will be a far 
                                                 
830 It was reported that CMOs had begun pulling out with the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (ASCAP) allegedly being the first one to retract from the project and stop funding it. See Klementina 
Milosic, ‘The Failure of The Global Repertoire Database’ (August 2015) Music Business Journal 
<http://www.thembj.org/2015/08/grds-failure/> accessed 30 May 2017. 
831 ibid. 
832 Chris Cooke, ‘PRS confirms Global Repertoire Database “cannot” move forward, pledges to find “alternative 
ways’ (10 July 2014)  <http://www.completemusicupdate.com/article/prs-confirms-global-repertoire-database-
cannot-move-forward-pledges-to-find-alternative-ways/> accessed 30 May 2017. 
833 ibid. 
834 This will need an effective supervisory mechanism in place for enhancing the transparency of CMOs’ activities. 
This issue will be discussed in section 4. 
835 As this issue is beyond the discussion of the current topic, it is only being raised here but won’t be analysed 
further in this research. 
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more complex mission, even if it is only in the music sector, since nearly every territory has a 
different revenue collecting system.836  
 
Although the first initiation of GRD failed, it has been widely accepted in the music sector that 
a better information system of rights ownership and management is crucial to the developing 
digital music industry; and despite the failures of previous attempts, a global database still 
seems like the best system to pursue.837 After the failure of GRD, alternatively, some CMOs 
have started to move to multi-territory licensing by bilateral agreements in the digital 
domain.838 Therefore, a number of mini-GRDs have been established in addition to the uber-
GRD.839 Thus, it is better to re-evaluate how the GRD could be created or reformed based on 
the lessons from the first initiation, and take the issues put forward above into consideration. 
For this purpose, the following section is going to explore a new model of GRP, starting with 
the discussion on the nature and legal position of such a super platform worldwide. 
 
6.3 Nature, Features and Benefits of the Proposed GRP  
It is important to clarify the legal nature of the GRP because it affects their legal position, and 
determines whether or not regulatory policies should be adopted to interfere its operation. As 
discussed in chapter 3 that there is not a consensus as to the nature of CMOs worldwide: in 
some countries CMOs are private organisations, but in others they are public or semi-public 
organisations.840 The following section aims to explore to what extent the GRP is a public 
organisation. 
                                                 
836 Some core legal barriers will be analysed in section 8.3. See Chapter 3, CMOs perform different roles in 
different territories. For instance, U.S. CMOs only manage public performance rights, whereas European CMOs 
manage both public performance rights as well as mechanical rights. 
837 Milosic (n 830). 
838 Cooke (n 832). 
839 Press Release, ‘PRS for Music, STIM and GEMA to Collaborate on New Joint Venture: Licensing and 
Processing Hub to Provide Services Across Europe’ 
<http://www.authorsocieties.eu/uploads/PRS%20for%20Music%20STIM%20and%20GEMA%20launch%20joi
nt%20venture%20FINAL%20(2).pdf> accessed 30 May 2017. 
840 See the analysis of models of CMOs at international level in chapter 3. A degree of supervision and public 
control of the operations of CMOs exists in different forms in various countries around the world – for example, 
supervision of establishment by a public authority, the Ministry of Culture in France and Spain, the Ministry of 
Justice or the Patent Office in Germany; self-regulatory framework approach in UK; civil courts supervision over 
all disputes in Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; administrative authority in Germany; specialist copyright 
tribunals in Australia and UK; Government department supervision in Canada and Denmark, supervised by the 
general law of competition and the powers of the competition authorities. See, CISAC (n 68). 
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The proposed GRP, which can be regarded as a CMOs’ CMO, would mainly function as an 
information system facilitating copyright licensing of musical works. But it would not perform 
the administration function, eg negotiating with users, collecting and distributing royalties, 
enforcing copyrights, and carrying out the social-cultural obligations. Such concrete 
administration functions mentioned above will still be performed by individual national CMOs 
which are members sharing membership of the GRP. The central contact point which serves to 
balance information asymmetries can be understood as a ‘copyright management information 
system’.841 The system itself does not grant licenses, but its most important task is to provide 
information to persons about who holds and possibly manages the rights. It also records every 
usage of copyrighted works by end users. To some extent it provides supervision on the 
operation of national CMOs. The system was supposed to work as an important part of cross-
border licensing of musical works to achieve the objective of information economics at 
international level. Such a global database platform would contain accurate information about 
every recording, the copyright owners in each territory, the authors who wrote the underlying 
musical work, publisher information, and performer identification. It would substantially 
improve the transparency, efficiency, simplification and harmonization of international 
copyright licensing. 
 
As a comprehensive information system, data provided by the GRP for its members and the 
public should include at least four aspects:842 first, a register of members whose rights they 
represent; second, details of registered works (titles, authors, publishers and the agreed split of 
revenues between them); third, details of users with whom agreements are signed; fourth, 
details of music use by such users. These categories of documented information, originating 
from national CMOs, could be globally standardised, and offer with online access to their 
members and the public at large. The GRP would also oversee the information provided by 
national CMOs to ensure the information is accurate and updated. Therefore, the 
documentation of all the information becomes essential to the effectiveness and transparency 
of the operation of licensing practice in the digital era. The GRP does not serve rightsholders 
                                                 
841 Towse and Hanke (n 36). 
842 Frith and Marshall (n 261) 112. 
  
200 
only. It is not the representative of CMOs or rightsholders. The members of the GRP would 
include individual songwriters, composers, publishers, producers, CMOs, and users. At the 
same time, commercial users could register as GRP members to exploit musical works from 
the platform. Platform users could require information any time at any place through the 
internet. Therefore, the GRP would be a not-for-profit semi-public organisation in nature. 
 
Because of consumers’ desire, it has been argued that one-stop-shop is justified for music joint 
ventures. 843  One-stop-shop is a uniform and unproblematic acquisition of all required 
copyrighted works existing in the world in one single place.844  Licences can be directly granted 
through portals.845 In this case, consumers are provided with true one-stop licence shopping at 
a central online location, providing a convenient, easily adaptable, and secured system with the 
capacity to handle thousands of transactions every day. 846  The GRP, however, does not 
function to directly grant licences to right-users. This is the main feature that distinguishes it 
from the concept of one-stop-shop. National repertoires can and should perform the function 
of one-stop-shop for the sake of reducing right-users’ transactions costs. 
 
From the perspective of a two-way copyright licensing industry, an online music licensing 
clearinghouse has been proposed to reconcile the existing licensing structure with new 
technologies by positing a method of digitally licensing music copyright.847 The online music 
clearinghouse would provide licensors with fair compensation in a manner consistent with 
traditional licensing practices and would allow those seeking a licence to easily and quickly 
pay one price for their desired use.848 It has been argued that it would provide an efficient way 
to manage and store JMOs’ enormous music catalogues, as well as the detailed accounts of all 
clearinghouse users.849 As proposed, this clearinghouse may have to charge a small fee for each 
                                                 
843 Harry First, ‘Online Music Joint Ventures: Taken for a Song’ (2004) NY Univ Law & Econ.  
844 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (n 36). 
845 ibid. 
846 Brian R Day, ‘Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age: The Online Clearinghouse’ 






transaction to help to offset administration costs.850 This feature is distinct from that of the GRP. 
The GRP records transaction history but would not charge an administration fee. This part is 
left to national CMOs as before. 
 
The GRP would be a useful tool for establishing an infrastructure for multi-territorial licensing 
worldwide. 851  In addition to the multi-function, the GRP could also benefit developing 
countries which might do not have the ability to set up a modern functioning CMO, to facilitate 
the global free flow of cultural goods. With the technological advances in recent years of 
database software systems and the online environment, great efficiency could be achieved if a 
GRP could be created that each JMO could have access to.852 The GRP initiative would greatly 
simplify, modernise and improve the conditions of licensing in the digital market.853 Its main 
objective is to provide, for the first time, a single, comprehensive and authoritative 
representation of the global ownership and control of musical works. The compilation and 
availability of accurate information on music creators’ rights ownership information in one 
authoritative database is of utmost importance for facilitating efficient cross-border licensing 
and the distribution of royalties to the relevant right holders in a consistent manner. This 
information should be publicly available and provide transparent information to users, thus 
facilitating licensing. The main benefit of the GRP’s system is rapid and efficient copyright 
documentation, permitting timely and accurate royalty distributions, which is delivering 
substantial benefits for the creators and rights-owners. Indeed, the copyright management 
information system is the prerequisite to ensure the transparency of the operation of JMOs. For 
markets in intangibles like digital musical works to function properly, full disclosure of all 
necessary information about copyright and the identity of rights-holders and licensors is 
indispensable.854 
 
                                                 
850 ibid. 
851 The GRD was deemed a useful infrastructure for multi-territorial licensing worldwide. See Bonadio (n 825). 
852 David Stopps, Howto Make a Living From Music (World Intellectual Property Org. 2008)3. 




6.4 Rawls’s Theory of Justice and the GRP 
Various JMOs worldwide as GRP members would be in a relation of cooperative 
interdependence under the social institution of international copyright licensing in musical 
works. Repertoires from different countries muturally rely on the common market of music for 
the sake of augmenting their national incomes. It is believed that gains in national income by 
international free trade are further augmented by economies of scale and the spread of 
technology and ideas, by reducing costs of production and increasing output, while the resulting 
gains in turn contribute to economic growth. 855  The central point platform facilitating 
worldwide cross-border copyright licensing in musical works is to allow countries to further 
refine what was produced, allocate music copyright resources more productively and thereby 
increase national overall production and greater national-level income gains.  
 
The basic structure of the social institution of GRP can be organised in different ways, with 
varying consequences for the incomes of JMOs and for the socio-economic prospects of their 
country. This international social practice of market reliance would certainly generate issues 
of fairness. JMOs may benefit from the GRP to very different degrees overall, and specific 
groups of people may on balance be “losers” from global copyright licensing even if their 
represented JMO gains in the aggregated. Inside the GRP there are various sizes of repertories 
from different countries managed by JMOs which have distinct natures, features and nuanced 
functions and abide by national laws. As far as the distribution of copyright benefits and 
burdens concerned, organisational members choose to form this society through negotiated 
agreements and, therefore, are subject to the demands of fairness beyond mere considerations 
of JMOs’ interest, national economic efficiency, or overall welfare. This thesis suggests to 
arrange the basic structure of the social institution of global JCM according to Rawlsian 
principles. 
 
The discussion of global justice in this section is the introduction of distributive fairness in 
copyright resources, rather than other morally important issues, including international 
                                                 
855 Aaron James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’ (2014) 1 Moral Philosophy and Politics 177. 
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relations, global wealth and poverty, or global inequality in other aspects. This is because 
philosophical discussion of global justice has become sufficiently rich and complex that it is 
no longer possible to discuss all the various threads of this discussion in one entry.856 Cross-
border copyright licensing in musical works has become a factual global phenomenon. The 
global inequality as the outcome of globally copyright licensing is an imperative issue that we 
have to face. Rawls’s theory offers two principles to assess the justness of any configurations 
or law. Some scholars argue Rawls justice theory is merely for domestic political institutions.857 
Also, the concept of global justice has also been constantly debated.858 At macro-level the 
philosophical research on the phenomenon of global inequalities appears to be inconclusive. 
However, as a specific global phenomenon, cross-border copyright licensing in musical works 
is relevant from the standpoint of justice which is worth a separate test. Within the scope of 
this specific area, Rawls’s theory of justice can be applied to assess and design the social 
institution of the GRP.  
 
To fulfil the goal of global copyright justice, the proposed multi-objective theoretical 
framework is applied.859 The economic objective of copyright legal system is to fulfil economic 
fairness between different JMOs. According to Rawls’s first principle of equal liberty, 
copyright should be a universal legal right that equally enjoyed by all rightsholders without 
prejudice.860 Thanks to international copyright treaties,861 the content of copyright protection 
has been minimally harmonised at international level. Copyrights are able to be equally 
protected among member countries. For satisfying the first part of the second principle, fair 
equality of opportunity, the GRP should integrate all kinds of musical works from all over the 
world together into a central platform. All music owners, including famous music artists, larger 
rightsholders and less-known musicians, fairly enjoy the global market opportunities and the 
                                                 
856 Deen K Chatterjee, Encyclopedia of Global Justice: A-I (Springer Science & Business Media 2011). 
857 See Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press on 
Demand 2007); Samuel Richard Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press 
2003). 
858 Chatterjee (n 856). 
859 See the proposed theoretical framework in chapter 2. 
860 The first principle of Rawls’s theory of justice states that ‘each music creator is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’. See Rawls 
(n 137). 
861 For example, the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC). 
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GRP services regardless of their nationality or social class. The GRP should provide an equal 
opportunity to all member repertoires, whether from developed or developing countries, to 
disseminate musical works and to reach the global music market. The second part of the second 
principle ensures that everyone will benefit from the social cooperation. It requires that no 
one’s life prospects would be worse off during such global copyrights licensing practice.  In 
the global context, the understanding of “everyone” in the society should include both JMOs 
and JMOs’ individuals. Neither the overall interests of JMOs or individual rightsholders’ 
interests should be worsened off. According to Rawls, economic inequalities are only allowed 
when they will be to everyone’s advantage, and with the priority to those who are worse off.  
 
As discussed in chapter 5, the justification of the objective of social function is for improving 
the long-term expectation of the worse off.862 With regard to the social cooperation by means 
of JCM in the global context, the scope of public interests has been broadened in digital era. 
People wherever they come from, contribute to add values to the common assets in some seen 
or unseen ways and easily share such common assets worldwide by means of internet. The 
scope of the concept of music users or contributors should not be limited according to their 
nationality. The subject of traditional discussion of global justice is mainly about the 
distribution of ordinary goods. However, ordinary goods are scarce goods which are different 
from cultural goods. Social institutions have to concern the allocation of scarce goods and 
burdens since the scarcity of them. That is why it is impossible to discuss philosophical theory 
regarding international distributive justice at the global level. On the contrary, cultural goods 
have infinite lives and they increase values by usage. Social institutions have to be designed to 
encourage the dissemination and exploitation of cultural goods. There is no difference in terms 
of values between diverse musical works.  Also, due to the realities of globalisation and 
digitalisation, music users worldwide agreed to cooperate with each other behind a veil of 
ignorance under the condition to share the “primary goods”. Accordingly, the concept of 
international public interests can and should be established. For improving the long-term 
expectation of the least favoured, the GRP could offer exceptions to and limitations of 
                                                 
862 See section 3.4.2 and section 5.2. 
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copyrighted works, allowing the least favoured to exploit musical works freely without 
infringing copyrights, and fulfilling the social function of copyright legal framework. It could 
also offer mandatory licences to musical works for education purposes by the least advantaged.  
 
As to the justification of cultural objective, the GRP would be commissioned to promoting 
cultural diversity at the global level. As discussed in chapter 3, the concept of cultural rights is 
justified by the first principle of Rawls’s theory that cultural rights are equal political rights 
between all people which requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties. This 
function cannot be taken into effect by a singular repertoire of course. The GRP would provide 
an ideal place for musicians’ cultural expression all over the world. At the same time, the access 
right of music users would also be improved through this social infrastructure.  
 
6.5 Core Legal Issues to Establish Global Copyright Licensing Framework 
The failure of the first attempt to create a GRD has proved that it is a formidable project to 
establish a global licensing framework. The challenges facing the policy-makers are not only 
from the financial problems, political obstacles, technological difficulties, but also, more 
importantly, from the legal barriers between different jurisdictions all over the world. This 
section studies the two core legal issues, named prohibition of formalities and natural 
monopoly, which would be the main obstacles to the establishment of a global licensing 
informational platform – the GRP. 
 
6.5.1 The Issue of Prohibition of Formalities 
Copyright formalities are defined as formal requirements that the law imposes on authors and 
copyright owners for the purpose of securing or maintaining copyright protection or enforcing 
this right before the courts. 863  Copyrights are generated automatically along with the 
completion of creative works. From the moment that an original work is created, the author 
enjoys all the benefits that copyright protection grants, without the need to complete a 
registration, deposit the work, mark it with a copyright notice or comply with any other 
                                                 
863 Van Gompel (n 396) 10. 
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statutorily prescribed formality.864 Creators are not under any obligation to accomplish any 
formality to gain exclusive rights on their works. This famous rule of prohibition of formalities 
was introduced in Berne Convention in 1908 and now it is Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention 
(1971). 865  However, formalities of copyright have not disappeared entirely. As will be 
discussed in the following sections, in some countries, some kind of formalities still exist. The 
advantage of registration is that it creates a presumption of constructive notice that a work is 
under copyright, which is useful to a plaintiff in an infringement action.866 In fact, in the digital 
era, copyright licensing will dramatically benefit from such formalities. Before arguing to 
remove this out-of-date provision from international treaties, this section starts with a brief 
introduction of the three forms of formalities of copyrights. 
 
6.5.1.1 Registration: Information of Ownership  
The registration of copyrighted works is not required to gain copyright protection according to 
the Berne Convention. However, rightsholders are encouraged to register their works by 
national copyright laws on a voluntary basis,867 for the purpose of establishing prima facie 
evidence from an official source in case of copyright conflicts. In most countries, online 
registration services of musical works are provided by CMOs or governments normally for a 
small fee, as well as other options like filing application forms by post are also available.868 
These kinds of register services do not generate copyright, but are regarded as a way to better 
identify the basic information such as rightsholders of a musical work and proof of ownership. 
These services are usually convenient for rightsholders and aim to simplify as much as possible 
the registration process of musical works. This is because the information of ownership is 
important and fundamental in the field of copyright licensing, especially for digital musical 
                                                 
864 ibid, 1. 
865 Article 5(2), Berne Convention. “The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the country of 
origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well 
as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of 
the country where protection is claimed.”  
866 Christopher Sprigman, ‘Reform (aliz) ing Copyright’ (2004) 57 Stanford Law Review 485. 
867 For example, in Spain, every work protected by Law 22/1987, of 11 November 1987, as amended by Law 
20/1992, of 7 July 1992, may be registered in the General Registry of Intellectual Property. This register is under 
the authority of the Ministry of Culture and is made available to the public. 
868 For example, SABAM, UK PRS, US copyright office, BMI, Canadian IP office, Kenya copyright board. 
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works whose structure of ownership can be rather complex and confusing for copyright-
users.869 To set up a GRP, the registration of musical works becomes the prerequisite of the 
success of this project.   
 
6.5.1.2 Recordation: Record of Transferring Information  
Recordation is the registration of amendment, assignment, transfer or conveyance of copyrights, 
for keeping the registers up-to-date. If there is no transferring information, the original author 
is deemed as the right-holder(s). The basic rule of recordation of other IP rights like patent, 
trademarks, industrial design, is that if an assignment is recorded, the assignee is protected 
against earlier unrecorded transfers of rights. If he fails to do so within a certain period, a 
subsequent recorded transfer will take priority.870 The assignment or transfer of copyrights in 
musical works happen frequently in practice. US copyright law used to stipulate that 
recordation is required as a condition to sue for anyone claiming to be the right owner by virtue 
of a transfer of copyright. However, after joining the Berne Convention, it was modified as 
recordation only gives constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document and 
priority in case of conflicting assignments. 
 
6.5.1.3 Notice 
The rule of copyright notice was firstly introduced in US copyright law. It is a notice of a 
statutorily prescribed form that informs users all over the world of the underlying claim to 
copyright ownership in a published work. According to the US 1909 Copyright Act, the notice 
should consist of three elements, i.e., the indication ‘copyright’, ‘copr.’ or the symbol ©, the 
name or initials of the right owner and the year of publication.871 It should be placed on the 
title page – or other visible part – of each copy of the work published or offered for sale in the 
US by authority of the copyright owner.872 The use of notice informs the public that a work is 
protected by copyright, identifies the copyright owner, and shows the year of first publication.  
 
                                                 
869 See section 6.5.1.5. 
870 See sec. 68, UK Patent Act 1977; sec.25(4) UK Trade Marks Act 1994. 
871 Sec. 18 of the US Copyright Act 1909; 17 USC § 19 (1947). 
872 Secs. 9 and 19 of the US Copyright Act 1909; 17 USC §§10 and 20 (1947). 
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6.5.1.5 Necessity and Feasibility to Reintroduce Formalities to GRD 
In the context of copyright licensing in the digital era, identifying and locating copyright 
owners may be difficult, since not all works have an attached statement indicating the 
authorship or ownership of copyrights. Even if they do have notices, the information may be 
outdated since the ownership may have transferred to a third party or even sub-third party. In 
the absence of copyright formalities, adequate and updated copyright registers are insufficient. 
This can be a huge obstacle for the free cross-border flow of copyrighted goods due to the 
difficulty for users to obtain accurate information. This problem of unidentifiable and 
untraceable copyright owners, also known as the problem of ‘orphan works’, 873 may also 
obstruct public access to cultural goods. The reintroduction of copyright formalities into 
copyright licensing law could be an optimum solution for clearing these obstacles and 
facilitating cross-border licensing and the free flow of musical works worldwide. 
 
However, due to the fact that copyright law is facing such challenges, among scholars there is 
a hot debate on whether it is feasible to reintroduce copyright formalities into the copyright 
legal framework.874 Opponents argue that copyright is a natural right that ought to be protected 
independently from compliance with formalities.875 They believe that all the requirements of 
formalities discussed above can be very burdensome and costly for individual creators to fulfil 
them,876 and more importantly, they violate Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention.877 Authors 
cannot be forced to register their works. Professor Ginsburg emphasized that ‘orphan works 
                                                 
873 See Gompel (n 396) 5.  
874 The prohibition of formalities rule in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention stipulates that “the enjoyment and 
the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be 
independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work…” 
875 See Adolf Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community: A Comparative Investigation of National 
Copyright Legislation, with special reference to the provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, vol 20 (Kluwer Law Intl 1978) 24-25; Jane C GINSBURG, ‘A Tale of two Copyrights: Literary 
Property in Revolutionary France and America’ (1991) Revue internationale du droit d'auteur 124; Silke Von 
Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2008) 43, 119; Lessig, Free Culture 
(n 813) 250-251; Sprigman (n 866) 543; Graeme W Austin, ‘METAMORPHOSIS OF ARTISTS'RIGHTS IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE: KEYNOTE ADDRESS’ (2005) 28 Colum JL & Arts 397; referring to such ‘natural rights’ 
claims in relation to (the abolition of) copyright formalities. 
876 See Arthur Levine, ‘The End of Formalities: No More Second-Class Copyright Owners’ (1994) 13 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent LJ 553; Irwin Karp, ‘A Future Without Formalities’ibid 521; Austin (n 875) 414; Gompel (n 396) 9. 
877 Jane C Ginsburg, ‘The US Experience with Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship’ (2010) 457. 
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legislation should not occasion back door imposition of formalities that condition the 
“enjoyment or exercise” of copyright’.878 
 
Whereas, supporters observe that copyright formalities may have a useful role to play in 
addressing the current challenges in copyright law.879 They seek to explain that by ‘making 
claims on the ownership of property clear’, formalities assure ‘that the property can be allocated 
in a way that makes everyone better off’.880 According to economic studies,881 the costs of 
tracing the right owner and obtaining a license to use a work may be significantly reduced if 
copyright formalities are conditional. Also, the encouragement of formalities is a way to 
conserve cultural heritage.882 The period of copyright protection is a creator’s life time plus 70 
years. After some time, the information of ownership would become unclear if the work had 
never been registered. In this case, a register would act as the guardian of culture by recording 
the evolvement from our past and our present to future generations. 883 Based on a legal-
theoretical analysis, Gompel demonstrates that reintroducing copyright formalities is 
acceptable and feasible for an author’s economic rights which are property-related; however, 
moral rights aiming to protect authorial dignity, must be protected without formalities.884 For 
creators’ economic rights, formalities will benefit all stakeholders involved, not only for 
rightsholders but also for users, the domestic economy, and the society as a whole.885 
 
The issue of the requirement of formalities is an important element for considering the essential 
question of whether the requirement of formalities by CMOs and GRP to establish a central 
licensing database is Berne compliant, in particular by those non-voluntary collective licensing 
systems. As regards Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, it is a misperception to understand 
that this provision forbids all formalities. Subjecting copyright to formalities is prohibited only 
                                                 
878 Estelle Derclaye, Copyright and Cultural Heritage: Preservation and Access to Works in A Digital World 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 43. 
879 Gompel (n 863). 
880 ibid, 8. 
881 Landes and Posner (n 96).  
882 Derclaye (n 878) 44. 
883 ibid. 
884 Gompel (n 863) 262. 
885 ibid.  
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if it affects the ‘enjoyment’ or the ‘exercise’ of this right.886 Therefore, formalities that leave 
the enjoyment or the exercise of copyright unaffected are not covered by the Berne prohibition 
on formalities. 887  CMOs act as intermediaries by providing licensing services between 
licensors and licensees, functioning to facilitate the control of the licensing process to benefit 
all stakeholders involved, including the whole society. Their collective management of 
copyrights, eg by means of setting up a central database, as well as the corresponding copyright 
licensing policies do not affect the enjoyment or exercise of proprietary rights authorised by 
copyright law. Creators are free to choose to license their works to another intermediary, eg a 
publisher or producer, to make profits, or authorise copyrights to any CMOs as they like. Also, 
rightsholders are still free to exercise their copyrights individually. Therefore, as long as CMOs 
do not interfere with rightsholders’ choices or exclude the means of individual licensing of 
copyrights, the requirement of formalities by CMOs is consistent with Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention. For non-voluntary collective management of copyrights, rightsholders would be 
authorised the rights to opt-out to enjoy or exercise their rights freely. Otherwise, non-voluntary 
CMOs would affect their “enjoyment” or “exercise” of rights that is inconsistent with Article 
5 (2). 
 
Nowadays, there are new ways music is distributed that permit its dissemination across national 
borders, 888  and this trend has been growing dramatically during the last decade. 889  When 
foreign musical works flowed into local repertoire, the local repertoire could be expanded 
dramatically. Some countries have extended the term of copyright protection. 890  This has 
resulted in a much more increased number of works. Additionally, substantive national 
copyright law has only been harmonised at a minimum level by international treaties. There 
are still distinctions between domestic copyright laws which has caused practical difficulties 
                                                 
886 See Art. 5(2), Berne Convention. 
887 Gompel (n 863) 174. 
888 Bonadio (n 825). 
889 See IFPI music report 2013, “the music industry has achieved its best year-on-year performance since 1998… 
The expansion has gone truly global”; IFPI music report 2016, “global music revenues increase 3.2% as digital 
revenues overtake physical for the first time”. 
890 For example, the US Copyright Act of 1976 stipulated that copyright would last for the life of the author plus 
50 years, or 75 years for a work of corporate authorship. The 1998 Act extended these terms to life of the author 
plus 70 years and for works of corporate authorship to 120 years after creation or 95 years after publication. 
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to copyright licensing. Another difficulty is caused by the principle of divisibility which is 
stipulated in the US Copyright Act 1976 – a copyright is a compilation of many individual 
rights, and it allows for the severability and distinct exploitation of those rights.891. For example, 
a songwriter or music publisher as a copyright-owner may assign exclusive rights to a 
performing rights society BMI to perform the work publicly, but reserve all other rights, such 
as the right to reproduce the copyrighted works. That means CMOs have to carefully register 
what categories of rights they are representing and managing and by which country’s law the 
copyrights of these works have been transferred that CMOs have to respect.892 Because of the 
different rules as to the transferability and divisibility of copyrights, their ownership has also 
become more obscure. All of these are licensing difficulties that have intensified especially in 
the digital era due to the expansion of the amount of cross-border licensing of copyrighted 
works. Therefore, without an effective copyrights database platform, cross-border copyright 
licensing could become impossible. 
 
Technologies have also rendered the structure of copyrights in musical works much more 
complex than ever before. The means to be a musician has, in many ways, changed. The scope 
of the meaning of creators have also changed: creators are no longer limited to songwriters, 
composers, performers and producers, but also including technologists, contemporary 
composers and performers, engineers, synthesiser programmers, turntablists, sample artists, 
mixers and remixers, individuals whose knowledge and skill in the uses of the recording studio, 
and the various technologies associated with it.893 All these people have become an important 
part to the creation of modern musical works. This has added new layers of protection to 
existing creations and has brought new categories of right holders into the realm of copyright. 
As such, a single object, a piece of musical work for example, now may be protected by various 
layers of overlapping rights, each of which may potentially be owned by a different 
                                                 
891 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). The five basic rights provided to the copyright owner are reproduction, adaption, 
publication, performance, and display. Thus, the right to produce a movie is severable from the right to publish 
the story upon which a movie may be based. See Elliot Groffman, ‘Divisibility of Copyright: Its Application and 
Effect’ (1979) 19 Santa Clara L Rev 171. 
892 This is due to the principle of ‘country of origin’ stipulated in Berne Convention. 
893 Frith and Marshall (n 261) 139. 
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rightsholder.894 This perplexing structure of copyrights confuses users quite often. Now even 
the creators themselves, eg arrangers, synthesizer programmers, mixers and remixers, do not 
know whether or not they have copyrights to their musical works.895 If two different CMOs are 
set up to manage copyrights separately, this technological change will render copyrights 
licensing more complicated. Meanwhile, users refuse to pay twice for the licence of a repertoire 
if the musical works are managed by different repertoires at the same time. 896 Licensees claim 
that payment should be combined.897 A central information system that provides one place of 
documentation would be cost-efficient to right-users. Therefore, it is a good idea to document 
all the information of authorship or ownership as well as copyrights licensing information to 
avoid any disputes about ownership, and also to help users to locate correct licensors. The 
licensing system would be much more simplified if there were a central information platform 
integrating and providing comprehensive information of the ownership and/or authorship of 
copyrights as well as copyrights licensing information altogether. 
 
Generally, in the context of global cross-border licensing, such a central database to record 
information of musical works would not only benefit rightsholders and right-users, but also 
facilitate the licensing process and promote the free flow of musical works across borders. The 
principle of prohibition of formalities was more concerned with the practicability and political 
feasibility of the treaty than with ideological considerations.898 After a careful examination of 
the purpose of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention and its practical feasibility, it can be 
concluded that a global information system of musical works is consistent with the Berne 
Convention. And more importantly, this common social infrastructure would benefit the 
stakeholders involved by providing them accurate information about copyrighted works and 
licensing activities. It would not only dramatically reduce transaction cost, but more important 
improve the transparency and efficiency of CMOs’ performance. Member CMOs, 
                                                 
894 The typical case is the process of producing digital music that would involve some or all of arrangers, 
programmers, mixers and lyrics. 
895 See Frith and Marshall (n 261). 
896 Music users who obtained direct licenses had to pay twice for the music – once to the direct licensor, eg 
composers and publishers, and once to the relevant CMO. See D.J. Gervais and P.L. Landolt, Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights (Kluwer Law International 2006) 337. 
897 ibid. 
898 Gompel (n 863). 
  
213 
rightsholders, users, as well as the public would be able to access to the core information at any 
time and any place over the world. This information system would operate as an essential 
infrastructure which is the prerequisite for functionalising JMOs to achieve multi-objectives. 
 
6.5.2 The Issue of Natural Monopoly  
Another legal obstacle is the so called natural monopoly function of CMOs. To justify the 
feasibility of a GRP, the inevitable issue of the GRP’s de facto monopoly position has to be 
dealt with in terms of worldwide copyright information management in musical works. This 
section starts with a brief introduction of how GRP would work, and then the natural monopoly 
theory will be applied to assess whether or not GRP is a natural monopoly; if it is, should it be 
encouraged or any measures adopted to correct any possible distortion?  
 
6.5.2.1 The Way Forward of GRD and Proposed GRP 
Historically, CMOs have operated and administered the rights in musical works predominantly 
on a single territory basis with the users of these rights predominantly operating within a single 
territorial boundary. This leads to the databases of musical works, whether at national level or 
controlled by a global repertoire, being of varying quality and not always maintained at an 
optimum level.899 GRD can standardise the requirements and forms of the database of musical 
works at an international level. Such a centralised information system will be critical to register 
and keep track of performances, avoid duplication on the documentation, improve efficiency 
and convenience, and will dramatically facilitate the licensing practice.900Authoritative, multi-
territory, transparent, openly accessible, comprehensive rights ownership data is key to 
enabling these multi-territory licensing solutions to function effectively and efficiently. Such 
solutions that offer an aggregated worldwide repertoire licence would maximise stakeholders’ 
trust in licensing practice, deliver administrative efficiency through standardisation and 
                                                 
899  GRD, WG, ‘Global Repertoire Database Working Group the Way Forward for a GRD’ (2010) 
<http://www.globalrepertoiredatabase.com/docs/GRD-077-GRDRecommendations(Finalv1.0).pdf > accessed 15 
February 2017. 
900 Philippe Gilliéron, ‘Collecting Societies and the Digital Environment’ (2006) 37 IIC 939. 
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interoperability and provide for a level of accuracy, comprehensiveness and automation fit for 
copyright licensing practice in the digital era.  
 
As shown in diagram 8.1 below, the main obligation of GRD is to manage the data quality and 
user accounts. Any rightsholders, CMOs and music service providers can register as GRD users. 
The GRD should strive to deliver a consolidated, comprehensive and authoritative source of 
truth.901 This authoritative information provided by the GRD is about which organisation is in 
a position to grant the requisite licences for the exploitation of the musical works by rights 
share, by right type, by use type, by territory and by exploitation date.902 Some of the data 
elements are static in the sense that they do not change, for example, the title of a musical work 
or its songwriter and composer. However, a significant amount of other information identified 
above is dynamic, such as the usage of the works, transfer of ownership, and royalties. Such 
data elements are highly time sensitive and need to be updated constantly. As claimed, none of 
the existing databases around the world provides such quality data903 which is deemed as a 
fundamental tool for worldwide copyright licensing service. The GRD must, therefore, be able 
to keep all the data updated over time and retain a complete historical record that can be 
accessed as requested any time.  
 
  
                                                 






Diagram 8.1: The conceptual framework for the GRD environment.904  
 
Source:  GRD WG (2010) 
 
The concept of a GRD is now gaining greater attention across various stakeholder groups of 
the music industry because it is increasingly recognised that there are significant benefits to be 
had for all stakeholders. Accordingly, it is proposed that the objective of GRP is to establish a 
database to provide access to authoritative comprehensive multi-territory information about the 
ownership or control of the global repertoire of musical works that is openly available to all 
stakeholders, such as songwriters, publishers, musical works, CMOs and users (see diagram 
8.1 above.) For rightsholders and CMOs it will provide significant improvements in efficiency 
and reductions in costs particular in the areas of data reconciliation and subsequent usage 
matching. For licensees, GRP is cost-efficient. The access to authoritative data about musical 
works would ensure that appropriate licences can be obtained with more transparent rights 




clearance processes, which will enable simpler reconciliation of royalty invoice and eliminate 
multiple administrative charges where rights are licensed on a multiple repertoire basis. 
Authoritative and comprehensive data will also maximise matching and improve the accuracy 
of distributions to rightsholders whether rights are licensed on a worldwide repertoire or 
specific repertoire basis. For all music industry stakeholders, there will be general reductions 
in costs and improvements in efficiency associated with the people and processes involved in 
works registration, resolution of data conflicts, matching of usage information and the 
management of the resulting financial transactions. 905  All of these benefits in turn would 
inevitably lead to increased revenue generally to all stakeholder groups regardless of where 
they sit in the supply chain.906 
 
6.5.2.2 The Application of Natural Monopoly Theory 
With very few exceptions, CMOs are organised as national monopolies.907 The term “natural 
monopoly” has been associated with CMOs, because it is widely accepted that collective 
management is the most efficient form for managing copyrights and at the same time, 
regulation is necessary to assure that the benefits of the natural monopoly will not be replaced 
by monopolistic abuses.908 The proposed GRP will also be the case. Research on CMOs’ 
natural monopoly, however, is usually superficial and most of the literature only points out that 
CMOs, as monopoly suppliers, are more efficient in the sense of having lower costs than if 
there were in competition, without demonstrating what the essence of natural monopoly is and 
how to apply this theory appropriately to CCM. 909  They simply believe that the main 
measurement relies on whether CMOs who exploit their monopoly position, tolerate the market 
and reduce efficiencies or successfully regulate the market and achieve efficiencies. 910 
Theoretically, all the stakeholders would rely on the information provided by the GRP, whether 
static or dynamic, which would be the only worldwide database of copyright licensing in 
musical works, stakeholders would certainly be concerned about the issue of monopoly. Thus, 
                                                 
905 ibid. 
906 ibid. 
907 Handke, ‘Collective Administration’ (n 36) 179. 
908 See Katz (n 341). 
909 See ibid; Handke and Towse (n 917); Hansen and Bischoffshausen (n 36); Drexl and others (n 64). 
910 Studies on CMOs’ natural monopoly are usually on the ground of economic efficiency. See ibid. 
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this section will re-examine, in a different way, the nature of the natural monopoly of GRP by 
applying the natural monopoly theory. 
 
It has been argued that markets with natural monopoly characteristics are thought to lead to a 
variety of economic performance problems, eg excessive prices, production inefficiencies, 
costly duplication of facilities, poor service quality, and to have potentially undesirable 
distributional impacts.911 It is believed that John Stuart Mill was the first to speak of natural 
monopolies in 1848,912 and the economic discussion about the definition, scope and regulatory 
attitudes, as well as the performance issues towards natural monopoly has evolved for over a 
hundred years.913 The natural monopoly rationale for and the consequences of price and entry 
regulation came under attack from academic research and policy makers. Eventually, only a 
few sectors, such as electric power and gas distribution, water and telecommunication industry, 
have continued to have natural monopoly characteristics and are subject to price and entry 
regulation. 
 
Joskow has concluded a range of questions that economists have raised to test and evaluate 
natural monopoly segments:  
 
What is the most efficient number of sellers (firms) to supply a particular good or 
service given firm cost characteristics and market demand characteristics? What are the 
firm production or cost characteristics and market demand characteristics that lead 
some industries “naturally” to evolve to a point where there is a single supplier (a 
monopoly) or a very small number of suppliers? If an industry has “a tendency to 
monopoly” what are the potential economic performance problems that may result and 
                                                 
911 Paul L Joskow, ‘Regulation of Natural Monopoly’ (2007) 2 Handbook of law and economics 1227. 
912 William W Sharkey, ‘The Theory of Natural Monopoly’ (1982) Cambridge University Press 14. 
913 See generally Edward D Lowry, ‘Justification for Regulation: the Case for Natural Monopoly’ (1973) 28 Public 
Utilities Fortnightly 1; Sharkey (n 912); Charles F Philips Jr, ‘The Regulation of Public Utilities: Theory and 
Practice’ (1984) Arlington, VA: Public Utilities Reports; Alfred Edward Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: 
Principles and Institutions, vol 1 (Mit Press 1988); Richard Schmalensee, The control of natural monopolies (Free 
Press 1979) Lexington, MA: Lexington Books; Baumol WJ Bailey EE and RD Willig, ‘Weak Invisible Hand 
Theorems on the Sustainability of Prices in a Multi-Product Monopoly’ (1977) 67 American Economic Review 
350.   
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how do we measure their social costs? When is government regulation justified in the 
presence of natural monopoly and how can it best be designed to mitigate the 
performance problems of concern’?914  
 
These questions can be used to assess whether GRP is natural monopoly. If it is, what are the 
natural monopoly characteristics that make it a natural monopoly? How should this industry be 
regulated and how is government regulation justified, and how can the regulation best be 
designed to mitigate the performance problems of concern?  
 
From a cost-efficient and market demand point of view, the most efficient number of firms to 
supply a copyrights information system is one – the one-stop-shop for blanket music copyrights 
licensing worldwide.915 If there were two or more GRDs to provide such a database instead of 
one, from the economic analysis perspective the producing and distributing costs would rise. 
Then, this single firm in the music market would be a  natural monopoly.916 As discussed earlier 
in section 5, a GRP can provide a blanket licence which incorporates a uniform pricing structure. 
Under a blanket licence, the licensee is granted access to a large repertoire of works and the 
licensing terms and conditions and pricing are identical for all works, including foreign works, 
covered by the licence. No differential treatment of the works takes place although market 
conditions might warrant a higher price for popular works than for less popular works.917 As 
discussed in section 5, a blanket licence is often advocated as a solution to many copyright 
licensing and enforcement problems, eg it is the most efficient method for licensing, monitoring 
and enforcing copyrights.918 The larger the repertoire is, the more efficient the administration 
would be. Hence, the extreme case is that CCM is served by a single repertoire.  
 
                                                 
914 Joskow (n 911) 1227. 
915 See section 5. 
916 “When total production costs would rise if two or more firms produced instead of one, the single firm in a 
market is called a “natural monopoly.” This formula is presented by Carlotn and Perloff, see Dennis W Carlton 
and Jeffrey M Perloff, ‘Modern Industrial Organization’ (2005) 104.  
917 Herman Cohen Jehoram, ‘The Future of Copyright Collecting Societies’ (2001) 23 European Intellectual 
Property Review 134; Christian Handke and Ruth Towse, ‘Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies’ (2008) 
38 IIC 937. 
918 Katz (n 341). 
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Kahn refers to both economies of scale and the presence of sunk or fixed costs that are a large 
fraction of total costs.919 These attributes lead to destructive competition. In turn, the outcome 
is, that naturally, only a single firm or a very small number of firms remain in the market in 
the long run. He also recognises the potential social costs of duplicated facilities when there 
are economies of scale or related cost-side economic attributes that lead single firm production 
to be less costly than multiple firm production.920 Therefore, the GRP has natural monopoly 
characteristics of both economies of scale and the presence of sunk or fixed costs. These costs 
are a large fraction of total costs that no single music repertoire or even collaboration between 
stakeholders can afford.921  These attributes determine that the music licensing industry is 
ruinous competition922, which lead to monopoly naturally. 
 
A natural monopoly happens when large-scale infrastructure, such as cables and grids for 
electricity supply, pipelines for gas and water supply, and networks for rail and underground, 
which are supposed to be extremely high fixed costs, is required to ensure supply.923 In this 
case, it is optimal to have a single firm to supply goods or services for market demand because 
it is less costly to produce any level of output of this product within a single firm than with two 
or more, because increased numbers of competitors lead to some loss of scale efficiencies.924 
It is more efficient to allow only one firm to supply to the market because allowing competition 
would mean a wasteful duplication of resources.925 This would be the case for the GRP. If there 
is more than one database, it will be uneconomic for all stakeholders to participate in the 
licensing activities. Accordingly, it is believed that the law should not try to impose 
competition on natural monopolies since competition would endanger the efficiencies 
produced by the natural monopoly.926  
 
                                                 
919 See Kahn (n 913). 
920 Ibid. 
921 This is one of the reasons lead to the failure of the GRD. See Milosic (n 830). 
922 Carl Kaysen, Antitrust Policy: An Economic And Legal Analysis [By] Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959) 191, 195-96.  
923 S Ran Kim and A Horn, Regulation Policies Concerning Natural Monopolies in Developing and Transition 
Economies (Citeseer 1999) DESA Discussion Paper No.8. 
924 Joskow (n 911); Katz (n 341). 
925 Sharkey (n 912). 
926 Drexl and others (n 64). 
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Nevertheless, the law should regulate the monopoly by addressing its anti-competitive effects 
and, more specifically act against abuse of the market dominance of CMOs. 927 As to the 
administrative regulation of prices, entry, and other aspects of firm behaviour have been 
utilised extensively in the US and other countries as policy instruments to deal with real or 
imagined natural monopoly problems. Joskow suggests that an imperfectly regulated market is 
better than an imperfectly unregulated market. A natural monopoly segment needs regulatory 
rules to regulate access, pricing and performance behaviour since regulated networks continue 
to be an essential platform to support efficient competition.928  
 
Indeed, natural monopoly does not mean non-competition. The efficiency and behaviour of a 
monopolistic organisation, whether private or public, depends much on the framework in which 
it operates, and especially on the existence of performance-enhancing incentives and 
penalties. 929  Thus, the design of regulation is essential. The question of which specific 
approaches and underpinning theories need to be applied is the crux of the matter when 
designing natural monopoly regulation policy. The monopolistic organisation should be 
motivated by productivity and growth since these objectives are more important for the 
sustainable development of the organisation.930 In order to do this, the spirit of distributional 
fairness for maintaining sustainable development should be embodied into the regulatory 
policy. Likewise, taking all different stakeholders’ interests into consideration to strike a fair 
balance between them, and ultimately fulfilling distributional fairness should be the goal of the 
GRP rather than simply focusing on efficiency, economy, or competition. To achieve this goal, 
there are several approaches, and one possibility is to retain the monopoly but to create 
competition between companies for the right of exclusive supply over a limited period.931 
When competition is impossible within the market, this solution offering the right to be the 
natural monopolist may be an adequate substitute under some circumstances. 932  In this 
hypothetical situation, the right of monopoly is, in fact, a contract between governmental 
                                                 
927 ibid. 
928 Joskow (n 911). 
929 Kim and Horn (n 923). 
930 ibid. 
931 This has been formalized as Demsetz-competition. See Kim and Horn (n 923). 
932 As to the circumstances, see below the analysis of the case BMI v. CBS. 
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authority and the organisation. They may be selected by auction as the exclusive provider with 
some terms and conditions, such as lowest price to consumers, and allowance to government 
to extract part of the monopoly rents for the benefit of the consumers. 933  Hence, natural 
monopoly needs a well-designed supervision system for maintaining productivity and growth. 
 
Therefore, the embodied theory934 and the goal of regulation935 which underpin the regulatory 
framework are of fundamental importance to determine whether a configuration of distribution 
of copyrights is just or not. The goal of copyright regulation is to fulfil distributional justice. It 
is important to keep in mind that the objective of natural monopoly of CMOs, in particular the 
GRP, is the sufficient and sustainable provision of the services of CCM in musical works. This 
objective is for achieving the ultimate goal of copyright law to fulfil distributive justice. 
 
6.5.2.3 Common Objectives of Competition Law and Natural Monopoly 
It is generally assumed that copyright law and competition law tend to conflict because 
competition law basically proscribes the abuse of monopoly power, while the purpose of 
copyrights is to grant legal monopolies, although limited ones.936 This view overlooks the fact 
that both of them have the common goal of promoting innovation and social welfare.937 As the 
famous US case of Broadcast Music Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. (hereafter 
BMI v. CBS),938 which was based on economic realities rather than on rigid legal doctrine, held 
that the practice of blanket licensing is not per se illegal. Yet, it did not rule that it was legal 
either. It highlighted that it is more appropriate to weigh the benefits of the considerable 
efficiencies and the blanket licences issued by CMOs under the rule of reason,939 which means 
                                                 
933 Antony W Dnes, ‘Franchising and Privatization’ (1995) 40 Public Policy for the Private Sector 5; Ronald R 
Braeutigam, ‘Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies’ (1989) 2 Handbook of industrial organization 1289; Pierre 
Guislain, The Privatization Challenge: A Strategic, Legal, And Institutional Analysis of International Experience 
(World Bank Publications 1997).  
934 A multi-objective theory – ensuring interactive multi-function named economic, social and cultural functions 
– of copyright law underpinned by Rawls’s theory of justice is proposed.  
935 As a pillar of the copyright legal framework, the proposed regulation aims to standardise JMOs’ operational 
activities in a way consisted to the goal of copyright law that is to struck a real balance between different interests 
at stake, and ultimately fulfil copyright justice. 
936 Katz (n 341). 
937 Werra (n 61). 




that the appropriateness of blanket authorisation for CCM should be read under particular 
circumstances. This point has been specifically acknowledged in subsequent decisions.940 
Therefore, this raised a question about under what circumstances the blanket licensing is 
allowed. 
 
The purpose of competition law is to ‘protect the public interest in competition by prohibiting 
acts that exclude competitors from the market-place or restrict output and raise prices so as to 
harm consumer welfare.’941 In most jurisdictions, the basic objectives of competition policy 
are to maintain and encourage the process of competition in order to ‘promote efficient use of 
resources while protecting the freedom of economic action of various market participants’.942 
These objectives are not in conflict with the goal of discussing copyright licensing law. The 
multiple functions of copyright licensing regulation are: to equally protect various 
rightsholders’ economic interests, especially small rightsholders; encourage small repertoires’ 
licensing activities; prevent the dominant position of large rightsholders’ licensing activities; 
promote the free cross-border flow of musical works; preserve cultural diversity; protect users’ 
interests, social welfare, and the interests of the public at large. Thus, when competition law 
objectives are applied in the context of copyright law, the negative conditions should be 
explained as limitations or disturbances to the potential uses of copyrighted works which will 
be harmful to a competitive market, are not allowed. That is to say when the blanket licensing 
behaviour is not harmful to a competitive market, blanket licenses are allowed. 
 
Undoubtedly, by the very meaning of natural monopolies, the purpose is to promote the 
efficient use of resources to increase economic interests for stakeholders. As to the objective 
of “protecting the freedom of economic action of various market participants”, natural 
monopolies do not necessarily mean it would exclude some market participants. As discussed 
in the last section, the market participants of the GRD would include registered users including 
                                                 
940 See Broadcast Music v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Ent. Services 746 F Supp 320 [1990] (Dist. Court, SD New York). 
941 Pamela Samuelson and Kurt Opsahl, ‘Licensing Information in the Global Information Market: Freedom of 
Contract Meets Public Policy’ (1999) 21 European Intellectual Property Review 386. 
942 R Shyam Khemani, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy (World 
Bank Publications 1999) 8. 
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publishers, creators, record companies, performers and various CMOs, and numerous users 
including ISPs who provide different online music services. One of the core objectives of GRD 
is to provide authoritative and comprehensive data which will be openly accessible for all 
stakeholders which will be supposed to benefit all stakeholders. Therefore, after a careful 
examination of the objectives of both competition law and natural monopoly of CMOs, it can 
be concluded that they are not necessarily contradictory as imagined. In fact, they can coexist 
under a well-designed regulation with a sound supervisory mechanism which will be discussed 
further in the following section.  
 
6.5.2.4 Possible Monopolistic Abuse 
One of the possible performance problems is that a natural monopolistic organisation would 
abuse its monopolistic position. The focus of this section is how the regulatory rules should be 
best designed to mitigate such a problem. Natural monopolies are de facto monopolies. It is 
necessary to consider whether the single supplier of JCM services in musical works would be 
beneficial for all stakeholders and the society at large in a just way. The abuse of a dominant 
position may particularly harm the interests of individual right-holder members, small CMOs 
and users. Like IMEs, CMOs have also gained substantial market power, thereby restricting 
competitors which might lead to the abuse of such market power.943  
 
Theoretically, CMOs may abuse the monopolistic position by setting tariffs and imposing other 
licensing conditions in an arbitrary way. Watt believes that public supervision and regulation 
of a natural monopoly such as a CMO would promote efficiency.944 Economic arguments for 
regulating CMOs include the need to limit the market power of monopolistic societies vis-à-
vis users as well as new members.945 The monopolistic abuse of a dominant position not only 
exists among individual members but also small repertories. When a competitive free market 
                                                 
943 P Sean Morris, ‘The Reform of Article 82 and the Operation of Competition Principles Upon the Normal 
Trading Functions of Copyright Collecting Societies’ (2009) 4 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 
566. For example, a recent paper raises the issue of market power of collecting societies for musical rights, see F 
Jenny, ‘EC Competition Law Enforcement and Collecting Societies for Music Rights: What Are We Aiming for?’ 
EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings (Brussels, 2005).   
944 See Watt (n 54). ‘Collective administration is an example of a natural monopoly so that unregulated markets 
are unlikely to bring up socially efficient solutions.’ 
945 Besen, Kirby, and Salop (n 340). 
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is opened between all CMOs, the consequence of such a policy may well be that only a very 
few, most likely the currently most powerful, CMOs would be able to grant a blanket licence, 
and then small CMOs would be pushed out of the market. 946 The smaller CMOs could hardly 
win this competition due to their smaller repertoire and general operational costs. The bigger 
CMOs, with their high-volume income, large reserves and cross-financing possibilities, can 
more easily operate even under the objectively necessary cost level.947  
 
In addition, monopolistic abuse also harms users’ interests. Theoretically, such monopolies can 
exploit their market power vis-à-vis music users, and set licensing terms and conditions, and 
their prices in order to maximize their revenue without any competitive restraints.948 The 
common argument is that CMOs do result in higher and monopolistic prices compared to those 
charged in a competitive market; yet such higher prices are dynamically efficient. 949 
Proponents of collective management, however, usually argue that CMOs are justified because 
the efficiencies that they create ultimately lead to lower, not higher, prices, and this is what 
makes them efficient.  
 
Though the role of CMOs has grown to include the fight against piracy, fulfilment of social 
and cultural functions, and copyright compliance,
 
the regional system for some CMOs has been 
labelled as outdated with numerous inefficiencies caused by the ‘arcane organisation of 
copyright payments’. 950  In practice, EU and US musicians are not satisfied with the 
performance of CMOs, which have been criticised as not representing their true voices.951 In 
China, musicians have also complained that they have lost control of their works once they 
assigned the copyrights of their creative works.952 Musicians in China are not willing to join 
                                                 
946 Drexl and others (n 64). 
947 Peter Gyertyanfy, ‘Collective management of music rights in Europe after the CISAC decision’ (2010) 41 IIC 
International review of industrial property and copyright law 59. 
948 Katz (n 341). 
949 ibid. 
950 ibid. 
951 CMOs have frustrated artists because they target file-sharers, even kids sharing cultural works with friends in 
name of songwriters which is contradicted with musicians’ intentions. See Reda (n 258). 
952 CBICE, Musicians worrying the new copyright law will be protective to CMOs and creators would lose their 
saying on their works, available at <http://portal.cbice.com/article/41/50/201207/20120700030098.shtml> 
accessed 15 February 2017. 
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any CMO and they believe CMOs plunder their creative works. The current copyright licensing 
system has been so over commercialised that CMOs have been over concerned about the music 
business that they have not performed their social-cultural obligation as written in copyright 
law.953 The current system does not encourage creativity. CMOs can exploit their power against 
individual members by refusing to license certain uses without any valid reason, or discriminate 
against some members.954 Hence, the monopolistic position needs to be regulated. 
 
To sum up, it is not appropriate to simply lock members up to CMOs by political policies like 
non-voluntary collective management, while keep disappointing rightsholders by poor 
performance. Rather, rightsholders and other members should be given the freedom to choose 
to entrust or withdraw their rights from CMOs. The global copyrights licensing practice 
facilitated by the GRP would attract stakeholders to join CMOs. The efficiency and justifiable 
behaviour of a monopolistic enterprise, whether private or public, depends much on the 
framework in which it operates, and especially on the existence of well-designed regulation 
with performance-enhancing incentives and penalties.  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
In addition to the multi-objective hard-law approach based on the proposed theoretical 
framework, the governance of JMOs also has to be improved to standardise JCM in musical 
works. From the experience of GRD, it seems that global copyright management in musical 
works is an impossible mission. After investigating the problems that lead to the failure of the 
former GRD and justifying the existence to reshape the proposed GRP, it appears that the idea 
of global regulatory framework on JCM in musical works is feasible and essential, although 
there are some obstacles and challenges for establishing a central information point for 
simplifying the current licensing practice. The first attempt of the GRD has failed, but a global 
database is still the best system to pursue. The proposed GRP is expected to improve the 
transparency and efficiency of distribution of royalties by providing accurate licensing data in 
musical works worldwide in the digital era which would be accessible online to the public as 
                                                 
953 See generally Street (n 476); Dietz, ‘Cultural Functions of Collecting Societies’ (n 461); Nérisson (n 48). 
954 See Katz (n 341). 
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requested at any time and any place. In doing so, CMOs’ management service would be 
expected to improve by the common infrastructure of GRP. This hypothetical outcome would 
benefit not only rightsholders, in particular small rightsholders, but also users (both commercial 
and non-commercial users would benefit from it), licensees, publishers, producers, individual 
CMOs, and the society as a whole would also benefit from their social-cultural functions. 
Accordingly, CMOs would attract more rightsholders to join in. However, the current scenario 
is that it is difficult to access copyright licensing information, and licensing practice is 
inefficient, especially for foreign works, due to many barriers to the free cross-border flow of 
copyrighted works.  
 
The barriers to establish the GRP are mainly from legal obstacles, administrative level issues, 
and technological difficulties. Due to the various national legal traditions, countries have many 
different attitudes towards CMOs as well as relevant policies. From the legal obstacles level, 
the harmonisation of some aspects of copyright licensing policy at the international level would 
be a far more complex mission, even in this one sector, the music sector, since nearly every 
territory has a different revenue collecting system. Two core legal issues have been discussed 
for the preparation to establish the legal framework for global JCM. The first one is the 
principle of prohibition of formalities. Based on the analysis of Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention it finds that the requirement of registration of information by CMOs to establish a 
global repertoire database is Berne compliant. As long as the formalities do not affect the 
“enjoyment” and “exercise” of copyrights, it is suggested to reintroduce formalities to GRP. 
The second one is natural monopoly. It is generally assumed that copyright law and competition 
law tend to conflict. Nevertheless, after a careful examination of the natural monopoly theory 
and applying it to CCM, it can be concluded that the goal of natural monopoly is consistent 
with the objectives of competition law, as long as a well-designed regulation comes into 
existence. 
 
The GRD has failed but a global licensing system is still necessary and imperative. This paper 
offers an alternative justification by applying Rawls’s theory of justiceto establish a reshaped 
GRP. Rawls’s theory of justicehas been chosen because it provides a better explanation to 
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copyright law, in particular for configuring a just institution of global JCM. This central 
platform is a prerequisite for the transparency and efficiency of the performance of JMOs. 
Cooperation between different repertoires through the creation and exploitation of a common 
database is crucial for avoiding the problems raised by segmented licensing repertoires. Apart 
from registering and keeping track of performances to avoid duplication on the documentation 
side for improving licensing efficiency and users’ convenience, 955  this platform should 
function to achieve the multi-objective of JMOs under a balanced and fairer copyright legal 
framework, and ultimately fulfil copyright justice. 
 
  
                                                 




Chapter 7 – Discussion and Conclusions  
 
7.1 Introduction  
In this final chapter, the main research findings with regard to the research questions will be 
recapitulated and summarised. And then, some essential implications and contributions of this 
study will be presented in section 7.3. Section 7.4 will discuss on the relationship between the 
present research and existing studies, discussing about how the research gaps identified in 
literature review have been filled by it and pointing out the difference of researching focuses 
between them. Furthermore, section 7.5 will reflect on the limitations of and possible criticism 
to this thesis. At last, sections 7.6 will critically evaluate this thesis and draw on which to 
recommend some possible topics for future research.  
 
7.2 Recapitulation of Purpose and Findings  
As to the question presented in the chapter of introduction: do we need copyright law or not, 
the answer is yes, we need; however, the most imperative issue regarding copyrights in musical 
works is that we need a more just legal framework to facilitate and regulate global joint 
copyrights management in musical works in digital era. The role of copyright law is to serve 
as a legitimate base to receive revenues, and to promote the legal exploitation of copyrighted 
works, usually in a commercial way. The authorisation of copyright or monetary rewards are 
not the motivation of re-creation. Rather, innate non-monetary motivation drives people to 
create. In the music industry, particularly in digital era, there are many people involved in the 
music business chain from production to consumption. They are not only creators and users, 
but also many investors, JMOs and other types of organisations. Music creators are artists who 
usually do not have business talents. Some of them, therefore, join CMOs to manage the 
copyrights of their works. However, more others choose to assign whole or part copyrights to 
IMEs who are professional business investors. From the point view of generating more 
revenues, IMEs are highly professionals who invest time and money into music business. For 
example, they provide professional music recording facilities, commercial advertising, 
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marketing, distribution, artists training, and other business affairs. Due to the development of 
social division of labour, IMEs came into existence and have been playing important roles in 
copyrights licensing and management and dissemination of musical works. They are more 
trustworthy among music creators compared to CMOs since they commercialise musical works 
and generate more revenues. However, when too many investors are involved in the business 
chain without a common legal institution to standardise their behaviours, winner-take-all 
phenomenon occurs. Investors take away most of the profits by licensing contracts although 
they are not the person who creates the works. In addition, IMEs do not have the obligations 
and burdens to fulfil social-cultural functions usually through different social and cultural 
schemes and fulfilled by some CMOs. In such an unfair licensing market, CMOs are facing the 
threat of being competed out by IMEs. Unregulated copyright licensing activities cause the 
problem of imbalance. Therefore, a harmonised copyright legal framework is needed to 
regulate JMOs’ licensing activities in musical works, by which to rebalance the competing 
interests and facilitate the cross-border flow of musical works. 
 
The imbalance of copyright interests is not only reflected in the distribution of economic 
revenues between different rightsholders, but also exists in the aspects of public interests and 
cultural justice. Unlike the exclusive rights, copyright legal system does not provide concrete 
provisions to protect public interest. Although international treaties do provide the three-step 
test criteria, some countries have implemented as LEs in their domestic copyright law system, 
the tradition and preference of LEs stipulations vary dramatically all across the world. And LEs 
are not respected that they are usually overridden by copyright contracts or other means. There 
is a lack of harmonised predictable LEs system at the global level. In the digital environment, 
the scope of public interest has been broadened by the internet. Since the social welfare between 
developed and developing countries interacts with each other, it is necessary to establish an 
international online social welfare scheme. This important role is played by libraries who are 
the custodians of public interest and represent the majority of public users. However, the 
current international treaties do not explicitly entrench library exceptions so that member 
countries have very different attitudes toward this sector. Therefore, it is imperative to establish 
mandatory library exceptions for facilitating access by lawful users.  
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Additionally, the cultural value of musical works has not drawn too much attention among 
scholars and legislators. Unpopular musical works and small repertoires have been excluded 
by the competition of music market. Users’ accessibility to musical works have not been fully 
ensured. The process of globalisation and McDonaldisation has become a hurdle to fulfil the 
objective of cultural diversity, which is also jeopardising the creation and production of high 
quality musical works since the re-creation of cultural goods depends on a flourish public 
domain. From the cultural diversity perspective, cultural imbalance is another problem facing 
modern copyright legal framework. 
 
Through the examination of existing copyright theories, it finds that the classic theories are 
failed to provide a morally accepted justification for designing a balanced copyright law. 
Differently, Rawls’s theory of justice can be perfectly applied to justify the interests of the least 
advantaged groups, and accordingly adopted to design a truly balanced copyright legal 
framework. The law crystallised by Rawls’s work is not so much concerned with the reward 
or desert of the talented person, but with the achievement of justice for all, in particular to 
benefit the worst well-off. Based on the analysis of the difference principle it finds that, first, 
the scheme of JMOs needs to pay more attention to economic fairness rather than economic 
efficiency. The model of CMOs can pass the assessment test of the difference principle if they 
meet some conditions, such as mandatory licensing and social-cultural obligations, while IMEs 
do not. IMEs’ copyright licensing activities have to be reformed and regulated by a harmonised 
copyright legal system. Second, Rawls’s theory can perfectly justify users’ rights for the 
purposes of education and research as one of the social objectives of copyright. The deduction 
for the purpose of education is to improve the long-term expectation of the lease off. This 
justification optimally solves the problem of inconsistency between the rationales of LEs 
existing across member countries. Third, according to the first principle, people in a society 
enjoy cultural justice which includes at least equality of cultural expression, equitable access, 
and more importantly, equal recognition of the dignity of and respect for all cultures. In digital 
environment, since all cultural assets are able to freely flow across-borders and copyrights can 
be easily managed, licensed, and exploited internationally, net-users enjoy universal cultural 
justice by means of the internet. To fulfil the objective of cultural justice, JMOs should play 
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their roles to embrace as many as possible musical works from all over the world into the 
repertoire, and at the same time ensure the end-users’ rights to access all the musical works. 
 
It has to note that Rawls’s theory should be applied in a general way to guide, evaluate, and 
assess the designation of the copyright legal framework. To fulfil copyright justice between 
stakeholders in musical works, the triple-objective of the copyright legal system has been 
formulated as a part of this theoretical framework. Through the analysis of the multiple values 
of cultural goods, it finds that the multiple values of musical goods are separate, independent 
but also interact with and impact on each other. Copyright legal system has a mission to 
increase the triple values of musical goods. Hence, the copyright legal framework in musical 
works should have multiple instead of singular objectives. The multiple objectives – economic 
fairness, social justice and cultural diversity – should be codified into the copyright legal 
framework. JMOs are the main organisations playing the role of fulfilling the multiple 
objectives of copyright. In the last chapter, it has also demonstrated that the idea of global 
regulatory framework on JCM in musical works is feasible and essential, although there are 
some obstacles and challenges for establishing a central information point for simplifying the 
current licensing practice.  
 
7.3 Implications of The Main Research Findings 
The practical proposal of GRP is underpinned by a solid theoretical foundation which has been 
sufficiently elaborated and demonstrated. The elaboration of this theoretical framework is 
based on Rawls’s theory of justice which offers an ethical perspective to analyse the issues of 
imbalance of interests caused by copyright licensing activities. Rawls’s work provides 
powerful explanation of copyright theory based on which to build a fairer social institution of 
JCM at both national and the global level. The challenging problem of copyright imbalance 
has been discussed among scholars for decades. However, researches on relevant issues are 
scattered and failed to correct the unbalanced copyright law. Copyright law based on those 
classic copyright theories have been criticised as too protective to rightsholders, and users’ 
interests have been neglected. Although international copyright treaties have provided the 
criteria of “three-step test” for national legislators to establish domestic copyright LEs system, 
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which have been implemented in some countries, the requirements of LEs have not been fully 
respected in copyright practice. With the advent of digital era, the issue of unbalanced 
copyright interests has been worsened due the rapid and sometimes uncontrollable flow of 
musical works. And the imbalance is reflected on multiple aspects – economic interests 
between different rightsholders of musical works; interests between rightsholders and music-
users; cultural rights of small rightsholders and repertoires and of music-users to access to 
musical works. The systematic analysis of the main factors causing the imbalance from a multi-
facet perspective is different from traditional discussions. This is partly due to the special nature 
of musical goods. Musical goods are economic goods, but they are also cultural goods. The 
multiple values – economic, social and cultural values – interact with and impact on each other. 
To increase the multi-value of musical goods, it has to fortify their economic, social and 
cultural capitals at the same time. A true balance of copyright interests at stake and the 
prosperous repertoire of musical works rely on the simultaneous fulfilment of the multiple 
objectives. This finding is fundamentally different from traditional views of one-sided stress 
on copyrights from economic perspective or copyright LEs from the view of public interest. 
 
At the global level, few scholars have touched this complex area due to the nature of this topic. 
Global copyrights licensing of musical works causes a wide range of legal issues, including 
private international law, copyright contract, copyright infringement, diverse national 
provisions of LEs. Additionally, there is another issue of balance within copyright licensing at 
the global level, which is called international and domestic balance. The issues such as 
unbalanced economic revenues between music repertoires from different countries, whether 
music-users enjoy public interests, and how to improve cultural diversity through the GRP, 
have been seldom discussed before but have been researched in this study. The application of 
Rawls’s work to justify small JMOs’ economic interests, international public interests, and 
cultural justice at the global level is another important innovation and achievement of this thesis. 
The new view of international balance has been rarely discussed. However, this legal issue 
becomes increasingly important in the digital era when international copyright licensing in 




The innovative application of Rawls’s theory of justice to assess and design the global joint 
copyrights management legal framework, would hopefully provide a new perspective for 
copyright theory debate for improving the proposed theoretical framework. In this thesis, there 
are several theory innovations, including economic fairness by Rawlsian analysis, international 
public interests, copyright users’ rights, global LEs system, cultural justice, multiple objective 
theoretical framework. By proposing the GRP and sufficient demonstration of its feasibility 
and essentiality, this study would contribute to the global copyrights licensing practice in 
musical works. From the perspective of black law analysis, this research would also provide 
doctrinal suggestions, such as harmonised conflict of law rules for dealing with international 
copyright contract disputes. The harmonization of the rules of conflict of laws is necessary 
because the present network of international conventions does not provide a complete set of 
tools for resolving such conflicts.956 Private international law is one of the hurdles of the free 
cross-border flow of musical works.957 International commercial copyright licensing activities 
call for independent, uniform and predictable conflict of law rules for balancing small 
rightsholders’ economic interests nationally and internationally; and facilitating the free cross-
border flow of musical works. The uncertainty and unpredictable rules have caused 
economically and timely inefficiency for individual rightsholders, especially for foreign 
rightsholders.  
 
7.4 Relationship with Previous Research 
Existing researches claim to balance interest; however, they are failed to provide morally 
accepted theory or enforceable measures to strike a real balance between competing interests. 
Most of them claim that the balance between copyrights and users’ rights is extremely hard to 
strike and believe that the discretion of specific cases still goes to judges.958 Economic analysis 
of copyright has paid sufficient attention to its economic justification that JCM is justified 
because of economic efficiency in copyrights management. The issues such as how JMOs’ 
economic function affects the fairness and how to maintain the balance between different types 
                                                 
956 Dessemontet (n 664). 
957 See section 4.2.2. 
958 Geiger, ‘The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics can Influence the Shape and Use 
of IP Law’ (n 7). 
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of rightsholders. In addition, the study on the cultural function of copyrights has been extremely 
scarce, particularly in musical works. Copyright studies on the three balances are scattered. 
This thesis provides a systematic analysis of the three balances of copyrights in musical works, 
intending to demonstrate their dynamic relations of the triple copyright balances and propose 
a triple objective theoretical framework for global copyrights management in musical works. 
 
The existing studies of the different copyright topics regarding the economic, social and 
cultural functions of JMOs, are usually based on different IP theories. For example, there are 
utilitarianism, natural rights such as Locke’s labour theory and personality theory, social 
planning, and economic analysis to justify copyright’s economic rights or moral rights; legal 
doctrines (eg fair dealing and fair use) and principles (eg including fundamental rights, general 
interests, and public interests) to justify copyright LEs; cultural theory 959  or principle of 
cultural diversity to justify copyright. It is a paradox that copyright subjects are justified by 
omnifarious theories within a common copyright system. Whereas, as discussed in this thesis, 
Rawls’s theory of justice can be perfectly adopted to justify the whole copyright legal system 
in a unified way. Rawls’s principles focus on the least advantaged group by which to benefit 
everyone of the society since social, legal and political institutions are arrange in a social 
cooperation system. Accordingly, least advantaged group can be identified from different 
perspective of analysis, as long as Rawls’s two principles have been strictly applied. In this 
system, all copyright resources would be efficiently, and more importantly fairly, distributed 
among stakeholders. This unified copyright theory for the legal framework of global joint 
copyrights management would benefit the harmonisation of national copyright legal systems 
and accordingly benefit the cross-border flow of musical works.  
 
There is an unbalanced research trend in existing literature within the area of joint management 
of copyrights. A wide range of excellent research has been conducted from the perspective of 
economic analysis; and along with the development of new models of copyright licensing in 
                                                 
959 See Julie E. Cohen, ‘Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory Symposium: Intellectual Property and Social 
Justice: Copyright, Creativity, Catalogs’ (2006) 40 UC Davis L Rev 1151. (It contends that ‘human nature causes 
people to flourish more under some conditions than under others, and that social and political institutions should 
be organized to facilitate that flourishing’). 
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practice, economic analysis has been developed further to explore the economic functions of 
IMEs. This thesis has highlighted the equal importance of the three functions of JMOs. 
Research on CCM at national and regional level has been sufficient. However, this thesis 
discusses JCM at the global level which hopefully direct the debate into a new trend. This is 
because in copyright licensing practice in musical works, IMEs become increasingly important 
but less examined and discussed, particularly in a comparison way to CMOs. 
 
7.5 Limitations of The Research  
It may appear that the attitude of this thesis towards IMEs is slightly harsh, but it has to note 
that IMEs are important and popular JMOs who are managing copyrights in musical works and 
generate profits for creators and other rightsholders. They are professional merchants. Music 
creators need IMEs to manage their works in a commercial way since artists usually lack of 
such business talents and resources. The argument in this research is that the distribution of 
aggregated copyright revenues from music industry should be fair between creators and other 
types of rightsholders. This has been discussed in the chapter of economic fairness. However, 
since IMEs have their own nature and features that are different from CMOs, with regard to 
the detailed regulation on IMEs it has to investigate the legal issues existing in practice. Thus, 
empirical research in practice should be necessary prior to detailed discussion in this area.  
 
From the perspective of methodology, this thesis intends to adopt a mix-method methodology 
to analyse different legal issues where is needed and relevant. With respect to the comparative 
method utilised to compare differences or similarities of copyright laws from different 
countries and jurisdictions, it may appear not sufficiently discussed occasionally. For example, 
when discuss about the nature of CMOs across EU countries and LEs’ rationales from global 
countries, the analysis may be not deep enough in these areas. Due to the infinite nature of LEs, 
it is impossible to analyse each type of them in this thesis. Therefore, the study has formulated 
the framework where the objective of social justice can be used to assess whether a type of use 
is lawful use. Therefore, it has chosen one of the most important type of exception only - the 
uses for research, study and education purposes – to be analysed and justified as users’ rights 
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at international level. In the light of this analysis, future research could take this as a case-study 
to assess and evaluate other categories of LEs, and to enrich the research in this area. 
 
In addition, global information system required by the proposed GRP would be a technology-
demanding project. It requires high standard technology equipment. Hopefully, this technic 
problem would not be too challenging; or alternatively would be solved with the advancement 
of high-technology. 
 
7.6 Recommendation for Future Study 
The conducted theoretical framework – multi-objective system underpinned by Rawls’s justice 
theory, has been proved an appropriate theory to justify the copyright legal system. So, it would 
be suitable to adopt this theoretical framework for further study in other areas of IP law, for 
example patent law. Also, all the discussion has been defined within the copyright category of 
musical works. There are still many other categories of copyrights, such as literary works, 
dramatic works, painting works, movies, and other artistic works, could be examined according 
to this theoretical framework. In addition, this thesis discusses the copyright legal framework 
from the global level, so it touches only the tips of some national copyright laws. It would be 
interesting to see if this theoretical framework could be adopted to design a national copyright 
legal system, eg the UK or China’s copyright legal system, or a national IP legal system. This 
would require much more in-depth research though could provide interesting and practical 
results. It is recommended that these areas could be selected for further study to grow and 
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Directive 2014/26/EU on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-
territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market  
Article 13(4): Where the amounts due to rightholders cannot be distributed after three years 
from the end of the financial year in which the collection of the rights revenue occurred, and 
provided that the collective management organisation has taken all necessary measures to 
identify and locate the right-holders referred to in paragraph 3, those amounts shall be deemed 
non-distributable.  
Preamble 3: Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
requires the Union to take cultural diversity into account in its action and to contribute to the 
flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional 
diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. Collective 
management organisations play, and should continue to play, an important role as promoters 
of the diversity of cultural expression, both by enabling the smallest and less popular repertoires 
to access the market and by providing social, cultural and educational services for the benefit 
of their rightholders and the public.  
Preamble 44: Aggregating different music repertoires for multi-territorial licensing facilitates 
the licensing process and, by making all repertoires accessible to the market for multi-territorial 
licensing, enhances cultural diversity and contributes to reducing the number of transactions 
an online service provider needs in order to offer services. This aggregation of repertoires 
should facilitate the development of new online services, and should also result in a reduction 
of transaction costs being passed on to consumers. Therefore, collective management 
organisations that are not willing or not able to grant multi- territorial licences directly in their 
own music repertoire should be encouraged on a voluntary basis to mandate other collective 
management organisations to manage their repertoire on a non-discriminatory basis. 
Exclusivity in agreements on multi-territorial licences would restrict the choices available to 
users seeking multi-territorial licences and also restrict the choices available to collective 
management organisations seeking administration services for their repertoire on a multi-
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territorial basis. Therefore, all representation agreements between collective management 
organisations providing for multi-territorial licensing should be concluded on a non-exclusive 
basis.  
Preamble 46: It is also important to require any collective management organisations that offer 
or grant multi-territorial licences to agree to represent the repertoire of any collective 
management organisations that decide not to do so directly. To ensure that this requirement is 
not disproportionate and does not go beyond what is necessary, the requested collective 
management organisation should only be required to accept the representation if the request is 
limited to the online right or categories of online rights that it represents itself. Moreover, this 
requirement should only apply to collective management organisations which aggregate 
repertoire and should not extend to collective management organisations which provide multi-
territorial licences for their own repertoire only. Nor should it apply to collective management 
organisations which merely aggregate rights in the same works for the purpose of being able 
to license jointly both the right of reproduction and the right of communication to the public in 
respect of such works. To protect the interests of the rightholders of the mandating collective 
management organisation and to ensure that small and less well-known repertoires in Member 
States can access the internal market on equal terms, it is important that the repertoire of the 
mandating collective management organisation be managed on the same conditions as the 
repertoire of the mandated collective management organisation and that it is included in offers 
addressed by the mandated collective management organisation to online service providers. 
The management fee charged by the mandated collective management organisation should 
allow that organisation to recoup the necessary and reasonable investments incurred. Any 
agreement whereby a collective management organisation mandates another organisation or 
organisations to grant multi-territorial licences in its own music repertoire for online use should 
not prevent the first-mentioned collective management organisation from continuing to grant 
licences limited to the territory of the Member State where that organisation is established, in 
its own repertoire and in any other repertoire it may be authorised to represent in that territory. 
  
 
